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I. Introduction 
The first amendment has long protected a complex and interwoven 
range of individual interests. Protected freedoms often involve expressive 
activities-religion,1 speech,2 the press,J assembly,4 and association.5 
The first amendment also protects an individual's freedom to refrain 
from expressive activity. 
Two distinct kinds of liberty interest support the right to refrain 
from expressive activity. First, individuals have an interest in not being 
forced to reveal information about personal beliefs or associations. Such 
a claim may arise in a variety of contexts: a reporter may not wish to 
reveal the identity of news sources for fear of discouraging future revela­
tions;6 a public school teacher may not wish to reveal all organizations to 
which that teacher has belonged for fear of community hostility or loss of 
employment;7 or a litigant may seek to prevent disclosure of trade secrets 
or other private information8 through the discovery process. As a group, 
these cases are rightfully viewed as "compelled disclosure" cases. 
Second, individuals have an interest in not being forced to belong to 
any organization or to make any statements when they would rather be 
silent or express different views. Within this category fall the claims of 
schoolchildren compelled to recite the pledge of allegiance in violation of 
their own religious or political views,9 of school teachers compelled to 
sign an oath of loyalty to the Constitution as a condition of employ­
ment, 10 and of nonunion employees forced to pay service fees to support 
union activities with which they disagree. 11 As a group, the constitu­
tional obligations asserted in these three situations can be described as 
claims based on a first amendment protection for "intellectual 
1. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940). 
2. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring). 
3. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-14 (1931). 
4. See DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364 (1937). 
5. See NAACP v. Alabama ex ref. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958). 
6. See Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 667-71 (1972) (rejecting reporter's claim of a privi­
lege not to testify before a grand jury). 
7. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 482-87 (1960). 
8. See Cf. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 27, 33-34 (1984) (first amendment is 
not violated by issuance of a protective order prohibiting publication of membership information 
acquired through discovery process when publication would result in reprisals and harassment of 
members and contributors). 
9. See West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626-29 & n.2 (1943). 
10. See Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F. Supp. 339, aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 36 (1968). 
For further discussion of Knight, see infra text accompanying notes 91-95. 
11. See Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). For further discussion of Abood, 
see infra Part V. 
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individualism."12 
This Article focuses on the second group of "protected silence" in­
terests. It traces the history and development of such claims in the juris­
prudence of the first amendment through decades of sporadic Supreme 
Court attention. The Article explores how this distinct branch of first 
amendment doctrine relates to core free speech concepts and whether it 
is, as some have argued, a separate species appealing to a different range 
of interests than traditional free speech claims, 13 or, instead, a part of 
traditional fust amendment doctrine appealing to those same values.14 
The Article then discusses the development of the protection against 
compelled expression in Supreme Court decisions in the 1970s and early 
1980s. The aim of this inquiry is to determine whether later cases, taken 
together with earlier decisions, present a consistent and coherent doctri­
nal picture. To the extent that the later cases suggest the Court has 
taken a new turning-either consciously or inadvertently-the values 
motivating this doctrinal shift in focus are identified. The Article goes 
on to address cases from the 1983-1985 Supreme Court Terms to evalu­
ate whether the Court has found a methodologically consistent and doc­
trinally sound analysis. 
Finally, the Article concludes with a suggested judicial analysis for 
cases of this type. The proposed approach accommodates mainstream 
first amendment doctrine in analyzing claims of interference with the 
freedom from compelled expression or association. 
12. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641. One author characterizes these rights as negative rights. See 
Gaebler, First Amendment Protection Against Government Compelled Expression and Association, 23 
B.C.L. REv. 995, 996 (1982). This characterization is accurate only in the very limited sense that 
the individual subjected to government compulsion may wish to remain silent, instead of voicing the 
government-compelled message or disclosing information. The more typical first amendment situa­
tions are those in which the government attempts to prevent an individual who desires to engage in 
an affirmative act of expression from speaking or associating. In contrast, a person compelled to 
express an idea wishes to engage in a negative act by refusing to speak and in this narrow sense 
asserts a negative right. The negative rights characterization, however, is flawed for several reasons. 
First, the distinction between negative and affirmative rights has another meaning within the juris­
prndence of the first amendment. "Negative rights" are those limitations on government power that 
protect individual choices to speak or not to speak. "Affirmative rights" are the governmental obli­
gations to "promot[e] the system of freedom of expression." Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the 
First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795, 796 (1981). Second, the negative rights label is inaccurate 
because it is not always true that the individual desires not to speak. Instead, the individual is 
rejecting the government-compelled speech in favor of either silence or of voicing some different 
message. Moreover, if one chooses to remain silent, the desire not to speak may in and of itself be 
identified by the individual as expressing a viewpoint or attitude. For example, refusing to salute the 
flag is an act communicating a definite meaning. Thus, the term "intellectual individualism" has 
been chosen as more evocative terminology. 
13. Gaebler, supra note 12, at 1004-06. 
14. "Belief is not, strictly speaking, expression; yet it is so closely related that the safeguarding 
of the right to hold beliefs is essential in maintaining a system of freedom of expression . . . . The 
attempt to coerce belief is ... one of the most destructive forms of restricting expression." Emerson, 
Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 919 (1963). 
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II. Judicial Recognition of the Coerced Expression Issue 
A. The Flag Salute Cases 
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 15 was the first 
Supreme Court decision establishing that the free speech guarantee also 
secures the right to remain silent in the face of a government effort to 
coerce expression. Barnette arose out of a challenge to a resolution 
adopted by the West Virginia Board of Education one month after the 
start of World War II. The resolution required public schools to include 
a mandatory flag salute and the pledge of allegiance as part of their daily 
educational programs; all teachers and pupils were required to partici­
pate.16 Any pupil refusing to take part was deemed guilty of insubordi­
nation and could be expelled from school as a consequence. In addition, 
after the students had been expelled, the state could bring delinquency 
proceedings and subject the parents to prosecution.17 The flag salute cer­
emony was therefore an instrument to coerce not only school children, 
but also their parents. 
A suit was brought challenging the constitutionality of the Board of 
Education resolution six months after its enactment. The challengers, 
three Jehovah's Witnesses who were parents of public school students, 
claimed that the ceremony violated their religious principles. They ar­
gued that they could not be forced to violate those principles unless the 
state could show that excusing their children from participation would 
result in some clear and present danger to the state or nation. 
The Supreme Court held in favor of the challengers. Its plurality 
opinion, however, explicitly did not rely on the principle of religious lib­
erty that had been extensively briefed by the lawyer representing the Je­
15. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). Decided the same day as Barnette was the related case of Taylor v. 
Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943), in which the Court overturned the convictions of Jehovah's Wit­
nesses who had been found guilty of encouraging disloyalty to the federal government and to the 
State of Mississippi. One defendant had been charged with distributing literature encouraging resist­
ance to a state-mandated flag salute. The Court overturned this conviction commenting, "If the 
state cannot constrain one to violate his conscientious religious conviction by saluting the national 
emblem, then certainly it cannot punish him for imparting his views on the subject to his fellows and 
exhorting them to accept those views." Id. at 589. 
16. 	 The resolution provided in relevant part: 
Therefore, be it RESOLVED, That the West Virgiuia Board of Education does hereby 
recognize and order that the commonly accepted salute to the Flag of the United States ... 
now becomes a regular part of the program of activities in the public schools, ... and that 
all teachers ... and pupils in such schools shall be required to participate in the salute, 
honoring the Nation represented by the Flag; provided, however, that refusal to salute the 
Flag be regarded as an act of insubordination, and shall be dealt with accordingly. 
319 U.S. at 628 n.2. 
17. 	 Garvey, Children and the First Amendment, 57 TEXAS L. REv. 321, 341 (1979). 
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hovah's Witnesses. 18 Instead, the four Justices appealed to a broader 
principle. Writing for the plurality, Justice Jackson condemned, in a 
much-quoted passage, government prescribed orthodoxy: 
If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it 
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be ortho­
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or 
force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein. If there 
are any circumstances which permit an exception, they do not now 
occur to us. 19 
Although Justice Jackson's opinion spoke in terms of high-sounding 
principles, the principles asserted provide little assistance in understand­
ing the scope of the limitation on government authority announced in 
Barnette. Such understanding requires a more detailed examination of 
Justice Jackson's reasoning. 
The plurality opinion began by making clear the nature of the claim 
presented: The Jehovah's Witnesses asked only to be exempted from the 
flag salute, leaving others free to participate in the ceremony;20 they as­
serted no claim of paramonnt right over any other individual. Nor did 
the Jehovah's Witnesses suggest the state could not teach patriotism.21 
They acknowledged that the state could instruct students in the values 
behind the flag salute and permit voluntary participation in this patriotic 
ceremony. Their argument was only that the state could not compel stu­
dents to participate in the salute and pledge of allegiance. 
Mter considering the scope of the Witnesses' claim, Justice Jackson 
analyzed the nature of the state's requirement in light of the interfered 
with liberty interest. The flag salute was identified as symbolic speech 
communicating an "adherence to government as presently organized. It 
18. See Brief for Appellees at 15-33, West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 
(1943). 
19. 319 U.S. at 642. 
20. Id. at 630. 
21. See id. at 631. More recently, the Supreme Court affirmed the legitimacy of state efforts to 
transmit values such as patriotism in the public schools. See Board of Educ. v. Pice, 457 U.S. 853 
(1982); see also Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) ("The importance of public schools in 
the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on 
which our society rests, long has been recognized by our decisions."). 
Less clear to Justice Jackson, however, was whether the Board of Education resolution only 
required students to go through the motions of the flag salute-without needing to become true 
believers-or whether they were also required to abandon any contrary beliefs and become "unwill­
ing converts" to the state-supported ideology of patriotism. 319 U.S. at 633. In characterizing the 
flag salute as symbolic expression, Justice Jackson relied on Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 
(1931), involving a daily flag-raising ceremony at a summer camp where a reproduction of the Soviet 
Flag was used. Appellant was charged with violating a provision of California law criminalizing 
certain displays of a red flag. The Supreme Court overturned the conviction because it found uncon­
stitutional the aspect of the California law that permitted punishing anyone displaying the flag as a 
symbol of opposition to organized government. Id. at 369. The Court viewed such a display as 
within constitutionally protected peaceful political discussion. 
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requires the individual to communicate by word and sign his acceptance 
of the political ideas it thus bespeaks."22 
Justice Jackson then focused on the nature of the question before the 
Court. The question for Justice Jackson was not whether the Constitu­
tion required an exemption from the flag salute requirement as a matter 
of religious liberty.23 Instead, his inquiry was whether the state had the 
power to compel participation by children who had no choice but to at­
tend school as a result of compulsory education laws.24 Justice Jackson's 
concern was with the extent of government authority and not with the 
specifics of what motivated a particular child to refuse to participate in 
the ceremony.25 
For Justice Jackson, defining the limits of governmental authority 
involved fundamental questions about the nature of democracy, includ­
ing the seeming conflict between the need for strong government and the 
individual freedoms guaranteed in a democratic system. Those freedoms, 
as he saw them, included not only the right to speak but also the right to 
be free of government efforts to force individuals to say what they do not 
believe. In exposing this conflict as more apparent than real, Justice 
Jackson explored the nature of our governmental system: "There is no 
22. 319 U.S. at 633. 
23. Justice Jackson rejected the argument that the first amendment protection available to the 
Jehovah's Witnesses depended on the religious character of their objections: "Nor does the issue as 
we see it turn on one's possession of particular religious views or the sincerity with which they are 
held." 319 U.S. at 634. 
24. This view presages modern concern for the plight of a captive audience. See, e.g., FCC v. 
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 759 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (arguing that the FCC should be 
permitted to prohibit broadcasts ofobscene or offensive material during hours in which unsupervised 
children are listening); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 305-08 (1974) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (stating that a political candidate does not have first amendment right to display adver­
tising on city buses); Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 
COLUM. L. REv. 960 (1953) (discussing the rights and remedies of those deemed "captive audi­
tors"); Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 61 Nw. U.L. REV. 153 
(1972) (discussing the constitutional interrelationship between speech and privacy and the asserted 
right to be free from unwanted communication). 
25. In light of Justice Jackson's explicit refusal to limit his holding to religiously motivated 
actions, lower courts have readily extended Barnette to situations in which a refusal to participate in 
a flag salute ceremony was based on a political objection. See, e.g., Goetz v. Ansell, 477 F.2d 636, 
637-39 (2d Cir. 1973) (extending Barnette to the situation in which a high school student refused to 
stand for Pledge of Allegiance because he believed "that there [isn't] liberty and justice for all in the 
United States"); Frain v. Baron, 307 F. Supp. 27, 29, 33 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (extending Barnette to 
protect students who refused not only to participate in recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance but also 
to stand and leave the classroom during the pledge and flag salute). Teachers wishing to refrain 
from leading a daily flag salute ceremony because of political beliefs also have been afforded consti­
tutional protection. See, e.g., Russo v. Central School Dist., 469 F.2d 623, 633-34 (2d Cir. 1972) 
("[B]ecause the First Amendment ranks among the most important of our constitutional rights we 
must recognize that the precious right of free speech requires protection even when the speech is 
personally obnoxious."), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973); Hanover v. Northrup, 325 F. Supp. 170, 
172-73 (D. Conn. 1970) (holding that a teacher's refusal to lead the Pledge of Allegiance did not 
disrupt school activities, interfere with or deny the rights of other teachers or students, or cause any 
disciplinary problems among her students). 
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mysticism in the American concept of the State or of the nature or origin 
of its authority. We set up government by consent of the governed, and 
the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce 
that consent."26 Although "[n]ational unity [is] an end which officials 
may foster by persuasion and example,"27 compulsion is not a permissi­
ble means for its achievement. 28 
After establishing this guiding principle, Justice Jackson sought to 
justify his view by demonstrating that no society benefitted by efforts to 
compel unity and eliminate dissent. Justice Jackson invoked the lessons 
of history: "Those who begin coercive elimination of dissent soon find 
themselves exterminating dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion 
achieves only the unanimity of the graveyard."29 
These tactics were not only dangerous, he reasoned, they were un­
necessary. There was no need to fear that securing the "freedom to be 
intellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the 
social organization."30 Similarly, guaranteeing the right to refuse to par­
ticipate posed no threat to the continued existence of our form of govern­
ment: "To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic 
ceremonies are voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory rou­
tine is to make an unflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions 
to free minds."31 
As a final point in his argument, Justice Jackson pointed out that­
far from imposing disastrous costs-the kind of restriction on govern­
mental authority he was announcing would have many positive benefits: 
"We can have intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities 
that we owe to exceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccen­
tricity and abnormal attitudes. "32 
26. 319 U.S. at 641. 
27. Jd. at 640. 
28. Although Justice Jackson's view was that compelled affirmation of a government-sponsored 
idea is an impermissible means, the Barnette opinion does not make it clear whether such means are 
unconstitutional in all contexts or whether the unconstitutionality arose from an inadequate relation­
ship between ends and means specific to the facts of the case. On the one hand, the suggestion is 
made that the individual might be compelled to participate in the ceremony if to do otherwise would 
create "a clear and present danger that would justifY an effort even to mufile expression." I d. at 634. 
On the other hand, elsewhere the opinion states, in absolutist language, "We set up government by 
consent of the governed, and the Bill of Rights denies those in power any legal opportunity to coerce 
that consent." Jd. at 641. For a recent expression of the view that Justice Jackson's opinion in 
Barnette is an example of the absolutist philosophy in first amendment analysis, see Gard, The Flag 
Salute Cases and the First Amendment, 31 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 419, 422-24 (1982). 
29. 319 U.S. at 641. 
30. Jd. 
31. Jd. 
32. Id. at 641-42. In addition to Justice Jackson's opinion for the Court, Justice Black wrote a 
concurring opinion that relied on the claim of religious freedom advanced by the resolution's chal­
lengers. Justice Black's opinion, joined by Justice Douglas, warned of the religious prejudice hidden 
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Although the plurality opinion makes many resounding statements, 
it also leaves one important question unanswered or unclear: What is the 
scope of the restriction on government authority and of its mirror image, 
the individual's freedom to differ? Responding to those inquiries re­
quires determining what core value is threatened by incursions on the 
freedom to think as one pleases. Some writers view the Barnette ration­
ale as resting on a notion of individual self-realization.33 That Justice 
in mandatory flag salute laws: "The ceremonial, when enforced against conscientious objectors, 
more likely to defeat than to serve its high purpose, is a handy implement for disguised religious 
persecution." Id. at 644. Justice Murphy, joining the opinion for the Court, also wrote separately 
agreeing with Justices Black and Douglas that Barnette was principally a case about freedom of 
religion: "Official compulsion to affirm what is contrary to one's religious belief is the antithesis of 
freedom of worship." Id. at 646. 
Only Justice Frankfurter dissented in Barnette. Justice Frankfurter had written the majority 
opinion in Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940), an earlier decision upholding a 
similar mandatory flag salute policy. See infra text accompanying notes 37-44. Unlike a number of 
other members of the Court, Justice Frankfurter had not changed his mind about the appropriate 
outcome of such cases in the intervening three years. See infra note 52. His dissent in Barnette 
emphasized the importance of judicial restraint and respect for democratic processes. 319 U.S. at 
647-52. He also reiterated, as he had expressed in Gobitis, that religious liberty did not grant an 
immunity from laws of general applicability. Id. at 653. The Jehovah's Witnesses were free to 
educate their children in private schools rather than public schools and could affirmatively express 
their disagreement with the flag salute ceremony. Id. at 657-58. They could not, however, refuse to 
participate in the ceremony so long as the legislature viewed such mandatory participation as a 
means to promote good citizenship. Id. at 654-55. For an interesting analysis of Justice Frank­
furter's opinions in Barnette and Gobitis, see Danzig, Justice Frankfurter's Opinions in the Flag Sa­
lute Cases: Blending Logic and Psychologic in Constitutional Decisionmaking, 36 STAN. L. REv. 675 
(1984). 
The disagreement between Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concerning the appropriate resolu­
tion of the issues posed in Barnette appears to have been deep-seated. See Gard, supra note 28, at 
421-35. Nevertheless, in a letter Justice Frankfurter wrote to President Roosevelt in 1943, he praised 
Justice Jackson's Barnette opinion: "You may fmd some diversion from your heavy burdens-some 
of which are needlessly put upon your shoulders-in Bob Jackson's opinion. It is really worth read­
ing." ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER: THEIR CORRESPONDENCE, 1928-1945, at 699 (M. Freed­
man ann. 1967) (reprinting letter of May 3, 1943). 
33. Professor Tribe takes the view that Barnette is most accurately classified as a case in which 
the focus of concern is on preventing an invasion of the right of personhood. This right includes an 
individual's autonomy to define the essence of one's own personality, both the inner self and the 
outward manifestation of the self. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW§ 15-1, at 899-900 
(1978). As an underlying justification for the protection of freedom of speech, this concern is re­
ferred to as a protection for "self-realization." Id. § 12-1, at 579. 
The need to protect "individual self-realization," as the central value behind the first amend­
ment, is urged by Professor Redish. See Redish, The Value ofFree Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 
593 (1982). Professor Redish finds this term particularly appropriate because it incorporates the 
dual concerns of a person's ability to "realize[ ] his or her full potential," and an "individual's 
control of his or her own destiny through making life-affecting decisions." Id. at 593. See generally 
Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom ofSpeech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 966 (1978) (the 
free speech clause protects individual liberty); Scanlon, A Theory ofFreedom ofExpression, 1 PHIL. 
& PuB. AFF. 204, 215-22 (1972) (the first amendment promotes personal autonomy). 
The concepts of autonomy and self-realization as explanations for the underlying purposes 
served by the first amendment free speech guarantee have been criticized for not focusing on values 
that are specially furthered by the first amendment: 
Each of these theories relies on the fact that expressing one's self is an important compo­
nent of individual liberty, and if we do not allow channels of self-expression then we will 
suffer accordingly. Now this is of course true, but the question is whether communicating 
824 
Jackson's Flag Salute Legacy 
Jackson was concerned primarily with the individual freedom to develop 
serves any particularly special function in terms of self-expression. I can also express my­
self in my attire, my occupation, my sexual activity and preferences, my residence, my 
hobbies and other recreations, and so on. The list is virtually endless, and that is exactly 
the point. Communicating is obviously a form of self-expression, but it is by no means the 
only form of self-expression, and it is by no means the form of self-expression that is most 
important to everyone. Thus, the argument from self-expression leads to the conclusion 
that all forms of self-expression are worthy of equivalent protection. As a result, it is 
impossible to distinguish an argument from self-expression as an argument for freedom of 
speech from an argument from self-expression as an argument for liberty in general. 
Schauer, Must Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U.L. REv. 1284, 1291 (1983). 
Justice Jackson's summation of the holding of Barnette is reflected in the following language 
from his opinion: "We think the action of the local authorities in compelling the flag salute and 
pledge transcends constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of intellect and 
spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to reserve from all official 
control." 319 U.S. at 642 (emphasis added). Although this statement has received much praise over 
the years, Justice Jackson's words are not without their critics. One commentator stated, "It would 
be difficult to find another statement so plausible, so seductively obvious, and yet so utterly, so 
foolishly, SO deeply mistaken." J. TuSSMAN, GOVERNMENT AND THE MIND 3 (1977). Justice Jack­
son's use of the phrase "sphere of intellect and spirit" has been seized upon as synonymous with "the 
individual's interest in selfhood," an interest which includes both "the individual's ability to define 
the persona he presents to the world" and "the individual's freedom of conscience." Gaebler, supra 
note 12, at 1004 (quoting Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642). Equating Justice Jackson's concept of the 
"sphere of intellect and spirit" with a protection for the concept of "selfhood" or "personhood" 
requires embarking on the difficult task of defining the meaning of those terms. Much aeademic 
enterprise has already been devoted to translating these concepts into their core components in an 
effort to make them useful in the judicial decision-making process. Much of this effort has focused 
on defining the scope of the individual interest in privacy that is a part of the "liberty" protected by 
the fifth and fourteenth amendments rather than on defining that part of the concept of personhood 
protected by the free speech clause. See, e.g., Craven, Personhood: The Right to be Let Alone, 1976 
DuKE LJ. 699, 702 (defming personhood to include elements of individuality, autonomy, and pri­
vacy); Gerety, Redefining Privacy, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 233, 236 (1977) ("Privacy will be 
defined here as an autonomy or control over the intimacies of personal identity."); Henkin, Privacy 
and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410, 1411 (1974) (defming privacy as a zone of autonomy, 
presumptively free of government regulation). 
The overlap between a concept of personhood that stresses autonomy, privacy, and individual­
ity and the freedom of the mind and spirit protected by the first amendment free speech guarantee is 
obvious. That aspect of the first amendment encompassing freedom of mind or freedom of con­
science has been described in these terms: 
When we refer to freedom of conscience, we ordinarily mean some sort of private domain 
of the mind, some area that is under the exclusive control of the individual. This domain is 
off limits to the state, not only as a matter of moral right, but also as a matter of necessity. 
Ifl say that I am following my conscience, I mean that I am retreating into that portion of 
my personality that is an exclusive preserve against governmental interference. Similarly, 
references to freedom of thought mark off an area ofexclusive control by the individual, an 
area that simultaneously sets the outer boundaries of permissible (and practical) state 
intrusion. 
F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 68 (1982). Described in these terms the 
act of thinking is, according to Professor Schauer and others, a self-regarding act and not an other­
regarding act, and therefore this freedom falls within the category of private activities that, accord­
ing to the philosophy of John Stuart Mill, should be free of state control. See J.S. MILL, ON LIB­
ERTY (1859). Because Mill's analysis serves as an important element in the argument for a general 
constitutional protection for private behavior under the "liberty" clause, the overlap is not surpris­
ing. This analysis, however, is not sufficient to explain Barnette. 
The behavior at issue in Barnette took place in a public setting. The state was not attempting 
the impractical task of trying to influence the Jehovah's Witnesses thoughts, only their acts. Addi­
tionally, allowing the Witnesses to refuse to participate in the patriotic ceremony would have some 
identifiable impact (for example, to make others uncomfortable in the face of unusual behavior, to 
direct additional resentment or prejudice against the Witnesses, or even to cause others to question 
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one's own personality, however, is not the only conclusion that can be 
drawn from a careful reading of the opinion. To the contrary, although 
Justice Jackson's language is sometimes ambiguous, its primary focus is 
not on the needs of the individual. Instead, the first amendment is 
presented not as an end in itself, but as serving an instrumental purpose34 
described in terms of benefits to the community. Focusing on the gov­
ernmental excesses that can grow out of compelled uniformity of view­
point,35 Justice Jackson suggested that core values of the first 
amendment include the preservation of democratic government and 
"rich cultural diversities"36 that the community may reap through its 
tolerance of dissent. Although this analysis protects the individual, this 
protection is provided explicitly because it is necessary to the effective 
functioning of democratic government. 
The values involved in Barnette did not arise in a jurisprudential 
vacuum; the opinion built upon other cases that must be examined to 
understand the decision's background and historical context. Three 
years before Barnette, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of 
a school board rule requiring a mandatory flag salute and pledge of alle­
giance in Minersville School District v. Gobitis.37 As in Barnette, the 
their own participation in the flag salute) on the other participants. Although the nature of the 
impact is uncertain, its existence is not. 
34. First amendment literature reflects an unresolvable debate over whether the first amend­
ment is designed to further instrumental purposes or whether it is an end in itself. The chief archi­
tect of the instrumental theory is Alexander Meiklejohn, who describes the first amendment free 
speech guarantee as essential to successful self-government. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH 
AND ITS RELATION TO GOVERNMENT (1948); A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CON­
STITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1965) [hereinafter cited as A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL 
FREEDOM]; see also Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. I, 
20 (1971) (arguing for an internally consistent free speech theory that protects only explicitly polit­
ical speech); Wellington, On Freedom ofExpression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1106 (1979) (addressing the 
"role of expression in the political process" and "the proper limits of expression's immunity"). 
Others view the first amendment as an end in itself, promoting speaker-oriented values. See Redish, 
supra note 33, at 593 (asserting that the constitutional guarantee of free speech serves only one true 
value, individual self-realization); Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral The­
ory ofthe First Amendment, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 45, 62 (1974) ("The value of free expression, in this 
view, rests on its deep relation to self-respect arising from autonomous self-determination without 
which the life of the spirit is meager and slavish."). Still other first amendment theorists refuse to 
identify a single value served by the first amendment or to limit it to furthering either instrumental 
or intrinsic values. See T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 
3-15 (1963) (arguing that the first amendment furthers four purposes: individual self-fulfillment, 
attainment of truth, participation in decision-making, and balance between stability and change); 
Schauer, Codifying the First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 SUP. CT. REv. 285, 313 (assert­
ing that "the concept of freedom of speech may not have one central core"). 
35. See supra text accompanying note 29. 
36. 319 U.S. at 642. 
37. 310 U.S. 586 (1940). On four occasions prior to Gobitis, the Supreme Court had upheld 
similar flag salute requirements in per curiam decisions. See Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, 306 U.S. 
621 (1939); Johnson v. Deerfield, 306 U.S. 621 (1939); Hering v. State Bd. of Educ., 303 U.S. 624 
(1938); Leoles v. Landers, 302 U.S. 656 (1937). 
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challengers were Jehovah's Witnesses who claimed the required flag sa­
lute and pledge were contrary to their religious beliefs. Justice Frank­
furter, writing for an eight-to-one majority upholding the rule, reasoned 
that religious convictions did not excuse citizens from obedience to gen­
eral laws. Addressing the possibility of a constitutional argument based 
on the free speech guarantee, Justice Frankfurter was unwilling to con­
cede that protection for anything beyond a citizen's dissemination of 
views could be found within the concept of freedom of expression. Even 
if the Constitution protected citizens from being required to appear sup­
portive of government-compelled expressions38 that protection was not 
absolute. The government's interest in promoting national unity, he sug­
gested, was sufficient to outweigh any interference with rights of free 
speech.39 
The Gobitis opinion reviewed existing Supreme Court precedent. 
From that case law, it was· clear that principles of religious freedom had 
not been interpreted to include the right to be exempt from generally 
applicable laws; religious beliefs did not grant an exemption from mili­
tary service,40 or provide an exemption from laws banning polygamy.41 
Earlier decisions demonstrated that the Court had traditionally drawn a 
line between freedom to believe and freedom to act. 42 
The Court also relied on the few Supreme Court cases that had ex­
amined the constitutionality of compelled behavior. Although princi­
pally concerned with the obligation of military service, these cases had 
reiterated the principle that no special exemption from law could be 
based on a claim that compelled activities violate religious scruples. The 
state was free to require attendance at a course in military science as a 
condition of attending a state land-grant university, despite a student's 
religious and conscientious belief that war is immoral;43 applicants for 
citizenship could be compelled to swear an oath of allegiance to support 
and defend the United States as the price of citizenship.44 In light of the 
38. The Court described this as being protected "from conveying what may be deemed an im­
plied but rejected affirmation." 310 U.S. at 595. 
39. /d. 
40. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 623 (1931). 
41. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 
(1878) ("To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious belief superior to the 
law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to become a law unto himself."). 
42. See, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878) ("Laws are made for the 
government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they 
may with practices."). 
43. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal, 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934). 
44. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 616 (1931). The Court interpreted the oath of 
allegiance required before admission to citizenship to include a promise to bear arms on behalf of the 
United States. This interpretation of the naturalization oath was overruled in Girouard v. United 
States, 328 U.S. 61, 64 (1946). 
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precedent, the decision in Gobitis to uphold the mandatory ceremony was 
not surprising. 
The Gobitis decision, however, was not unanimous. Justice Stone's 
vigorous dissenting opinion conceded that first amendment rights are not 
absolute but argued that the government could interfere with these pre­
cious guarantees only to further important government ends su.ch as the 
need to raise an army.45 Requiring the flag salute had to be placed at a 
different point on the spectrum of government purposes; the govern­
ment's interest-promoting patriotism-was less important than raising 
an army, and, moreover, alternative means to achieve the asserted pur­
pose were available.46 
Justice Stone also wrote at length about the individual interests at 
stake in Gobitis: 
The guaranties of civil liberty are but guaranties offreedom of 
the human mind and spirit and of reasonable freedom and opportu­
nity to express them. They presuppose the right of the individual 
to hold such opinions as he will and to give them reasonably free 
expression, and his freedom, and that of the state as well, to teach 
and persuade others by the communication of ideas. 47 
Clearly, in Justice Stone's view there was an intimate connection between 
freedom from compelled expression and the guarantee of freedom of 
speech; the individual desire to exercise the right of expression must be 
built upon dual protections-unfettered thought and an absence of com­
pelled expression. If government is permitted to dampen the independ­
ent spirit of the mind, it may damage irreparably the willingness of 
individuals to speak out on behalf of divergent views that they hold. 
Justice Stone wrote that the individual interest is at its zenith if reli­
gious freedom is threatened: 
The very essence of the liberty which [civil liberties] guaranty is the 
freedom of the individual from compulsion as to what he shall 
think and what he shall say, at least where the compulsion is to 
bear false witness to his religion. If these guaranties are to have 
any meaning they must, I think, be deemed to withhold from the 
state any authority to compel belief or the expression of it where 
that expression violates religious convictions, whatever may be the 
45. See Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 602 (1940) (Stone, J., dissenting) 
("Government has a right to survive and powers conferred upon it are not necessarily set at naught 
by the express prohibitions of the Bill of Rights."). 
46. Id. at 603-04 (asserting that "there are other ways to teach loyalty and patriotism" than to 
compel salute of the flag). 
47. 310 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added). Some of the themes stressed in Justice Stone's dissenting 
opinion are later echoed in Justice Jackson's opinion in Barnette. For example, in Barnette, Justice 
Jackson spoke of the "sphere of intellect and spirit." 319 U.S. 642. This phrase is reminiscent of 
Justice Stone's Gobitis reference to the need to guarantee the "freedom of the human mind and 
spirit." 
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legislative view of the desirability of such compulsion. 48 
In Justice Stone's view, the preeminence of religious freedom in the value 
structure of the first amendment had its roots in the history of the United 
States. The facts of Gobitis, involving a "small and helpless minority ... 
entertaining in good faith a religious belief,"49 conjured up for Justice 
Stone the image of the persecuted colonists who fled their homelands to 
escape condemnation for their failure to conform to the established 
religions. 
Traceable to his vision of persecuted religious minorities, Justice 
Stone's view of what was at issue in Gobitis nevertheless went further. 
The essential difference between totalitarian systems and the democratic 
form of government was defined by their differing treatment of small 
minorities, whatever the source of the shared beliefs that united the 
groups' members.5 ° For Justice Stone, protecting the rights of such 
groups was a hallmark of a free government. 5 1 
Justice Stone's vision of the issues at stake in Gobitis was not then 
shared by other Justices. Only three years later, however, the Court did 
an "about-face" inBarnette.52 When this new challenge came before the 
Court, the invidious impact of mandatory flag salute laws was evident. 
48. 310 U.S. at 604 (emphasis added). 
49. Id. at 606. 
50. See id. at 606-07. Justice Stone emphasized the commitment to the "constitutional protec­
tion of the liberty ofsmal1 minorities to the popular will." I d. at 606. Consequently, our "Constitu­
tion expresses [not only) the conviction of the people that democratic processes must be preserved at 
all costs," but also the necessity to preserve "freedom of mind and spirit" if a government is to 
adhere to "justice and moderation without which no free government can exist." Id. at 606-07. 
51. Only two years before Gobitis, Chief Justice Stone wrote about the need for "more exacting 
judicial scrutiny" when legislation curtails the rights of "discrete and insular minorities." United 
States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). The history of the drafting of the 
Carolene Products footnote is recounted in Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products Reminis­
cence, 82 CoLUM. L. REv. 1093 (1982); see also Ball, Judicial Protection ofPowerless Minorities, 59 
IowA L. REv. 1059 (1974) (extending Justice Stone's theory of a special role for the judiciary in 
protecting small minorities). For additional insight into the meaning of "minorities," as intended by 
Justice Stone in 1938, see Cover, The Origins ofJudicial Activism in the Protection ofMinorities, 91 
YALE L.J. 1287, 1294-1300 (1982). 
52. The Court's rapid "about-face" on the constitutionality of the mandatory flag salute and 
pledge was first suggested in a dissenting opinion in Jones v. City of Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942), 
vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (per curiam). In Jones, members of the Jehovah's Witnesses who had 
been convicted of selling religious books without licenses challenged the constitutionality of city 
ordinances requiring the purchase of a license before selling printed matter. In a five-to-four opin­
ion, the Court upheld the constitutionality of their convictions against a first amendment challenge. 
The dissenting Justices wrote three separate opinions. Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy, stated 
that they had come to believe that Gobitis, in which they had voted with the majority, had been 
wrongly deeided. They saw the Witnesses as an unpopular religious minority who were in the pro­
cess of having their freedom to worship as they chose squelched. They observed, "Certainly our 
democratic form ofgovernment, functioning under the historic Bill of Rights, has a high responsibil­
ity to accommodate itself to the religious views of minorities, however unpopular and unorthodox 
those views may be." Id. at 624. 
In addition to this announced change in viewpoint, there had been a change in the Court's 
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Appellees' brief reported that many similar laws had been enacted after 
the Gobitis decision, and that enforcement of these laws had resulted in 
the expulsion of thousands of schoolchildren for refusal to salute the 
flag.53 In addition, widespread hostility against the Jehovah's Witnesses 
had produced mob violence directed at members of the sect: beatings, 
knifmgs, shootings, arson, and parading members of the religion-tied 
together with ropes-through the streets.54 The brief argued that the 
central catalyst for these acts of brutality was the refusal of Jehovah's 
Witnesses to salute the flag. 
In light of the record, the Barnette Court could not view mandatory 
flag salute laws as merely foolish, unwise, or uncertain to achieve their 
desired end. Instead, the plurality described such laws as destructive of 
the fabric of society: 
Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the lesson 
of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out Christian­
ity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a means to 
religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a means to Rus­
sian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our present totalitar­
ian enemies. 55 
In order to prevent a desire for unity from deteriorating into totalitarian­
ism, our system had to give greater weight to a respect for individualism. 
In the end, forced conformity was seen as exacting too high a cost by 
stifling the impulse to dissent and eliminating tolerance of the innovative 
or idiosyncratic. 
B. The Jehovah's Witnesses in the Supreme Court 
In Barnette, Justice Jackson did not adopt the view of Justice 
Stone's dissenting opinion in Gobitis-that religious speech was elevated 
membership since Gobitis was decided in 1940. The history of these membership changes is re­
counted in detail in H. ABRAHAM, JUSTICES AND PRESIDENTS 227-36 (1985). 
With four Justices (Chief Justice Stone, the original dissenter in Gobitis, plus Justices Black, 
Douglas, and Murphy) now expressing their disagreement with the result in Gobitis, and Justices 
Jackson and Rutledge newly appointed to the Court, the stage was set for a renewed challenge to the 
widespread use of mandatory flag salute laws. 
53. Brief for Appellees at 62-63, 72, 319 U.S. at 624; see also State v. Lefebvre, 91 N.H. 382, 20 
A.2d 185 (1941) (overturning lower court order declaring three children who were Jehovah's Wit­
nesses to be delinquent based on their failure to attend school after having been suspended for refus­
ing to salute the flag); In re Latrecchia, 128 N.J.L. 472, 26 A.2d 881 (1942) (reversing criminal 
conviction of Francesco and Raffaela Latrecchia, both Jehovah's Witnesses, who were convicted of 
being disorderly persons based on the expulsion of their children from school for failure to salute the 
flag); In re Jones, 175 Misc. 451, 24 N.Y.S.2d 10 (1940) (dismissing delinquency proceedings 
brought against nine-year-old Jehovah's Witness who had been expelled from school for refusal to 
salute the flag). 
54. Brief for Appellees at 71-77, 319 U.S. at 624 (reporting events chronicled in Rotnem & 
Folsom, Recent Limitations Upon Religious Liberty, 36 AM. PoL. SCI. REV. 1053 (1936)). 
55. 319 U.S. at 641. 
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above other kinds of speech. Despite the record in Barnette of religion~ 
based persecution of the Jehovah's Witnesses, the opinion explicitly went 
beyond the religious freedom argument pressed by appellees and utilized 
as the ground of decision by Justices Black, Douglas, and Murphy. 
However, the choice Justice Jackson made in Barnette-appealing to 
broader speech principles-was not unique to his opinion in that case. 
A substantial volume of Supreme Court decisions during the Gobitis~Bar~ 
nette era involved the Jehovah's Witnesses. In light of the sect's religious 
tenets, the frequency of their legal battles during this period is far from 
surprising.56 
In the years immediately preceding Barnette, the Witnesses were 
vindicated in many of their legal battles. 57 In each case, the Jehovah's 
Witnesses argued that an ordinance or statute unconstitutionally inter~ 
fered with their religious freedom; in each case the Witnesses were victo~ 
56. The Witnesses believe themselves accountable only to the God Jehovah and to his laws. 
The source of their belief is found in various biblical passages. A major reference is to Exodus: 
I am JEHOVAH thy God, who brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house 
of bondage. 
Thou shalt have no other gods before me. 
Thou shalt not make unto thee a graven image, nor any likeness of any thing that is in 
heaven above, or that is in the earth beneath, or that is in the water under the earth: 
Thou shalt not bow down thyself unto them, nor serve them; for I JEHOVAH thy 
God am a jealous God, visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children upon the third 
and upon the fourth generation of them that hate me. 
And showing loving kindness unto thousands of them that love me and keep my 
commandments. 
Exodus 20:2-6 (American Revised Edition). Jehovah is the head of a theocracy and the Witnesses, 
therefore, reject most civil rule. The only exceptions are the payment of taxes and laws that do not 
violate the Word of God. As Witnesses, their purpose is to inform all sinners that Jehovah's King­
dom has come and it is the route to deliverance for all. For a more thorough description of the 
religious beliefs and practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses, see Waite, The Debt ofConstitutional Law 
to Jehovah's Witnesses, 28 MINN. L. REV. 209, 212-13 (1944). These beliefs explain both the reason 
why the Witnesses distribute literature explaining the Kingdom of Jehovah and why they disobey 
civil authority by not obtaining permits, paying license fees, or saluting the flag. 
57. The first ease to reach the Supreme Court during this period was Lovell v. City of Griffin, 
303 U.S. 444 (1938) (overturning conviction for distributing literature without permission of city 
manager). After a victory in Lovell, the Jehovah's Witnesses successfully litigated other cases. See, 
e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (invalidating a ban on door-to-door distribution of 
literature without a permit and invalidating municipal ordinances prohibiting the distribution of 
literature in public places); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (striking down a state 
statute prohibiting fundraising for religious causes without a prior determination by a local official 
that a true religion was the object of the fundraising and overturning a breach of the peace convic­
tion resulting from defendant's efforts to solicit sales for his religious literature); Jamison v. Texas, 
318 U.S. 413 (1943) (striking down a municipal ordinance that barred the use of the streets to 
distribute handbills publicizing religious views); Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943) (holding that 
city ordinance that required a permit to sell or solicit orders for books, as applied to distribution of 
religious materials, violated first amendment); Jones v. City of Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943) (citing 
Murdoch v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), to overturn on rehearing the conviction of a Jeho­
vah's Witness for selling religious books in violation of an ordinance requiring the payment of license 
taxes to sell printed materials), vacating per curiam 316 U.S. 584 (1942); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 
319 U.S. 105 (1943) (striking down an ordinance that required colporteurs to pay a license tax before 
distributing religious literature); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (invalidating city 
ordinance prohibiting door-to-door distribution of literature). 
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rious; and in each case the Court chose to ground its opinion in general 
free speech and press principles, rejecting the opportunity to rule solely 
on the religious liberty issue. 58 
. The Court's pattern of behavior can be explained, in part, by the 
controversial nature of the Jehovah's Witness religion. The Witnesses 
were not only a new religion,59 but an unpopular one as well. The ag­
gressive behavior of the sect's members in spreading their message had 
resnlted in fairly widespread public hostility. In all the litigation involv­
ing the Witnesses, their lawyers attempted to demonstrate that their ac­
tivities-such as going door-to-door, distributing leaflets, and playing 
recorded messages-were engaged in as a mandatory part of their service 
to Jehovah as required by their religion.6 ° Courts could have attempted 
to decide which of the Witnesses' activities were part of their religious 
58. In Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938), because the challenged ordinance prohib­
ited the distribution of all literature, not only religious literature, without the permission of the City 
Manager, the ordinance was held to be an unconstitutional prior restraint on the press. Id. at 451. 
In Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939), Clara Schneider was convicted of door-to-door dis­
tribution of religious literature without a permit. The Supreme Court reviewed her conviction to­
gether with three other challenges to municipal ordinances regulating the distnlmtion of printed 
matter. None of the other cases involved the Jehovah's Witnesses or even the distribution of reli­
gious literature; they involved absolute bans on the distnoution of leaflets in public places justified 
by a municipal concern with littering. The Supreme Court held all four ordinances to be violative of 
the first amendment protection for speech and press. The Court struck down the three antilittering 
ordinances because the government's justification was inadequate due to the infringement of first 
amendment interests. Id. at 163. In light of the important speech and press interests at stake, the 
permit scheme that Clara Schneider violated vested too much discretion in police authorities to 
decide which ideas could be carried into the homes of citizens. Id. at 164. 
In Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), the Court struck down a licensiug scheme that 
required a state official to determine whether the cause for which an individual sought to solicit 
contributions qualified as a religious one because granting a government official the discretion to 
make such a judgment was an impermissible censorship of religion. /d. at 305. Although relying on 
the free exercise clause, the Court's reasoning was in line with its earlier decision in Lovell striking 
down a prior restraint scheme that gave the government censor unbridled discretion. The Court in 
Cantwell also overturned Jesse Cantwell's breach of the peace conviction, categorizing Cantwell's 
religious speech as provocative speech but finding his behavior insufficiently threatening to amount 
to a breach of the peace. The Court considered Cantwell's behavior analogous to someone airing 
unpopular political ideas. Id. at 310. Finally, in Martin v. City of Strothers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943}, 
the Court invalidated an ordinance that banned all door-to-door distribution of literature, on the 
ground that it violated the guarantees of free speech and free press. Id. at 149. 
59. Viewed from the perspective of the 1940s, the Jehovah's Witness religion was relatively 
recent in origin. The group had only adopted the name "Jehovah's Witnesses" in 1931, having been 
previously called "Russellites." The name refers to Charles T. Russell, who founded the religion in 
1868. In 1884, the followers of Charles Russell founded the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society. 
Today, the Society is responsible for printing the books, pamphlets, and magazines that are distrib­
uted by adherents of the religion. Charles Russell was succeeded by Joseph F. Rutherford as the 
group's leader. Under Rutherford's leadership they chose to call themselves Jehovah's Witnesses. 
For a description of the origin, beliefs, and practices of the Jehovah's Witnesses, see L. PFEFFER, 
CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM 533-37 (1953). 
60. References to passages in the Bible and to the Biblical directives to engage in behavior of 
the kind described are found in all the briefs filed in the Supreme Court on behalf of the Jehovah's 
Witnesses. See Brief for Petitioners at 22-25, Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Brief 
for Appellant at 22-25, Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943}; Brief for Appellant at 19-20, Jamison 
v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943). Because of their lawyers' increasing familiarity with the concerns of 
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practices and which were simply a secular strategy chosen by the sect's 
members to proselytize for their religion, a question not easily answered. 
Instead, by deciding cases before them on general freedom of speech and 
press principles, the Court could refrain from deciding the scope of the 
Jehovah's Witnesses' religious as opposed to lifestyle practices.61 Simi­
larly, in Barnette, by regarding as irrelevant what had motivated the de­
cision to refuse to salute the flag, the Court avoided the necessity of 
evaluating the bona fides of the Jehovah's Witness claim that their re­
fusal to salute the flag was required by their religion and protected by the 
free exercise clause of the Constitution. 
In the period immediately before and after Barnette, the Court was 
in the throes of a struggle over the legitimacy of claims raised by the 
Jehovah's Witnesses to immunity from generally applicable laws, an im­
munity based on an assertion of religious liberty for beliefs and practices, 
including door-to-door evangelical activities.62 In resolving these claims 
the members of the Court were at philosophical loggerheads as to the 
proper balance between freedom of religion and government regulatory 
the Supreme Court, the briefs filed later in the period place less emphasis on the Bible and more 
emphasis on case authority. See Danzig, supra note 32, at 683 & n.22. 
61. The Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in the context of the Amish religion in Wis­
consin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In evaluating a religious objection to the application of Wis­
consin's compulsory education law to Amish youths above the age of fourteen, the Court had to 
decide if the objection was based on a religious belief. The Court described the task before it and the 
justifications for its undertaking: 
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier to 
reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to 
have the protection of the Religion clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief. 
Although a determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice entitled to constitu­
tional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of ordered liberty 
precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which 
society as a whole has important interests. 
Id. at 215-16 (footnote omitted). Because the Court found the Amish claims to be based on their 
religious beliefs, the State had to demonstrate a sufficiently strong justification for its infringement of 
religious freedom. The Court held that Wisconsin had failed to show that its "strong interest in 
compulsory education would be adversely affected by granting an exception to the Amish." Id. at 
236. 
62. The controversial nature of the Jehovah's Witnesses and the Court's cautious handling of 
their legal battles is illustrated by examining three cases: Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 
(1943); Douglas v. City ofJcannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943); and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 
(1944). In the chronology of the fiag salute cases, Murdock and Douglas were decided shortly before 
Barnette, and Prince was deeided a little over six months after Barnette. 
In Murdock, the Jehovah's Witnesses challenged municipal ordinances that imposed a flat li­
cense tax on persons wishing to solicit for the sale of merchandise or literature. 319 U.S. at 106. 
Convicted of selling religious literature without paying the tax, the Witnesses challenged their con­
victions as violative of the speeeh, press, and religion clauses of the first amendment. Douglas was a 
companion case to Murdock, also involving a licensing scheme, but it was dismissed on jurisdictional 
grouuds. 319 U.S. at 163. In Prince, the Court had before it an appeal from a conviction for violat­
ing the Massachusetts child labor laws. Sarah Prince had been convicted for permitting her nine­
year-old ward to offer for sale copies of two religious publications, Watchtower and Consolation, in 
violation of Massachusetts law. Mrs. Prince argued that her conviction violated her right to reli­
gious freedom as protected by the first amendment. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. at 158 
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control.63 Justice Jackson defined the scope of religious freedom nar­
rowly, and he believed the Constitution's separate recognition of protec­
tion for religious liberty was designed to give religious liberty no more 
constitutional protection than freedom of speech, but, instead, only an 
equal amount of protection.64 Justice Jackson strongly opposed other 
Justices' willingness to deprive municipalities of the authority to protect 
their citizenry and preserve the peace. 65 
63. The various opinions in Murdock, Douglas, and Prince are telling examples of the deep 
division on the Court about the constitutional status of the Jehovah's Witnesses and their religious 
practices. 
Justice Douglas' majority opinion in Murdock, overturning the ordinances, supported the evan­
gelical activities of the Jehovah's Witnesses and described their door-to-door distribution of religious 
literature in positive terms: 
It is more than preaching; it is more than distribution of religious literature. It is a combi­
nation of both. Its purpose is as evangelical as the revival meeting. This form of religious 
activity occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the 
churches and preaching from the pulpits. 
319 U.S. at 109. In contrast, Justice Reed's dissent expressed the view that the sale of religious tracts 
was not a religious practice to be protected under the religious freedom clause of the first amend­
ment: "The rites which are protected by the First Amendment are in essence spiritual-prayer, 
mass, sermons, sacrament-not sales of religious goods." /d. at 132. Although recognizing that the 
purpose of these evangelical activities was to spread a religious message, Justice Reed could not see 
this behavior as amounting to a religious rite. 
An even more negative view of the Witnesses' proselytizing activities was expressed by Justice 
Jackson. See Douglas, 319 U.S. at 167-74. Describing at length the sometimes intrusive and irritat­
ing behavior of members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, Justice Jackson argued that the presence of 
such behavior created a need for municipal governments to be able to protect their residents from 
such abusive actions. Foreshadowing his reasoning in Barnette, Justice Jackson revealed his anger at 
the notion that the religiously motivated practices of the Witnesses deserved greater immunity from 
government regulation than behavior that promoted political, economic, or scientific ideas: "When 
limits are reached which such communications must observe, can one go further under the cloak of 
religious evangelism? Does what is obscene, or commercial, or abusive, or inciting become less so if 
employed to promote a religious ideology?" /d. at I 79. Justice Jackson's response was clearly "no." 
Justice Jackson disagreed with Justice Douglas on the analogy to be drawn between religious 
ceremonies and the distribution of literature: 
I cannot accept the holding in the Murdock case that the behavior revealed here "oc­
cupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as do worship in the churches and 
preaching from the pulpits." To put them on the same constitutional plane seems to me to 
have a dangerous tendency towards discrediting religious freedom. 
/d. at 180 (quoting Murdock, 319 U.S. at 109). 
64. Justice Jackson grounded his theory of why the Constitution separately mentions freedom 
of religion in "the history of religious persecution": 
It was often claimed that one was an heretic and guilty of blasphemy because he failed to 
conform in mere belief or in support of prevailing institutions and theology. It was to 
assure religious teaching as much freedom as secular discussion, rather than to assure it 
greater license, that led to its separate statement. 
319 U.S. at 179. 
65. Justice Jackson's concern that the Court, when it zealously protected minority rights, was 
necessarily undercutting the rights of the majority, is evident elsewhere in his writing: 
But we must bear in mind that in the protection of individual or minority rights, we 
are often impinging on the principle of majority rule. Judicial opinions rarely face this 
dilemma. Let us take, for example, a community engaged largely in steel work, many of 
whose inhabitants are employed on night shifts and get their rest by day. Acting through 
regularly chosen representatives, the municipality duly enacts a regulation that precludes 
doorbell ringing in the distribution of literature or goods. A religious faction insists upon 
ringing doorbells to summon the occupant to the door to receive religious tracts that attack 
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The ringing endorsement of the principle of tolerance for the unu­
sual or unorthodox that Justice Jackson sounds in Barnette must be con­
trasted with his earlier comments about the need to make sure that a 
religious minority does not become a tyrannical force going beyond the 
limits of a free society. 66 Justice Jackson's narrow view of religious free­
dom provides at least a possible answer to the question of why his opin­
ion in Barnette relies on broad free speech principles and does not restrict 
itself to religious liberty concerns. 
Justice Jackson's view was that the line drawn should be between 
activities that affect only members of a religious group and activities that 
adversely influence the interests of members of the public. This view was 
not shared by all the members of the Court. Some would give broader 
deference than others to claims of religious freedom.67 In Justice Jack-
his religion and seek to convert him to the faith of the caller. If the Court holds that the 
right of free speech includes the right to enter upon private property and summon the 
owner to the door, it necessarily holds that a majority of a community are without the right 
to protect their hours of rest against such religiously inspired aggression. 
In case after case in which so-called civil rights are involved, the question simmers 
down to one of the extent to which majority rule will be set aside. 
R. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 76-77 (1955) 
(published posthumously from the drafts written by Justice Jackson in preparation for his antici­
pated delivery of the Godkin Lectures at Harvard University) (the facts described in this passage are 
taken from Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 144 (1943), in which the Court struck down a 
municipal ordinance of the kind described over the dissent of Justice Jackson). 
66. See, e.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting) 
("Civil government can not let any group ride rough-shod over others simply because their 'con­
sciences' tell them to do so."). 
67. The battle over the Jehovah's Witnesses' place in the constitutional pecking order still raged 
after Barnette, as made clear by the Court's opinion six months later in Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158 (1944). Justice Rutledge, writing for the Court, made it clear that freedom of religion has 
no greater constitutional protection than the other freedoms described in the first amendment. Jus­
tice Rutledge went on to uphold the state's ability to protect children from the dangers of youthful 
employment, even if the child labor at issue involved selling religious tracts. An important govern­
ment objective was appropriately served by the challenged Massachusetts legislation. 
Justice Murphy, in dissent, disagreed about the extent to which religion should play a role in the 
case and its outcome. He viewed the case as one raising a religious liberty claim in which the state 
had failed to demonstrate an interest sufficiently important to justify infringement on that "vital 
freedom," id. at 174-75, and criticized the majority decision as perpetuating religious suppression: 
No chapter in human history has been so largely written in terms of persecution and 
intolerance as one dealing with religious freedom. . . . And the Jehovah's Witnesses are 
living proof of the fact that even in this nation, conceived as it was in the ideals of freedom, 
the right to practice religion in unconventional ways is still far from secure. 
Id. at 175-76. 
Justice Jackson also wrote separately in Prince, pointing out that the members of the Court had 
a fundamental disagreement as to the proper constitutional analysis to apply to complaints of inter­
ference with religious liberty. ld. at 177. He could agree neither with the views of Justice Rutledge 
writing for the Court nor with the dissent of Justice Murphy. 
It is interesting to note by way of comparison that the dispute over the relationship between 
freedom of speech and freedom of religion reflected in the Court's decisions during the Barnette era 
has resurfaced in recent Supreme Court opinions. Compare Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 
n.6 (1981) (majority opinion) (religious worship as well as other religious speech is entitled to the 
protection of the free speech guarantee of the first amendment), with id. at 284-86 (White, J., dissent­
ing) (although religious worship uses speech, it cannot be treated as simply a form of protected 
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son's Barnette opinion, as in several other cases during this period, no 
preferred position was offered to religious liberty. Instead, freedom of 
conscience68 and freedom of mind were equal in the eyes of the first 
amendment. The importance of these freedoms was reflected in the 
Court's willingness to protect the rights of small minorities who held 
unpopular views. So long as unpopular minorities chose to express their 
views in ways that did not seriously interfere with the rights of the other 
members of the community, their right to express dissident views would 
be assured. This protection was required by the ideal of democratic tol­
erance; a principle that dictated a concern for securing the kind of society 
in which freedom to differ was guaranteed both for its own sake and for 
the benefit of the culturally diverse and innovative society that was the 
Constitution's vision of America. 
C. Justice Jackson Elaborates on His Barnette Themes 
To whatever extent the meaning of the Barnette opinion may have 
remained obscure even to the careful reader, Justice Jackson clarified and 
expanded upon his views expressed there seven years later in American 
Communications Association v. Douds.69 Although the issue in Douds 
was not the same kind of compelled expression as had been presented by 
the pledge in Barnette, Justice Jackson's opinion nevertheless explored 
the same first amendment themes that he had written about in Barnette. 
With only six Justices participating in Douds, the Supreme Court 
upheld, by an equally divided vote, the constitutionality of section 9(h) of 
the Taft-Hartley Act,70 otherwise known as the non-Communist affidavit 
provision. Under that provision, each union officer was required to file 
an affidavit stating that the officer was not a member of the Communist 
Party or any similar organization and did not believe in "the overthrow 
expression under the free speech guarantee; separate treatment is required to avoid undermining the 
religion clauses of the first amendment). 
68. Freedom of religion is sometimes characterized as "freedom of conscience." Justice Mur­
phy's use of the phrase in his dissent in Prince, 321 U.S. at 175, to refer to religious liberty is one of 
the occasional references found in the opinions of the Supreme Court during this era. E.g., Schneid­
erman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 135 (1943) (quoting from United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 
605, 635 (1931) (Hughes, C.J., dissenting)); Cantwell v. Conneeticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). For 
a thorough examination of the origins and meaning of the phrase "freedom ofconscience," as well as 
a survey of its use in Supreme Court opinions, see Freeman, A Remonstrance for Conscience, 106 U. 
PA. L. REv. 806 (1958). 
69. 339 u.s. 382 (1950). 
70. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 143, repealed by Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, § 201(d), 73 Stat. 519, 525. The result in 
Douds was in effect overruled in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965). In Brown, the Court 
found § 504 of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 504 
(Supp. IV 1958), which made it a crime for a Communist Party member to hold a position as an 
officer or employee of a labor union, to be an unconstitutional Bill of Attainder. That section was 
the successor to § 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act. 
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of the United States government by force or by any illegal or unconstitu­
tional methods."71 Many benefits of the National Labor Relations Act 
were withheld from any union whose officers failed to submit such affi­
davits to the National Labor Relations Board. 
Although the required filing of this affidavit, under penalty ofloss of 
benefits, was a form of compelled expression, it belongs within that cate­
gory of compelled expression known as "compelled disclosure."72 It 
forced all union officials to disclose information about their political affil­
iations and beliefs, but did not affirmatively ask them to swear allegiance 
to a particular political philosophy, as had the pledge of allegiance in 
Barnette. 
The union challenging the provision argued that it interfered with 
the union's ability to select its officers and infringed on those officers' 
freedom of choice in their political views and associations. In response, 
Chief Justice Vinson found that the infringement of first amendment 
rights was minimal and that the government interest in ensuring labor 
peace was important enough to justify that minimal interference. 73 
Justice Jackson's separate opinion agreed with that part of Justice 
Vinson's opinion that upheld section 9(h) insofar as it required disclosure 
of Communist Party membership or affiliation; he disagreed, however, 
with the constitutionality of the affidavit that section 9(h) required union 
71. Douds, 339 U.S. at 386 (quoting from § 9(h) of the National Labor Relations Act, Act of 
June 23, 1947, ch. 120, § 101, 61 Stat. 136, 143 (repealed 1959)). That section, in its entirety, pro­
vided as follows: 
No investigation shall be made by the [National Labor Relations] Board of any question 
affecting commerce concerning the representation ofemployees, raised by a labor organiza­
tion under subsection (c) of this section, no petition under section 9 (e) (1) shall be enter­
tained, and no complaint shall be issued pursuant to a charge made by a labor organization 
under subsection (b) of section 10, unless there is on file with the Board an affidavit exe­
cuted contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve-month period by each officer of 
such labor organization and the officers of any national or international labor organization 
of which it is an affiliate or constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist 
Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in, and is not a member of 
or supports any organization that believes in or teaches, the overthrow of the United States 
Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional methods. The provisions of 
section 35 A of the Criminal Code shall be applicable in respect to such affidavits. 
72. See supra text accompanying notes 6-8. 
73. The Chief Justice, joined by Justiees Reed and Burton, distinguished the case before him 
from the situation in Barnette. In Barnette, according to Chief Justice Vinson, "the sole interest of 
the State was in securing uniformity of belief by compelling utterance of a prescribed pledge." 339 
U.S. at 404 n.19. In Douds, however, the government's interest was not seen as aimed at suppressing 
political ideas, id. at 402; instead, the government was interested in preventing Communists from 
infiltrating labor unions and encouraging obstructive strikes that would serve revolutionary political 
ideas, rather than legitimate union objectives. ld. at 388-89. A second factor Chief Justice Vinson 
saw as distinguishing Douds was the fact that in Barnette refusal to salute the flag resulted in punish­
ment, id. at 404 n.19, but the non-Communist affidavit provision did not impose any similar punish­
ment for its violation. Individuals were free to retain their associations and beliefs, subject only to 
the posssible loss of their positions as union officials. Id. at 404. Thus, the adverse impact on the 
individual was much less serious. 
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officers to sign: "that he does not believe in . . . the overthrow of the 
United States Government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional 
methods."74 In the course of his opinion, Justice Jackson wrote at length 
about the value of "intellectual individualism"75 that was so central to 
his opinion in Barnette: 
Progress generally begins in skepticism about accepted truths. 
Intellectual freedom means the right to re-examine much that has 
been long taken for granted. A free man must be a reasoning man, 
. and he must dare to doubt what a legislative or electoral majority 
may most passionately assert. The danger that citizens will think 
wrongly is serious, but less dangerous than atrophy from not think­
ing at all. Our Constitution relies on our electorate's complete ide­
ological freedom to nourish independent and responsible 
intelligence and preserve our democracy from that submissiveness, 
timidity and herd-mindedness of the masses which would foster a 
tyranny of mediocrity. The priceless heritage of our society is the 
unrestricted constitutional right of each member to think as he 
will. Thought control is a copyright of totalitarianism, and we 
have no claim to it. . .. 
The idea that a Constitution should protect individual non­
conformity is essentially American and is the last thing in the 
world that Communists will tolerate. . . . If any single characteris­
tic distinguishes our democracy from Communism it is our recog­
nition of the individual as a personality rather than as a soulless 
part in the jigsaw puzzle that is the collectivist state.76 
In this eloquent statement, Justice Jackson reaffirmed the position he 
announced in Barnette. In doing so he further clarified what underlay 
the constitutional protection against compelled conformity that he val­
ued so highly. 
In his Douds opinion, Justice Jackson established once again his be­
lief that the first amendment provides individuals with an immunity that 
shields the "realm of opinion and ideas, beliefs and doubts, heresy and 
orthodoxy, political, religious or scientific."77 This hnmunity is designed 
74. Id. at 435 (quoting National Labor Relations Act, § 9(h), Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, 
§ 101, 61 Stat. 136, 143 (repealed 1959)). 
75. West Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943). 
76. Douds, 339 U.S. at 442-43. Justice Jackson's view of the characteristics of our democratic 
system was supported by one other member of the Court. Although writing separately, Justice 
Frankfurter's opinion reflects a similar belief: 
The cardinal article of faith of our civilization is the inviolate character of the individual. 
A man can be regarded as an individual and not as a function of the state only if he is 
protected to the largest possible extent in his thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his 
person. 
Id. at 421. The agreement of Justices Jackson and Frankfurter on this point is somewhat ironic in 
light of their sharp differences over the proper outcome in Barnette. For a description of Justice 
Frankfurter's dissenting opinion in Barnette, see supra note 32. 
77. 339 U.S. at 443. 
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to assure a free-thinking electorate that can preserve our democratic sys­
tem and cause it to prosper.78 Our system's superiority over totalitarian 
regimes was seen as arising out of its willingness to tolerate nonconform­
ity. An individual's ability to develop into his own person is protected in 
order to preserve democratic principles of tolerance and to enhance our 
country's greatness by assuring its receptiveness to innovative ideas. In 
this aspect of Justice Jackson's first amendment philosophy, individuality 
is seen not primarily as an end in itself, but as a means to a larger social 
end. The individual may receive the immediate benefits of policies 
designed to preserve a strong democratic system, but the motivating fac­
tor for protecting independence of mind is a concern for our system of 
government. Justice Jackson thus appears to align himself with those 
who view the first amendment freedoms as serving principally instru­
mental functions and not as ends in themselves. 79 
Justice Jackson's views, however, did not begin and end with con­
cern for the effective functioning of democratic government. In Douds, 
he argued that the willingness to allow each person to develop an individ­
ual identity, free of government constraint, is what distingnishes democ­
racy from totalitarian government. 80 In this part of his first amendment 
78. The similarities between Justice Jackson's views and the theories of Alexander Meiklejohn 
as to the values furthered by the first amendment are obvious: 
We Americans, in choosing our form of government, have made, at this point, a momen­
tous decision. We have decided to be self-governed. We have measured the dangers and 
the values of the suppression of the freedom of public inquiry and debate. And, on the 
basis of that measurement, having regard for the public safety, we have decided that the 
destruction offreedom is always unwise, that freedom is always expedient. The conviction 
recorded by that decision is not a sentimental vagary about the "natural rights" of individ­
uals. It is a reasoned and sober judgment as to the best available method of guarding the 
public safety. We, the People, as we plan for the general welfare, do not choose to be 
"protected" from the "search for truth." On the contrary, we have adopted it as our "way 
of life," our method of doing the work of governing for which, as citizens, we are responsi­
ble. Shall we, then, as practitioners offreedom, listen to ideas which, being opposed to our 
own, might destroy confidence in our form of government? Shall we give a hearing to 
those who hate and despise freedom, to those who, if they had the power, would destroy 
our institutions? Certainly, yes! Our action must be guided, not by their principles, but by 
ours. We listen, not because they desire to speak, but because we need to hear. If there are 
arguments against our theory of government, our policies in war or in peace, we the citi­
zens, the rulers, must hear and consider them for ourselves. That is the way of public 
safety. It is the program of self-government. 
A. MEIKLEJOHN, PoLmCAL FREEDOM, supra note 34, at 57. Despite the similarities of their views, 
Meiklejohn's writings are referred to only twice in the opinions of Justice Jackson. See Dennis v. 
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 567 n.9 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 
290, 300 n.3 {1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting). Both references express Justice Jackson's disagreement 
with Meiklejohn ·s absolutist philosophy of first amendment protection for speech that is necessary to 
the process of self-government. 
79. The battle over instrumental or speaker-benefit values in first amendment jurisprudence is 
still a very lively one. See supra note 34. 
80. Professor Freund described the centerpiece ofJustice Jackson's constitutional philosophy in 
the following terms: 
What must be cherished and secured above all-what the Constitution means to be se­
cured-is human personality. Its cultivation is both a civic necessity and a spiritual duty. 
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theory, Justice Jackson recognized the identity-reinforcing aspect of the 
first amendment.81 Thus, Justice Jackson's first amendment philosophy 
surfaces as a multilayered one. 82 Although primarily concerned with the 
need for an effective democratic government, his philosophy also recog­
nized the independent value of intellectual individualism. 
III. The Loyalty Oath Cases 
In the years following Barnette, quotations from Justice Jackson's 
Barnette plirrality opinion began to appear regularly in the Court's writ­
ings.83 For a number of years, however, no new controversy raising the 
precise issue· of a compelled affirmation reached the Court. The next 
The right to be oneself, to differ in thought and word, to express one's nonconformity in 
peaceable persuasion, to be treated by one's fellows wielding public power as a rational 
subject and not as mere object, to be treated evenhandedly-these claims as ancient as 
religious sensibilities formulated with modest British insularity as the immemorial rights of 
Englishmen, and retransformed in eighteenth-century America into rights of man, remain 
the central concern of a civilization torn between the angel and the dynamo. 
Freund, Individual and Commonwealth in the Thought ofMr. Justice Jackson, 8 STAN. L. REv. 9, 
23-24 (1955). Professor Freund has been credited with recognizing the emerging concept of 
personhood: 
The theme ofpersonhood ... is emerging. It has been groping for a rubric. Sometimes it is 
called privacy, inaptly it would seem to me; autonomy perhaps, though that seems too 
dangerously broad. But the idea is that of personhood in the sense of those attributes of an 
individual which are irreducible in his selfhood. 
Speech by P. Freund to the American Law Institute (May 23, 1975) (quoted in Craven, supra note 
33, at 702 n.l5). 
81. In this respect, Justice Jackson's first amendment philosophy goes beyond the views of 
Professor Meiklejohn. Meiklejohn's view was that in order to meet the responsibilities of governing, 
the citizenry must "acquire the intelligence, integrity, sensitivity, and generous devotion to the gen· 
eral welfare that, in theory, casting a ballot is assumed to express." Meiklejohn, The First Amend­
ment Is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. Cr. REV. 245, 255. Thus, for Meiklejohn, individual dignity and 
freedom of thought receive the protection of the first amendment, but they are merely means to the 
end of successful self-government. Justice Jackson further refines this theory by considering the 
distinctive values inherent in a democratic system. The chief value identified by Justice Jackson is a 
respect for individual personality. This aspect is the missing piece in the Meiklejohn analysis. Pro­
fessor Redish criticizes Meiklejohn for failing to explore the basic values served by a democratic 
system. See Redish, supra note 33, at 601. Redish views democracy as serving to foster individual 
self-realization, see supra note 33, because of its process-oriented values. Redish, supra note 33, at 
602. Process-oriented values include both "intrinsic" value and "instrumental" value. Intrinsic 
value is identified as "the value of having individuals control their own destinies." Id. The instru­
mental value is seen as "development of the individual's human faculties." I d. at 603. In the terms 
used by Professor Redish, Justice Jackson's reference to democracy as a system that recognizes the 
individual personality seems to speak more to instrumental values. 
82. Professor Freund explains the multiple layers of Justice Jackson's constitutional philosophy 
as resulting from the Justice's focus on the facts of the case before him instead of on an overarching 
judicial philosophy. Freund, Mr. Justice Jackson and Individual Rights, in MR. JuSTICE JACKSON: 
FOUR LECTURES IN His HONOR 29, 37 (1969) ("Justice Jackson was, above all-and this was one of 
his great strengths-a case lawyer."). 
83. A partial list of the references to Barnette over this period of years includes United States v. 
Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 97 (1945); Dennis v. United 
States, 341 U.S. 494, 507 n.5 (1951); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232, 244 n.l5 
(1957); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 530 (1958) (Black, J., concurring); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 
U.S. 599, 603 (1961); School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 
360, 371 (1964); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965). 
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such occasion came when the Court began to consider the issue of the 
constitutionality of affirmative loyalty oaths, those that required the oath 
taker to pledge support for the state or federal government, or both. 
Such affirmative loyalty oaths presented a somewhat different constitu­
tional problem than did the negative oath epitomized in Douds. 
As early as 1866, long before the non-Communist affidavits at issue 
in Douds, loyalty oaths and the various constitutional issues associated 
with such oaths had reached the Supreme Court. 84 Over the years, the 
Supreme Court employed an ever-growing collection of constitutional 
doctrines to test the constitutionality of such oaths, 85 often declaring the 
oaths unconstitutiona186 The central focus of the Court's attention, 
however, had been on negative oaths, like that in Douds, requiring indi­
viduals such as applicants for public employment to swear that they did 
not belong to any groups that advocated the overthrow of the United 
States government and that they never themselves had been disloyal to 
the government. 87 Such oaths sought both to force disclosure of past 
beliefs and associations and to condition government employment on the 
absence of such beliefs and affiliations. 88 In this sense, to the extent that 
these loyalty oaths related at all to the problem of compelled speech, they 
raised the problem of compelled disclosure rather than compelled expres­
sion. Although many of the oaths also required an affirmative declara­
tion of support for the United States Constitution, the Court often did 
not rule specifically on the constitutionality of this aspect of the oaths. 89 
84. See, e.g., Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866) (holding an 1865 federal law 
requiring attorneys practicing in the federal courts to swear they had never been disloyal to the 
United States unconstitutional as both a bill of attainder and as an ex post facto law); Cummings v. 
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866) (holding that provisions of 1865 Missouri Constitution requir­
ing all ministers and teachers to swear they had never been disloyal to the state or to the United 
States violated constitutional prohibitions on bills of attainder and ex post facto laws). 
85. For an excellent survey of the varying methods of analysis employed to dispose of the 
loyalty oath cases, see Note, Loyalty Oaths Are Not Dead-At Last Report One Was Alive in New 
York, 77 YALE L.J. 739 (1968). 
86. E.g., Whitehall v. Elkins, 389 U.S. 54, 62 (1967); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 366-70 
(1964); Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 285-88 (1961); Speiser v. Randall, 357 
u.s. 513, 529 (1958). 
87. E.g., Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278, 279 & n.1 (1961); Speiser v. Ran­
dall, 357 U.S. 513, 515 (1958); Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 718-19 (1951). 
88. To the extent that these negative oath cases are viewed as government attempts to affiX a 
condition of noninvolvement in subversive political activities to the opportunity for government em­
ployment, they can be classified as cases involving unconstitutional conditions. See, e.g., Wieman v. 
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (Oklahoma statute requiring prospeetive state employees to make a 
"loyalty oath" that they were not members of a Communist or subversive organization for the pre­
ceding five years violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment). On the subject of 
unconstitutional conditions, see Van Alstyne, The Demise ofthe Right-Privilege Distinction in Consti­
tutional Low, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HARV. L. REv. 
1595 (1960). 
89. E.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. at 184 n.l (Court did not rule on constitutionality of 
challenged support oath-"I will support and defend the Constitution"); Ex pane Garland, 71 U.S. 
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On the rare occasion when it did, the Court found the oath unconstitu­
tional on vagueness grounds.90 
The first attack on the merits of a so-called affirmative oath that 
reached the United States Supreme Court was Knight v. Board of Re­
gents.91 Faculty members at a private university challenged a New York 
State law requiring all state teachers to execute a loyalty oath. The oath 
provision required teachers to swear or affirm that they supported the 
United States Constitution and the Constitution of the State of New 
York and would faithfully discharge their duties. In challenging the oath 
requirement, the teachers relied upon Barnette. 
A three-judge federal court rejected the Barnette analogy on several 
grounds. First, the court interpreted Barnette as resting on religious free­
dom grounds despite Justice Jackson's specific disclaimer of such a 
ground of decision.92 Second, the court was of the opinion that the pen­
alties attached to refusal to take the oath were not as serious as in Bar­
nette. And third, the court interpreted "the statute to impose no 
restrictions upon political or philosophical expressions by teachers in the 
State of New York."93 
The last argument, although somewhat vague, suggests that an oath 
requirement violates the first amendment only if it restricts the rights of 
teachers to engage in protected expression. This view is consistent with 
the concept that freedom from compelled expression is merely a deriva­
tive of the guarantee of free speech and that protected rights are violated 
ouly when a required expression is likely to discourage speech and not 
merely because the compelled expression is an insult to an individual's 
political conscience. Because the court viewed the teacher's execution of 
the oath as a pro forma activity, unlikely to have any long-term impact 
on an individual teacher's willingness to engage in political dialogue, the 
oath did not rise to the level of a constitutional concern. 
In addition to these factors, the court also believed the government 
had an adequate justification for imposing the oath. The oath was 
viewed as the equal of the allegiance every citizen owed the government 
(4 Wall.) at 335 (no specific ruling on constitutionality of challenged support oath-"1 will support 
and defend the Constitution of the United States against all enemies"); Cummings v. Missouri, 71 
U.S. (4 Wall.) at 280-81 (no challenge to constitutionality of support oath-"1 will bear true faith 
and allegiance to the United States, and will support the Constitution and laws thereof as the 
supreme law of the land"). 
90. Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 371 (1964) (holding that oath requiring a promise to "pro­
mote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United States and the State of Washington" was 
too vague because the range of acts consistent and inconsistent with the promise is very broad and 
"institutions" is not defined). 
91. 269 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 36 (1968). 
92. 269 F. Supp. at 341. 
93. Id. 
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at common law. Further, the state's interest in employing the best teach­
ers justified the entire oath, including the requirement of subscribing to 
their dedication to their profession. An appeal to the Supreme Court by 
the teachers resulted only in a summary affirmance of the three-judge 
district court opinion.94 The Court, therefore, offered no clue as to 
whether the lower court's interpretation of Barnette was an accurate 
one.95 
Loyalty oaths do not reach the Court against the same constitu­
tional background as the pledge in Barnette, because these affirmative 
oath cases are complicated by three specific constitutional references to 
oaths.96 These constitutional provisions requiring oat}]. taking have made 
it easy for members of the Court to look favorably on the requirement of 
an affirmative loyalty oath even as against a first amendment challenge. 
As Chief Justice Vinson's opinion in Douds stated: "Obviously, the 
Framers of the Constitution thought that the exaction of an affirmation 
94. 390 u.s. 36 (1968). 
95. On several occasions after Knight, the Supreme Court was again asked to rule on the consti­
tutionality of affirmative loyalty oaths. Just as in Knight, the Court in Hosack v. Smiley, 276 F. 
Supp. 876 (D. Colo. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 390 U.S. 744 (1968), and Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. 
Supp. 1152 (D. Colo. 1969), aff'd per curiam, 397 U.S. 317 (1970), responded by summarily af­
firming three-judge district court decisions upholding oaths almost identical to the one challenged in 
Knight. 
Both Hosack and Ohlson involved a Colorado loyalty oath required of teachers, the original 
version of which had been struck down as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. Gallagher v. 
Smiley, 270 F. Supp. 86, 87 (D. Colo. 1967). The oath provided: "I solemnly swear or affirm that I 
will support the Constitution of the State of Colorado and of the United States of America and the 
laws of the State of Colorado and of the United States." Hosack, 276 F. Supp. at 878. The district 
court found the oath to be a straightforward statement of support for our government and not 
violative of the first amendment. Id. at 878-79. 
The oath was subsequently revised to read: "I solemnly (swear) (affirm) that I will uphold the 
constitution of the United States and the constitution of the State of Colorado, and I will faithfully 
perform the duties of the position upon which I am about to enter." Ohlson, 304 F. Supp. at 1153 
(quoting from CoLO. REv. STAT. §§ 123-17-6 to 123-17-8, as amended). The oath was upheld, 
having been unsuccessfully attacked on equal protection, vagueness, overbreadth, procedural due 
process, contract clause, ex post facto, and bill of attainder grounds. 
96. The Constitution sets out the oath required of all Presidents of the United States upon 
assuming office: "I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I wiii faithfully execute the Office of Presi­
dent of the United States, and wiii to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Consti­
tution of the United States." U.S. CaNST. art. II,§ I, cl. 7. Moreover, the Constitution provides that 
all members of Congress, all state legislators, and all executive and judicial officers of the states and 
United States "shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation to support this Constitution." Id. at art. VI, 
cl. 3. In addition to these two references to constitutionally required loyalty oaths, there is one 
restriction on the requirement of oath taking: "[N]o religious Test shall ever be required as a Quali­
fication to any Office or public Trust under the United States." Id. 
The Supreme Court has found it unnecessary to decide whether the prohibition on religious test 
oaths contained in Article VI applies to the states as well as to the federal government. In Torcaso v. 
Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), appellant was denied a commission as a notary public because he 
refused to declare his belief in the existence of God. He challenged his disqualification on the 
ground that it violated article VI, and the first and fourteenth amendments. Because the Supreme 
Court held that the religious test requirement unconstitutionally invaded Torcaso's "freedom of 
belief and religion," id. at 496, the Court found it unnecessary to decide whether the article VI 
prohibition applied to the states. Id. at 489 n. I. 
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of minimal loyalty to the Government was worth the price of whatever 
deprivation of individual freedom of conscience was involved."97 Thus, 
in any situation viewed as analogous to the oath taking required by the 
Constitution, no constitutional problem has been thought to exist. 
Two issues, however, have remained: first, how far oath taking can 
be required beyond the list of public officials included in the Constitu­
tion; and second, to what extent the language of an oath can go beyond 
the support for the Constitution described in the Constitution itself. The 
implication of Knight is that such oaths can be required of teachers, a 
group responsible for imparting moral values,98 and that the state can 
require both a promise of support and a promise of best professional 
efforts . 
. The issues raised in Knight came before the Supreme Court again in 
1972 with Cole v. Richardson.99 In Richardson, the Court addressed the 
affirmative oath question in a full opinion in upholding a loyalty oath 
97. 339 u.s. 382, 415 (1950). 
98. The conclusions that teachers play a special role in imparting values and that the state is 
therefore justified in holding them to higher standards than other public employees are reinforced by 
a 1979 Supreme Court decision, Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979), that upheld a state re­
quirement that public school teachers be United States citizens or persons manifesting an intention 
to become citizens. The Court stated: 
Within the public school system, teachers play a critical part in developing students' 
attitude toward government and understanding of the role ofcitizens in our society. Alone 
among employees of the system, teachers are in direct, day-to-day contact with students 
both in the classrooms and in the other varied activities ofa modem school. . . . Further, a 
teacher serves as a role model for his students, exerting a subtle but important influence 
over their perceptions and values. 
Id. at 78-79. 
99. 405 U.S. 676 (1972). Only seven members of the Court participated in Richardson. Justices 
Powell and Rehnquist took no part in the consideration of the case. The Court's decision had been 
foreshadowed by its 1971 deeision in Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971) (per curiam). In 
Connell, a Florida teacher who had been dismissed for refusing to sign a loyalty oath challenged her 
dismissal. In a brief per curiam opinion, the Court upheld only the support portion of the Florida 
oath which included both a promise of support for the state and federal constitutions and a state­
ment that the oath taker did "not believe in the overthrow of the Government." Id. at 208. The 
support part of the oath was upheld on the authority ofKnight, Hosack, and Ohlson. Justice Mar­
shall, joined by Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, concurred in the part of the opinion finding 
the support oath constitutional. In contrast to the support oath, the section of the oath that included 
a statement of belief was struck down. It violated the dismissed teacher's due process right to a 
hearing prior to dismissal for failing to subscribe to the oath. ld. at 208-09. Under the Florida 
procedure, the failure to sign the oath operated as an irrebutable presumption of belief in the over­
throw of the government. Justice Marshall disagreed with this aspect of the per curiam opinion. 
Citing Barnette, Justice Marshall asserted that the belief section of the oath was violative of the first 
amendment. Id. at 209-10. Justice Stewart would have first given the Florida courts the opportu­
nity to narrowly construe the belief section of the oath to avoid its constitutional infirmity. Id. at 
210; cf. Law Students Civil Rights Research Council, Inc. v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 161-63 (1971) 
(holding that a state rule that a lawyer may not be admitted to practice unless the lawyer believes "in 
the form of the Government of the United States and [is] loyal to [such] Government" is permissible 
because state authorities interpret this role "extremely narrow[ly] and [are] fully cognizant of pro­
tected constitutional freedoms"). 
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required of most Massachusetts public employees. 100 The text of the 
oath read as follows: 
I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will uphold and defend 
the Constitution of the United States of America and the Constitu­
tion of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts and that I will oppose 
the overthrow of the government of the United States of America 
or of this Commonwealth by force, violence or by any illegal or 
unconstitutional method.1o1 
In Richardson, the Court for the first time clearly distinguished between 
the permissible sort of support oath at issue and oaths that conditioned 
employment on the relinquishment of rights to political beliefs and as­
sociations secured by the first amendment.102 So long as an oath requir­
ing support is not vague in its meaning and does not ask an individual to 
attest to an absence of certain past or present political beliefs and associa­
tions, the oath can look to the constitutional provisions providing for 
oaths of office as the basis of its validity. Further, it is not necessary for 
an oath to employ language identical to that contained in the Constitu­
tion. 103 Thus, the Richardson majority viewed the requirement that one 
"uphold and defend" the Constitution as indistinguishable from the 
"preserve, protect and defend" language in article II, section 1, clause 8 
and the oath "to support this Constitution" in article VI, clause 3. 104 
More controversy surrounded the second part of the oath which re­
quired government employees to affirm that they would "oppose the 
overthrow of the government ... by force, violence or by any illegal or 
unconstitutional method." 105 Chief Justice Burger's opinion, joined by 
Justices White, Blackmun, and Stewart, interpreted this language as not 
expanding on the support obligations contained in the first part of the 
oath. Instead, the second part of the oath was seen as merely clarifying 
"the application of the first clause to a particular issue,"106 specifically 
the commitment made by persons in positions of public trust "to live by 
100. The controversy before the Supreme Court in Richardson had been before the Court on 
another occasion. In Cole v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 238 (1970), the Court had vacated the judgment 
of the court below and remanded to the district court to determine whether the controversy had 
become moot as a result of the elimination of the job previously held by Mrs. Richardson at Boston 
State Hospital. The district court, on remand, held that the case was not moot because the Boston 
State Hospital stood ready to rehire Mrs. Richardson once the oath controversy was resolved. The 
district court therefore reinstated its earlier judgment invalidating the oath and Cole, superintendent 
of the hospital, again appealed. 
101. ld. at 677-78 (quoting MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 14 (West 1970)). 
102. Id. at 680-82. 
103. Id. at 682. 
104. Id. at 683. 
105. ld. (quoting MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264, § 14 (West 1970)). 
106. Id. at 684. 
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the constitutional processes of our system."107 The oath was read as im­
posing no obligation to take specific action in defense of the government 
and as depriving no oath taker of any constitutional right. Because there 
was no first amendment right to overthrow the government by force or 
other unconstitutional method, "no constitutional right is infringed by an 
oath to abide by the constitutional system in the future." 108 
Although Chief Justice Burger's opinion did not address the issue of 
the relationship between the oath in Richardson and the pledge in Bar­
nette, a concurring opinion by Justices Stewart and White implicitly con­
sidered that question and concluded that the oath did not "impinge on 
conscience or belief."109 
That casual rejection of the Barnette analogy was disputed by the 
two dissenting opinions, one by Justice Douglas and the other by Justice 
Marshall joined by Justice Brennan. Justice Douglas, citing Barnette, 
expressed a general opposition to loyalty oaths, characterizing them as 
"tools of tyranny" aimed at "coercing and controlling the minds of men" 
and therefore "odious to a free people."110 Justice Marshall wrote at 
greater length about the evils of such oaths and the relationship between 
a constitutionally patterned support oath and expanded loyalty oaths. 
Unlike Justice Burger, Justice Marshall was not willing to consider 
the kind of oath at issue in Richardson as "no more than an amenity."111 
107. ld. This aspect of Chief Justice Burger's opinion is consistent with the view expressed by 
Justice Stewart in Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207, 210 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). See supra note 99. The oath at issue in Connell required the taker to 
swear she did "not believe in the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of 
Florida by force or violence." 403 U.S. at 209. In Justice Stewart's view, "[i]f the clause embraces 
the teacher's philosophical or political beliefs" it is constitutionally invalid, id. at 210, however, if 
"the clause does no more than test whether the first clause of the oath can be taken 'without mental 
reservation or purpose of evasion' it is constitutionally valid." ld. 
108. 405 U.S. at 686. Chief Justice Burger also rejected a vagueness challenge as well as a claim 
that the state employees who refused to take the oath were entitled to a hearing prior to being 
discharged from their employment. 
109. ld. at 687 (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Cole v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 238, 241 (1970) 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
110. Id. at 688 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 193 (1952) 
(Black, J., concurring)). In Wieman, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of an Oklahoma loy­
alty oath required of all state employees. Failure to subscribe to the oath resulted in loss of employ­
ment. Although the oath contained a variety of sections, including one requiring the employee to 
"support and defend the Constitution," 344 U.S. at 184 n.1, the Court's review was limited to the 
part requiring employees to swear that they were not and had not been members of subversive or 
Communist-front organizations. The Court viewed the exclusion of persons from public employ­
ment on the basis of innocent membership-the provision was not limited to knowing membership­
in a subversive organization to be an arbitrary exercise of government authority in violation of the 
due process clause. 344 U.S. at 191. The Court, therefore, viewed the oath as an unconstitutional 
condition on government employment. See supra note 88. 
1 I 1. 344 U.S. at 685. The language used by the Chief Justice is a quotation from Justice 
Harlan's concurring opinion in the Court's earlier encounter with the Massachusetts oath. Richard­
son, 397 U.S. at 240 (Harlan, J., concurring). See supra note 100. 
846 
Jackson's Flag Salute Legacy 
Instead, Justice Marshall drew a careful line between support oaths re­
quired of government employees "as an expression of 'minimal loyalty to 
the Government,' " 112 and more comprehensive oaths. Minimal oaths, 
although they intruded on the freedom to think and express ideas, were 
tolerated as an expression of the idea that public employees would abide 
by the law in the performance of their duties. More extensive oaths were 
highly suspect and justified only in an emergency. 
Justice Marshall argued that the government had only limited 
power "to force its citizens to perform symbolic gestures of loyalty,'' 113 
and that these limits existed because of the oath's potential as "an instru­
ment of thought control and a means of enforcing complete political con­
formity."114 Justice Marshall ended his opinion with a quotation from 
Justice Black's concurrence in Speiser v. Randall :115 
Loyalty oaths . . . tend to stifle all forms of unorthodox or 
unpopular thinking or expression-the kind ofthought and expres­
sion which has played such a vital and beneficial role in the history 
of this Nation. The result is a stultifying conformity which in the 
end may well turn out to be more destructive to our free society 
than foreign agents could ever hope to be. 116 
This view of the societal cost exacted by loyalty oaths parallels Justice 
Jackson's warning about the detrimental effect of forced patriotic expres­
sions in Barnette. 
Although the Richardson dissenters did not discuss at length the 
relationship between the unconstitutional pledge in Barnette and the oath 
at issue in Richardson, the source of their concern is clear. The dangers 
of forced expression are seen in terms of costs to society. In the end, 
suppression of unorthodox thinking would be destructive to our nation; 
new ideas and nonconforming individuals need to be allowed to develop 
unchecked for the betterment of all. An atmosphere of tolerance for 
thought and speech is an essential aspect of a self-governing free society. 
Although this theme is apparent in Justice Jackson's opinion in Barnette, 
112. 405 U.S. at 696 (quoting American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 415 
(1950)). 
113. Id. at 697. Justice Marshall followed this comment with a citation to Barnette. 
114. 405 U.S. at 698 (quoting Asper, The Long and Unhappy History ofLoyalty Testing in Mary­
land, 13 AM. J. LEGAL Htsr. 97, 108 (1969)). 
115. 357 U.S. 513 (1958). In Speiser, a California law requiring the signing of an oath to obtain a 
property tax exemption, which the California Constitution granted to veterans, was challenged. The 
oath provided as follows: "I do not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States 
or of the State of California by force or violence or other unlawful means, nor advocate the support 
of a foreign government against the United States in event of hostilities." Id. at 515. The Supreme 
Court characterized this scheme as a penalty imposed on the exercise of free speech rights and held 
that it violated the due process clause by unfairly placing the burden of proof on applicants for the 
exemption to show that they had not engaged in criminal advocacy. Id. at 528-29. 
116. 405 U.S. at 698 (quoting Speiser, 357 U.S. at 532). 
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the additional message communicated by Justice Jackson's opinion in 
Douds was that forced conformity must be avoided not only for the bene­
fit of the community but also for the sake of the affected individual. 
Thus, while Justice Jackson saw the first amendment as condemning 
government-compelled affirmations of belief for two complementary rea­
sons, the Richardson dissenters focused on only one concern, the good of 
the nation. 
Any comparison of Barnette and the oath cases is of course compli­
cated by the constitutional approval of support oaths for government of­
ficials. Whenever the issue of the effect of dictating expressions of 
loyalty is raised in these cases, however, the focus of the Court's discus­
sion is the same-the tendency of such oaths to stifle unpopular thoughts 
and ideas. Justices who find such oaths constitutionally inoffensive view 
the impact on the individuals forced to take such oaths as a trivial and at 
most momentary annoyance. In contrast, Justices who fear such oaths 
argue that they portend an ominous direction, one choking the desire to 
think new thoughts and express new ideas. 
Thus far in the compelled expression cases, the beginnings of an an­
alytic framework can be deciphered. There is an initial focus on the ten­
dency of the compulsion to stifle intellectual individualism. Only if such 
a tendency is found does the Court go on to consider the governmental 
purpose behind the compulsion. If the purpose is to force loyalty, it is 
suspect. If the purpose is one of promoting some other legitimate gov­
ernment interest, a closer case is presented. 
IV. Wooley v. Maynard 
No expansion of the Barnette doctrine occurred through the loyalty 
oath cases of the late sixties and early seventies.' The case remained sui 
generis, and its central issue did not arise again in any completely analo­
gous situation117 untill977, when the Supreme Court decided Wooley v. 
117. One case in the period after Richardson, although distinguishable, deserves mention. 
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomiiio, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), involved a challenge to Florida's 
right of reply statute granting candidates for public office a right to reply to negative comments 
about the candidate's qualifications appearing in a newspaper. The paper was required to print the 
reply in the same type and just as conspicuously as the original critical commentary. The Miami 
Herald argued that the statute was an impermissible regulation of newspaper content. The statute's 
defenders replied that the statute's guarantee of a right of access was consistent with first amend­
ment principles. Although much of the opinion is addressed to the arguments made by access advo­
cates that the monopoly position of many newspapers has a negative effect on the marketplace of 
ideas, the Court did describe the statute as a "compulsion exerted by government on a newspaper to 
print that which it would not otherwise print." Id. at 256. The Court expressed the fear that the law 
would cause newspapers to refrain from publishing critical comments about candidates to avoid the 
reply requirement. Although the Court did not discuss the relationship between Tornillo and Bar­
nette, it is clear that one exists. Unlike Barnette, however, the compulsion is triggered by a particu­
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Maynard. 118 In Wooley, the Court directly confronted the Barnette pre­
cedent in a fact pattern parallel even to the extent that the appellees were 
Jehovah's Witnesses raising a claim of religious liberty under the 
Constitution. 
Jehovah's Witnesses George and Maxine Maynard challenged New 
Hampshire's requirement that all license plates for noncommercial vehi­
cles bear the state motto "Live Free or Die"119 as offensive to their reli­
gious beliefs. The Maynards also disagreed with the motto as a 
statement of political conviction, believing instead that "life is more pre­
cious than freedom." 120 The Maynards covered the state motto with 
tape. Mr. Maynard was found guilty on three separate occasions of vio­
lating the New Hampshire misdemeanor law against obscuring any part 
of a license plate.121 The Supreme Court viewed the case as raising "the 
question of whether the State may constitutionally require an individual 
to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by display­
ing it on his private property in a manner and for the express purpose 
that it be observed and read by the public."122 
At the outset of his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger ad­
dressed the relationship between the first amendment right to refrain 
from speaking and the free speech guarantee. The two rights were seen 
as complementary; both were necessary to assure that public debate re­
mained vigorous. This proposition was followed by a discussion of Bar­
nette. Barnette was viewed as involving a more drastic infringement of 
rights than the more passive behavior at issue in Wooley, but both cases 
were found to involve state invasions of "the sphere of intellect and spirit 
which it is the purpose of the First Amendment to our Constitution to 
reserve from all official control."123 The thread common to the two 
cases was that both concerned "a state measure which forces an individ­
• 
Jar action on the part of the press and can be avoided by refraining from publishing critical 
comments. This chilling effect on the willingness of the paper to print critical commentary clearly 
contributed to the law's invalidity. Professor Tribe has described Tornillo as a situation involving 
compelled speech that "comes too close to the power to censor speech." L. TRIBE, supra note 33, 
§ 12-22, at 697. 
118. 430 u.s. 705 (1977). 
119. The motto is taken from a remark attributed to Major General John Stark: "Live free or 
die; death is not the worst of evils." State v. Hoskin, 112 N.H. 332, 334, 295 A.2d 454, 455 (1972). 
Prior to 1971, license plates in New Hampshire bore the message "Scenic New Hampshire." 
120. 430 U.S. at 707 n.2 (quoting the Affidavit of George Maynard). 
121. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 261:176 {1982). 
122. 430 U.S. at 713. In contrast, the district court viewed the case as raising a claim based on 
symbolic expression. 406 F. Supp. 1381, 1386-87 (D.N.H. 1976). The court saw Mr. Maynard's 
behavior in covering the motto as symbolic expression because it was done to symbolize his objeetion 
to the motto and was likely to be understood in those terms. Id. at 1387. The district court held that 
the state lacked an adequate justification for interfering with free speech rights. Id. at 1388. The 
Supreme Court found it unnecessary to rule on this issue. 430 U.S. at 713. 
123. 430 U.S. at 715 (quoting West Va. StateBd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,642 (1943)). 
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ual, as part of his daily life . . . to be an instrument for fostering public 
adherence to an ideological point of view he finds unacceptable."124 
The Court then asked whether the state had a constitutionally suffi­
cient justification for its actions. Two interests had been advanced by the 
state. First, the state claimed the law assisted in ready identification of 
passenger vehicles because the motto was said to aid police in determin­
ing whether a vehicle was carrying proper plates. Although the Court 
accepted the importance of this state concern, it found that there were 
less drastic means available to achieve this purpose. 
Second, the state asserted that the license plate "promotes apprecia­
tion of history, individualism and state pride."125 The Court's reaction 
to this purported justification is of greater interest. Labelling the interest 
as "not ideologically neutral,"126 the Court indicated this legitimate in­
terest could be pursued in a variety of ways. Disseminating the state's 
chosen ideology by forcing individuals to become "an instrument for fos­
tering public adherence,"127 however, was not a legitimate choice among 
available means.128 
· Wooley offers a basis for determining what elements are now viewed 
as essential to the claim of freedom from coerced expression raised in 
both Barnette and Wooley. In the two cases, there is a distinction based 
on what is being coerced. The coerced speech in Barnette was pure 
speech in the form of the pledge of allegiance or, at the least, symbolic 
expression in the form of a salute: students were compelled to recite the 
pledge and salute the flag. In both written and recited loyalty oath cases, 
moreover, there was also a forced act connoting approval of the words of 
the pledge or oath: the oath takers had to recite in words or affix their 
signatures to a written declaration. This was not the case in Wooley. A 
license plate attached to a person's automobile is not the same kind of 
coerced affirmation-the Maynards were forced to display the state's 
message, not to identify it as their own. As the Court so graphically put 
it, appellee's car was used as "a 'mobile billboard' for the State's ideologi­
cal message."129 
This distinction between advertising the state's message and assert­
ing it as one's own, however, was not viewed as critical. The Maynards' 
124. Id. at 715. 
125. Id. at 716. 
126. Id. at 717. 
127. Id. at 715. 
128. Justice Jackson stressed a similar point in Barnette. In Justice Jackson's view, promoting 
patriotism, although a legitimate state interest, could not be furthered by coercing the recitation of 
the pledge. 319 U.S. at 640-41. 
129. 430 U.S. at 715. 
850 
Jackson's Flag Salute Legacy 
objections were based on a serious religious and political disagreement 
with the content of the message and a profound objection to displaying it, 
a resentment not lessened by the fact that they were not forced to recite 
the message by words or affirm it by deeds. In light of the depth of their 
objection, the distinction between affirmative and passive acts was not 
seen by the Court as a central issue. 
The Court, however, viewed as important two factual similarities 
between the cases. The first was the repetitious character of the forced 
expression: in Barnette, the pledge was recited each school day; in 
Wooley, the message was displayed each time the Maynards drove their 
car, part of their daily routine. Although the Court did not say so explic­
itly, there is a distinction between a daily activity and an oath recited on 
a single occasion, as in Richardson, or signing an oath form only once. 
This distinction does have significance in light of the first amendment 
values protected by the Barnette decision. Barnette addresses the chilling 
of individuality and the diminishing of the desire to engage in original 
thought; in that respect, a single act of compelled expression can be more 
easily shrugged off and is less likely to have a dampening effect upon the 
human spirit. In contrast, a repeated act is more likely, in a manner akin 
to brainwashing, to suppress individual initiative and to bring individual 
thought into line with the state's chosen ideology. 
A second similarity between the cases is that in both Barnette and 
Wooley the state's purpose was to promote a chosen ideology. Deliberate 
state encouragement ofa particular viewpoint is not analogous to the fact 
that another statute-with a nonideological purpose-may support some 
ideology as an incidental outgrowth.130 To distinguish other cases, the 
Wooley Court contrasted the license plate with the use of a state seal to 
130. A similar distinction, based on the government's purpose, between a statute prompted by a 
desire to suppress expression and one causing such a result only as an incidental outgrowth of some 
other governmental purpose has been viewed as critical in a number of Supreme Court decisions 
beginning with United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). In that case, the Court upheld a 
conviction for burning a draft card and found a symbolic speech defense insufficient grounds for 
overturning the conviction. The Court viewed the question of whether "the governmental interest is 
unrelated to the suppression of free expression," id. at 377, as critical to its analysis. The govern­
ment's interest was identified as a concern for the efficiency of the Selective Service System rather 
than a desire to prevent draft card burning, id. at 382; therefore, the criterion was satisfied. The 
O'Brien test is explored thoroughly in Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles ofCategori­
zation and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975). More recently, 
the Court has shown a renewed interest in the distinction between statutes justified by a government 
interest in suppressing expression and those justified by legitimate government interests "unrelated 
to the supression of ideas." See City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804-05 (1984) 
(quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377); see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. 
Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) ("[D]ifferential treatment ... suggests that 
the goal of regulation is not unrelated to supression of expression, and such a goal is presumptively 
unconstitutional."). 
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authenticate documents. 131 A seal, although it may contain a state 
motto, is not stamped onto documents for the purpose of disseminating 
the message contained in the motto; instead, the purpose is the ideologi­
cally neutral one of authentication, and the dissemination of any ideolog­
ical message is only an incidental by-product. State efforts that infringe 
on individual interests and purposefully disseminate favored ideologies, 
however, must be viewed less benignly by the Court. Because such ef­
forts can be seen as a form of reverse viewpoint discrimination, 132 they 
must be analyzed with greater attention to the relationship between ends 
and means. From the tone of Wooley and Barnette, whether the use of 
coerced expression is ever an appropriate means to disseminate a state­
supported idea is unclear. 133 Although the government may be free to 
131. 430 U.S. at 715 n.ll. 
132. In the typical case ofgovernment viewpoint-discrimination, government efforts are directed 
at censoring speech that promotes a disfavored idea. Access to a public forum may be permitted for 
some speech, but not for speech the government views as dangerous or evil. See, e.g., Widmar v. 
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,281 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that a university cannot discrimi­
nate against religious speech when school facilities are available to discuss anticlerical ideas); South­
eastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (holding that the musical "Hair'' could not 
be arbitrarily excluded from a municipal theater on the basis of its objectionable content). In some 
of the content discrimination cases, however, the government has chosen to grant access to speech 
within a particular subject-matter category and to deny it for others. Government efforts to grant a 
preferred status to certain private speakers and deprive others of a method of communication have 
often failed. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455,459-63 (1980) (concluding that a state cannot 
discriminate between ideas expressed by labor picketers over those communicated by nonlabor pick­
eters); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972) (holding that to permit labor picketing and 
not other forms of picketing is impermissible content discrimination). But cf. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. 
Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (holding that because of its special nonforum 
status, school mail system could be made available to union that served as exclusive bargaining 
representative and not to the rival uuion). In a situation like Wooley or Barnette, the government 
forces an individual to disseminate a government-favored viewpoint. Such efforts can be considered 
a form of forbidden reverse viewpoint discrimination designed to promote, not censor, a particular 
idea, and can be viewed as analytically different from government promotion of a favored idea by 
government speech. See infra note 134. The difference lies in the fact that in cases in which the 
government coerces individuals to assist in a government publicity campaign it is infringing directly 
on the constitutional rights of such persons. The government, therefore, bears a heavy burden of 
justification to legitimate its actions. 
Barnette involved a far more offensive version of government use of the citizenry to spread a 
government-supported message than did Wooley. In Barnette, the government's tactics obscured the 
source of the message. Although the government provided the occasion for the expression of patri­
otic sentiments by mandating the flag salute, the participants appeared to genuinely support those 
sentiments. By contrast, in Wooley the license plate bearing the state motto was supplied by the state 
and nothing about its appearance on the vehicle suggested that the driver shared the view expressed 
in the motto. Thus, the degree of complicity and duplicity in the government's scheme was far less 
than in Barnette. 
133. See Wooley, 430 U.S. at 717 ("[W]here the State's interest is to disseminate an ideology, •.• 
such interest cannot outweigh an individual's First Amendment right to avoid becoming the courier 
for such message."); Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642 ("If there is any fixed star in our constitutional 
constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, 
nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their 
faith therein."); see also supra note 28 (discussing the extent to which Justice Jackson's opinion in 
Barnette may reveal an absolute prohibition of coerced expression of government supported ideas). 
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promote some ideas at the expense of others, I34 it may not be able to use 
the device of forced affirmation or support as a legitimate means to that 
end. Such means may be per se illegitimate or may be inappropriate be­
cause of the existence of less restrictive alternatives. 
As the Wooley majority read Barnette, I35 the critical element was 
the individual's animus at being forced to participate in the dissemination 
of a state-sponsored message. The form of individual participation is not 
critical: being forced to express support for that message and being 
forced to disseminate it are both equally condemned. What does seem to 
matter is the quantity of forced participation. A key factor appears to be 
whether the state-composed message involves the individual only once or 
as an ongoing demand.I36 
These factors must be examined to judge their consistency with the 
focus of the Court's concern in Barnette. The Barnette Court was princi­
pally concerned with forced conformity because of the cost it exacted 
from the individual and from a society that depends on individual partic­
ipation in its government processes. To the extent that the state habitu­
ally requires an act affirming belief in a particular idea, that fear is well 
founded. The process of creating a universal voice sounding a single note 
134. Government efforts to promote particular ideas must be considered in the context of the 
subject of government speech. Questions have been raised as to whether constitutional limits should 
be placed on the government's ability to promote favored ideas by participating as a speaker in the 
marketplace of ideas. Scholarly commentary considering this question includes M. YuooF, WHEN 
GOVERNMENT SPEAKS: POLmCS, LAW, AND GOVERNMENT EXPRESSION IN AMERICA (1983); 
Kamenshine, The First Amendment's Implied Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REv. 1104 (1979); 
Schauer, Is Government Speech a Problem?, 35 STAN. L. REv. 373 (1983); Shiffrin, Government 
Speech, 27 UCLA L. REv. 565 (1980). 
135. Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion disagreed with the majority's view that Wooley was 
closely analogous to Barnette. Distinguishing Barnette, Justice Rehnquist noted that the State of 
New Hampshire had not compelled the Maynards to speak or engage in any act that was akin to 
speech in its communicative effect. Justice Rehnquist argued that the Barnette principle depended 
on the coercion of an affirmative belief. He argued, "[T]he State must place the citizen in the posi­
tion of either apparently or actually 'asserting as true' the message." 430 U.S. at 721. The May­
nards were not placed in any such position because placing the license plate on their car did not 
imply that they endorsed the state motto or agreed with the sentiment it expressed. /d. at 721-22. 
Justice Rehnquist's view on this point is supported by Hoskin v. State, 112 N.H. 332, 336, 295 A.2d 
454, 457 (1972), an earlier deeision by the New Hampshire Supreme Court considering several con­
stitutional challenges raised by two persons who had been convicted of obliterating the state motto 
appearing on their automobile license plates. The court rejected all the claims raised by the defend­
ants, including their claim of deprivation of first amendment rights. I d. 
Justice Rehnquist also stated there was nothing to prevent the Maynards from disclaiming the 
idea communicated by the state motto through a bumper sticker placed alongside their license plate. 
430 U.S. at 722. Justice Rehnquist apparently did not consider the dilemma his solution would 
create: the Maynards would be able to counter state-coerced expression only by disclosing their 
conflicting beliefs. Indirectly, then, the competing message remedy would involve compelled disclo­
sure. See infra notes 196, 199-201 and accompanying text. 
136. In both Barnette and Wooley, the challengers could point to daily repetitions of the offen­
sive message and the fact that the message reached a wide audience and had a visible presence in the 
marketplace of ideas at least in part because of compelled expression. See supra text preceding note 
130. 
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may be effective-the individual is impressed with the cost of noncon­
formity, including the cost of being the lone dissenting voice, and the 
price of nonconformity may seem too high for an individual to express a 
dissenting opinion. Forced repetition of an idea may also make that idea 
seem more acceptable as each repeated act of affirmation makes the 
state-sponsored idea seem less and less objectionable. 
Being forced to advertise the state's message, in contrast, may be 
more easily shrugged off. Once attached to the car, the license plate can 
be largely ignored by a driver not forced to perform any act of obeisance 
to it. The state's message may be an irritant to individuals and they may 
deeply resent the state's imposing on them the task of aiding in its dis­
semination campaign, but an individual is not forced to choose between 
the act of reciting the motto and imprisonment. ' 
To the extent that Wooley is a response to first amendment concerns 
articulated in Barnette, it is not a response to the fear that forced con­
formity poses a threat to our democratic system by weakening the incen­
tive to introduce new, nonconforming ideas. Instead, its appeal is to the 
vindication of individual personality. The Maynards felt their personal 
integrity was violated by having to display the state motto; its presence 
was an insult to deeply held religious, moral, and political beliefs. 137 Any 
association between them and the motto on their license plate deeply af­
fected their sense of personal well-being, because it affronted both their 
inner selves and the selves they wished to present to the world. 138 
Although the state's message did not create any pressure to conform, 
137. Despite the Court's disclaimer on this point, it is impossible to judge how much the Court's 
willingness to protect the concept of individual identity in Wooley might have been influenced by the 
intensity of the Maynards' religiously based objections to the state's message. Interestingly, despite 
that intensity, the record in Wooley indicates that Mr. Maynard was a "disfellowshipped" (a term 
synonymous with excommunicated) Jehovah's Witness who had been expelled from a congregation 
in Concord, New Hampshire. Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at A-40, Wooley v. Maynard, 
430 U.S. 705 (1977). In addition, charges of disturbing the peace had been brought against him by 
the Elders of the Congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses in Claremont, New Hampshire because he 
disrupted a religious meeting. Id. at A-41. The record also indicates that not all Jehovah's Wit­
nesses shared Mr. Maynard's view that the license plate bearing the state motto was objectionable. 
Brief for Appellees at 59 n.35, Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. at 705 (1977). This factor, however, 
would not be enough to deprive him of his claim based on religious belief so long as he was sincere in 
his view. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981). 
138. In other contexts, the Court has been less sympathetic to claims based on protection of 
individual identity. See, e.g., Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 239, 248 (1976) (regulation of police 
officer's hair length and style upheld); Daniel v. Paul, 424 U.S. 693, 712 (1976) (rejecting claim that 
constitutionally protected liberty was denied when plaintiff's reputation was damaged by two police 
chiefs' distribution to merchants of a flyer identifying plaintiff as a shoplifter). For a critical analysis 
of the reasoning and result in Paul, see Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property," 62 CORNELL L. 
REv. 405, 426 (1977) (arguing that the Court's analysis "ignores the spiritual character of human 
personality"). Although some constitutionally based protection for individual identity is available in 
contexts raising a claim of personal privacy, see, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) 
{protecting the right of private possession of obscene material), no such claim was available in 
Wooley because the Maynards were not asserting the right to behave as they wished in the privacy of 
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displaying that message made them feel like traitors to their belief sys" 
tern. In all these ways it infringed upon their freedom from compelled 
association with an idea with which they disagreed. To the extent that 
the first amendment as reflected in Barnette speaks to such an interest, 
Wooley is consistent with it. The major thrust ofBarnette, however, was 
more concerned with the instrumental values served by the free speech 
guarantee and less with its identity"reinforcing side. To that extent, the 
values at stake in Wooley were different ones. 
Thus, the Wooley Court's concerns appear to be two"fold. First, the 
Court limited the tools available to government for the dissemination of 
govemment"favored ideas. The government may advertise, promote, and 
fund certain ideas, but cannot force unwilling citizens to participate in its 
advertising campaign. This theme was, of course, apparent in Barnette 
as well; 139 Justice Jackson's opinion recognized the need to check the 
power of government so as to curb excesses that could lead us down the 
road to a totalitarian state. 140 Second, Wooley limited infringement on 
the freedom of individuals to associate only with ideas of their own 
choosing. In this aspect of the opinion, the Wooley Court went a step 
beyond Justice Jackson's primary concern in Barnette, supplementing a 
concern for individual freedom of mind as a precondition for democracy 
with the concept of protecting individual personality as an end in itself. 
V. Abood v. Detroit Board ofEducation 
The Court's next confrontation with the Barnette principle came in 
a distinctly different context. Only one month after Wooley, the Court 
decided Abood v. Detroit Board ofEducation, 141 a challenge to an aspect 
of Michigan law authorizing union representation for public sector em" 
ployees. Michigan pennitted "agency"shop arrangements"-agreements 
between a union and employer whereby nonunion employees represented 
by the union were required to pay a service fee to the union. 142 The 
service fee equalled what union members paid as union dues. 
In Abood, an agency-shop arrangement was part of the collective 
bargaining agreement between the Detroit Federation of Teachers and 
the Detroit Board of Education. Two nonunion teachers filed lawsuits 
charging that the service fee arrangement violated the constitutional 
their home, but instead wanted to be free of government intrusion in the public activity of driving 
their car. 
139. See 319 U.S. at 642. 
140. /d. at 640-41. 
141. 431 u.s. 209 (1977). 
142. The distinctions between agency-shop and union-shop arrangements are discussed infra 
note 151. 
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rights of teachers "who object to public sector unions as such or to vari­
ous union activities financed by the compulsory service fees." 143 
The Court viewed the case as presenting three not altogether separa­
ble issues. One issue was the constitutionality of the agency shop, which 
forced nonunion employees to support the union despite the decision of 
those employees not to join the union. The challengers claimed this re­
quirement violated their rights to freedom of association not in the tradi­
tional sense of interfering with a desired association but in the sense of 
compelling an undesired association.144 In this respect, Abood was far 
from the first time the Court had been confronted with such a claim.14s 
The second and third issues in Abood concerned the service fee re­
quirement and the purposes for which the service fee money was spent. 
Some of the funds supported the union's collective bargaining activities, 
and the challengers objected to being forced to finance such activities 
against their will. In addition, the challengers alleged that service fee 
money was also used to promote political views, to support political can­
didates, and to advance other ideological activities. 146 The challengers 
claimed that they did not approve of these political activities and would 
not willingly support them. 
Both challenges to the use of service fee money raised a free speech 
issue. In effect, nonunion employees were compelled to support activi­
ties, ideas, and causes against their will. The form of that support was 
fmancial, rather than a verbal committmetit as in Barnette or providing 
advertising space as in Wooley. The question before the Court was the 
extent to which the right to freedom of expression as defined in Barnette 
and Wooley was implicated by forced financing. 
All three issues in Abood required reference to first amendment con­
straints on government-compelled sponsorship of ideas. Although the 
connection between a compelled affirmation such as a pledge of alle­
giance and compelled funding is obvious, a somewhat more complex re­
lationship exists between compelled affirmation and compelled 
association. The roots of that relationship are found in the intertwining 
of the freedom of association and the freedom of expression. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that, although freedom of 
association is not named in the first amendment, it is a correlative right 
143. 431 U.S. at 211. The two lawsuits, both flied in state court, were identical except for the 
fact that one, Warczak v. Board of Educ., 73 LAB. REL. REP. (BNA) 2237 (Jan. 19, 1970), was a 
class action and the other, filed by D. Louis Abood and other named teachers, was not. The two 
cases were consolidated in the trial court. 
144. Abood, 431 U.S. at 213. 
145. For a discussion of these earlier precedents, see infra text accompanying notes 150-58. 
146. 431 U.S. at 232. 
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inextricably linked to the specifically enumerated first amendment free­
doms.147 Freedom of association must be protected to enable persons 
with shared beliefs to join together, free from government interference, to 
work toward a more general acceptance of their ideas. Collective activ­
ity, in many cases, may be the most effective method for spreading new 
ideas. Protecting only the right of individuals to engage in activities fos­
tered by the first amendment-and not the right to associate with others 
to engage in those activities-would greatly weaken the ability of diverse 
and divergent viewpoints to be heard in the marketplace of ideas. For 
these reasons, the Supreme Court has protected freedom of association in 
a variety of contexts.148 
The argument of the nonunion teachers in Abood was that just as 
there is a freedom to associate to pursue activities protected by the first 
amendment, there is also a freedom not to asso.ciate. If one is forced to 
associate with a group against one's will, the impact on the individual is 
akin to the impact produced by the forced pledge in Barnette. In an 
agency-shop situation, through the mechanism of selecting an exclusive 
bargaining representative, nonunion employees are compelled to lend 
their apparent support to and be represented by a group whose philoso­
phy is at odds with the individual employee's own values. Moreover, by 
requiring nonunion employees to pay a service fee, those employees are 
forced to help finance the union's collective bargaining activities. The 
forced funding therefore operates as an additional form of compelled as­
sociation, tying the nominally nonunion employees into an even closer 
involuntary relationship with the union.149 
Responding to the arguments advanced by the nonunion teachers, 
147. NAACP v. Alabama ex reL Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) ("It is beyond debate that 
freedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of 
the 'liberty' assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment which embraces 
freedom of speech."); see also Emerson, Freedom ofAssociation and Freedom ofExpression, 14 YALE 
LJ. I (1964) (discussing the difficulties with an independent constitutional doctrine of "freedom of 
association"); Fellman, Constitutional Rights ofAssociation, 1961 SuP. Cr. REv. 74 (analyzing free­
dom of association in the context of decisions of the 1960 Supreme Court Term); Raggi, An In­
dependent Right to Freedom ofAssociation, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 1 (1977) (considering the 
potential of an independent constitutional doctrine of freedom of association). 
148. The Court has struck down efforts to penalize individuals for membership in a disfavored 
group, Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 
(1957), and has prevented compelled disclosure of the names of association members when that 
disclosure was likely to deter membership in the group, Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 
(1960). The classic rationale for prohibiting compelled disclosure of association membership lists 
was first set out in NAACP v. Alabama ex rei. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958). In Patterson, the 
Court observed, "Inviolability of privacy in group association may in many circumstances be indis­
pensible to preservation of freedom of association, particularly where a group espouses dissident 
beliefs." Id. at 462. 
149. Abood, 431 U.S. at 222 ("To be required to help finance the union as a collective-bargaining 
agent might well be thought, therefore, to interfere in some way with an employee's freedom to 
associate for the advancement of ideas, or to refrain from doing so as he sees fit."). 
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the Court linked two aspects of the Michigan agency-shop arrangement. 
Compelling nonunion teachers to accept the union as their only collec­
tive bargaining agent and requiring them to pay a service charge as their 
fair share of the cost of collective bargaining activities were viewed by the 
Court as raising a single constitutional issue. The challenge to the use of 
service fees for non-collective-bargaining, ideological activities engaged 
in by the union was treated as a separate constitutional issue. 
In disposing of the first issue, that of the constitutionality of the 
exclusive representation aspect of the agency shop and the required fee 
for collective bargaining activities, the Court was able to point to prior 
decisions approving of similar arrangements. As early as 1956, in Rail­
way Employes' Department v. Hanson, 150 the Supreme Court upheld the 
union-shop provision of the·Railway Labor Act151 against a challenge 
from nonunion railroad e171ployees. The Hanson claimants alleged that 
their freedom of thought and association protected by the first amend­
ment was violated by compelled association with a group whose political 
and ideological views they did not share.152 The Hanson Court re­
sponded by pointing to the absence of any evidence in the record to show 
that compelled membership would "forc[e] ideological conformity"153 
and lead to an impairment of free speech rights. In the absence of such 
evidence, the facial validity of the union-shop provision was upheld. 
Five years after Hanson, the Court once again had an opportunity to 
rule on the compelled-association question in Lathrop v. Donahue, 154 a 
150. 351 u.s. 225 (1956). 
151. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1952). The union-shop arrangement in Hanson differed somewhat from 
the agency-shop provision in Abood. Under a union-shop agreement, all employees are required to 
become members of the union as a condition of employment, and as union members, they must pay 
all union dues and fees. In contrast, under an agency-shop arrangement, employees need not become 
formal members of the union. Instead, they may opt to pay an agency fee to the union, the amount 
of which is equivalent to union dues. In the Supreme Court's view, the union-shop arrangement 
permitted under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1982), and the Railway 
Labor Act, Act of Jan. 10, 1951, ch. 1220, § 152, Eleventh, 64 Stat. 1238, 1238-39 (codified at 45 
U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh (1982)), is the "practical eqnivalent" of the agency shop, Abood, 431 U.S. at 
217 n.10 (quoting NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 3'73 U.S. 734, 743 (1963)), because membership 
in the union cannot be conditioned on anything other than the payment of dues and fees. NLRB v. 
General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. at 742 (1963); Radio Officers' Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17,40-42 
(1954). Thus, union membership amounts to nothing more than the payment of a sum of money, the 
very thing required under the agency-shop arrangement. The Supreme Court has never fully re­
solved the question of whether this "technical distinction" may have constitutional significance in 
some contexts. General Motors, 373 U.S. at 744. 
152. 351 U.S. at 236. 
153. /d. at 238. 
154. 367 U.S. 820 (1961). International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), 
decided the same day as Lathrop, provided the Court with a similar opportunity. In Street, the 
Court considered a further challenge to the Railway Labor Act's union-shop provisions. 45 U.S.C. 
§ 152 (1952). Unlike the challengers in Hanson, the appellees in Street argued that a significant part 
of the union dues was used by the union to contribute to political campaigns and promote political 
causes with which they disagreed and that this use violated first amendment rights. The Supreme 
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challenge to Wisconsin's integrated bar system. Under Wisconsin law, 
an attorney had to be a dues-paying member of the State Bar of Wiscon­
sin to practice law. Membership dues funded various activities including 
investigating complaints of lawyer misconduct, promoting continuing 
legal education to increase lawyer competency, creating study groups to 
evaluate the state's judicial system and the quality of legal education, and 
engaging in legislative and political lobbying activities.155 The Wisconsin 
system was challenged by an attorney who argued that he was being 
compelled to support an organization that engaged in political and prop­
aganda activities that he opposed in violation of his right to freedom of 
association. The compelled support was in the form of fifteen dollars in 
annual dues. 
In evaluating the appellant's constitutional objection, the Court 
looked first at the purposes the state intended to further through its inte­
grated bar system-promoting "high standards of practice and the eco­
nomical and speedy enforcement oflegal rights."156 The Court held that, 
in order to improve the quality of legal services, the state was permitted 
to require that the costs of this effort be borne by the state's lawyers157 
and that the state's means were sufficiently tailored to the achievement of 
the desired ends.1ss 
In light of the Hanson and Lathrop holdings, the Abood Court could 
Court found it unnecessary to reach the constitutional question. As a matter of statutory construc­
tion, the Court ruled that the Act did not vest the union with absolute discretion in the use of an 
employee's dues. Under the Act, unions were not free to use compelled membership fees to promote 
political activities opposed by the employee contributing that money. 367 U.S. at 768-69. Professor 
Wellington has described the Supreme Court's decision in Street as "a slick but shallow performance 
in the delicate art of avoiding constitutional questions through statutory interpretation." Welling­
ton, Machinists v. Street: Statutory Interpretation and the Avoidance of Constitutional Issues, 1961 
SUP. Cr. REv. 49, 73. 
155. 367 U.S. at 828-31. 
156. /d. at 833 (quoting In reIntegration of the Bar, 273 Wis. 281, 283, 77 N.W.2d 602, 603 
(1956)). 
157. /d. at 843. The Court's conclusion that the burden imposed on the state's lawyers was 
reasonable in light of the state's purposes was supported by reference to its earlier decision in Rail­
way Employes' Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). As in Hanson, the Court found no interfer­
ence with freedom of association "in light of the limitation of the membership requirement to the 
compulsory payment of reasonable annual dues." 367 U.S. at 843. 
158. 367 U.S. at 843. The issue of whether appellant's money could be used, over his objection, 
to further the political agenda of the State Bar was reached on the merits by only five members of the 
Court and those members were divided three-to-two. Justice Harlan, in a concurring opinion joined 
by Justice Frankfurter, concluded that all political uses of the dues money were permissible. In 
Justice Harlan's view this result was justified for a number of reasons. First, in opting for an inte­
grated bar, Wisconsin was not guilty of any improper " 'establishment' of political beliefs" because 
the political positions likely to be taken by the Integrated Bar were far from predictable. /d. at 853. 
Second, requiring financial support for views one disagrees with is not likely to have a "substantial 
limiting effect on one's right to speak and be heard" expressing a differing opinion. /d. at 856. 
Finally, Justice Harlan distinguished Barnette because the contribution of money was a much Jess 
"concrete and intimate" expression of belief in a cause than is recitation of the pledge of allegiance, 
id. at 858, and because the government's purpose was not to promote a particular viewpoint. /d. at 
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easily approve the legitimacy of the agency shop itselfl59 and the require­
ment that nonunion employees support the union's collective bargaining 
activities. 160 The problem presented by the use of dues money for other 
purposes was more troublesome. All past efforts to present this issue to 
the Court had failed. 161 This time, however, the Court found the issue 
858-59. Justice Whittaker, concurring separately, also appeared willing to uphold all uses of the fee 
against a constitutional challenge. Id. at 865. 
In contrast, in separate dissenting opinions, Justices Black and Douglas viewed the exaction of 
money to support candidates and causes one fmds objectionable a clear violation of the first amend­
ment. Justice Black believed the interference with an individual lawyer's ability to think and speak 
freely outweighed the state's interest. Id. at 874. Justice Douglas carefully distinguished the Inte­
grated Bar from the labor union. Although freedom of association might need to be compromised in 
the interest of labor peace, forced association of members of a profession was not necessary to fur­
ther any equally compelling purpose. Thus, Justice Douglas viewed the upholding of the union shop 
in Hanson as providing no basis for upholding the Integrated Bar arrangement. ld. at 884. 
159. 	 The Court described the benefits of a system of exclusive representation: 
The designation of a single representative avoids the confusion that would result from 
attempting to enforce two or more agreements specifying different terms and conditions of 
employment. It prevents inter-union rivalries from creating dissension within the work 
force and eliminating the advantages to the employee of collectivization. It also frees the 
employer from the possibility of facing conflicting demands from different unions, and 
permits the employer and a single union to reach agreements and settlements that are not 
subject to attack from rival labor organizations. 
431 U.S. at 220-21. In addition, the Court focused on the necessity of such a system for public­
sector employees such as teachers: 
The confusion and conflict that could arise if rival teachers' unions, holding quite different 
views as to the proper class hours, class sizes, holidays, tenure provisions, and grievance 
procedures, each sought to obtain the employer's agreement, are no different in kind from 
the evils that the exclusivity rule in the Railway Labor Act was designed to avoid. 
Id. at 224. This conclusion was reached in large part on the authority of Railway Employes' Dep't. 
v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956), and International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 
(1961). The appellants in Abood attempted to distinguish those cases on the ground that they in­
volved private-sector employees, unlike the public school teachers in Abood, but the Court found 
that distinction unpersuasive. 431 U.S. at 229. The Court recognized that significant differences 
exist between public-sector and private-sector collective bargaining, but did not believe those differ­
ences granted public employees greater first amendment rights than their private seetor counter­
parts. Id. at 232. 
160. The Court noted that, under the exclusive representation system, the union is charged with 
the duty of representing all employees, including nonmembers: it must negotiate and administer a 
collective bargaining agreement and handle grievances raised by employees, all of which involve the 
expenditure of time and money. The agency fee fairly allocates costs of the union's work to those 
who benefit from it. The only alternative would be for nonunion employees to be "free riders," 
noncontributing members who would enjoy the same benefits as those that paid dues. 431 U.S. at 
222. The need to prevent free riders is not the only explanation that has been offered for why a 
system of compulsory membership or compulsory dues is necessary. It has also been argued that 
compulsory unionism is essential in order to create large, national labor unions. SeeM. OLSON, THE 
LoGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION 87 (rev. ed. 1971). 
Although the agency-shop arrangement necessarily interfered with the right of nonunion em­
ployees to associate, the Court concluded that such an interference was justified by the important 
benefits to the structure of labor relations in the public sector produced by the arrangement. See 
supra note 159. 
161. The issue of the constitutionality of the use of money from mandatory fees for political 
causes over the objections of some contributors had been raised previously. See Lathrop v. Dona­
hue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961); International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); Railway 
Employes' Dep't. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). In both Hanson and Street, the issue had not been 
viewed as ripe for decision. In Lathrop, the issue had been addressed by five members of the Court 
but no majority had agreed on a resolution. See supra note 158. 
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ripe for decision. 
As a starting point in its analysis, the Court confronted the relation­
ship between free speech and making financial contributions to support 
chosen views. In Buckley v. Valeo 162 the Court had recognized that con­
tributions in support of political candidates were expressions of views by 
the contributors. As expressions of political opinions, these activities 
merited first amendment protection.163 The Abood Court reasoned that, 
because contributing money for the dissemination of a political idea pro­
moted speech, requiring a contribution used to promote an idea opposed 
by the contributor was compelled support for an idea.l64 
This connection between the compelled service fee and compelled 
expression clearly implicated the teaching of Barnette and led the Court 
to conclude that a nonunion teacher could not be required to contribute 
funds to support "an ideological cause he may oppose as a condition of 
holding a job as a public school teacher." 165 Although the union could 
162. 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam). 
163. The Court in Buckley recognized that contributions to political candidates were a symbolic 
statement of support, but upheld the constitutionality of ceilings on contributions imposed by the 
Federal Election Act of 1971, as amended in 1974. See Federal Election Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 
92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (amended 1974) (codified as amended at 2 U.S. C.§§ 431-56 (1982 & Supp. 
III 1985)). This result was justified because "[t]he quantity of co=unication by the contributor 
does not increase perceptibly with the size ofhis contribution, since the expression rests solely on the 
undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing." 424 U.S. at 21. The Court's willingness to equate 
speech and the expenditure of money as a statement of support for a candidate has been criticized. 
See Wright, Politics and the Constitution: Is Money Speech?, 85 YALE L.J. 1001 (1976). 
164. 431 U.S. at 234-35. 
165. Id. at 235. The Court's conclusion in Abood that compelled funding of political causes is 
constitutionally impermissible has spawned a series of lawsuits challenging other forms ofcompelled 
fee arrangements. Mandatory student fees exacted by state colleges and universities are a primary 
focus of this litigation. In Kania v. Fordham, 702 F.2d 475 (4th Cir. 1983), university students who 
disagreed with views expressed in the student newspaper challenged the use of mandatory student 
fee money to fund the paper. Despite the students' reliance on Abood, the court rejected their claim 
based on a balancing of interests. In weighing the competing claims, the court viewed the students' 
interests as minimal. By contrast, the university's interest in funding the newspaper was important 
because the newspaper played a vital role in accomplishing the educational mission of the university 
by providing a forum for the expression of students' ideas. 
In Gaida v. Blaustein, 772 F.2d 1061 (3d Cir. 1985), the court offered a different analysis. 
Students successfully challenged the exaction ofa mandatory refundable fee to support the operation 
of the New Jersey Public Interest Research Group (PIRG), an independent political organization. 
Their argument, based on Abood, was that they could not be compelled, as a condition of attending 
tlte university, to contribute to a political cause with wltich tltey disagreed. Id. at 1063. The univer­
sity argued that PIRG made a contribution to the education of the students and that the educational 
value of tlte organization justified university funding through a student fee. Id. at 1067. In its 
opinion striking down the mandatory fee, the court found the university had failed to demonstrate 
any compelling state interest to justify its funding arrangement. Id. at 1068. The court was careful 
to distinguish cases involving objections to expenditures to support campus organizations that were 
funded by a general activities fee. Id. at 1064. The critical factor in Gaida was that PIRG was an 
outside political organization operating independently of the university. On tlte difficulties of draw­
ing an analogy between union agency fees and mandatory student fees, see Comment, "Fee Speech": 
First Amendment Limitations on Student Fee Expenditures, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 279, 292-95 (1984); 
Note, The Constitutionality ofStudent Fees for Political Student Groups in the Campus Public Forum: 
Gaida v. Blaustein and the Right to Associate, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 135, 164-67 (1983). 
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spend funds on political activities not related to its collective bargaining 
obligations, employees objecting to the advancing of those political ideas 
could not be forced to contribute money toward their advancement. Re­
alizing that drawing a line between the union's collective bargaining ac­
tivities and other political activities would be difficult, the Court 
nevertheless left that issue to a later day.l66 
The Court's separate treatment of union activities related to collec­
tive bargaining and other ideological activities was severely criticized in 
Justice Powell's concurring opinion.l67 Justice Powell concluded that 
compelled union dues for public employees infringed first amendment 
interests no matter what use of the funds was made by the union.l68 
"The ultimate objective of a union in the public sector," Justice Powell 
noted, "like that of a political party, is to influence public decisionmak­
ing in accordance with the views and perceived interests of its member­
ship."169 For Justice Powell, compelling ideologically opposed teachers 
"to affiliate with the union by contributing to it infringes their First 
Amendment rights to the same degree as compelling them to contribute 
to a political party."170 This was just as true of compelled support for 
166. Abood, 431 U.S. at 236. Also left for another day was the final resolution of the remedial 
issue. The Court had no doubts about the goal to be achieved in designing a remedy: "the objective 
must be to devise a way of preventing compulsory subsidization of ideological activity by employees 
who object thereto without restricting the Union's ability to require every employee to contnoute to 
the cost of collective-bargaining activities." Id. at 237. However, the Court posponed consideration 
of the achievement of that goal by court decree until the parties had exhausted an internal union 
remedy permitting an employee to protest the use of fee money for political canses at the beginning 
of each school year and to receive a refund of that part of the employee's serviee fee used for the 
protested purpose. Id. at 240 n.41. The constitutional sufficiency of this union procedure was not 
ripe for review. Id. at 242 n.45. 
167. Justiee Powell's first disagreement with the majority reasoning stemmed from the opinion's 
off-handed conclusion that clear precedent existed for upholding the agency-shop arrangement as 
applied to public-sector employees. As Justiee Powell read the case law, the Court had found only 
that statutory authorization of union-shop agreements voluntarily entered into by private employers 
did not violate the first amendment. Id. at 250. That case law did not comment on the very differ­
ent status of public employees and whether government employees could be eompeiled by their 
government employer to pay union dues as a condition of employment. In Justice Powell's view, 
"the government may authorize private parties to enter into voluntary agreements whose terms it 
could not adopt as its own." Id. 
168. Id. at 255. 
169. Id. at 256. 
170. Id. at 257. Justice Powell's views found support in the Court's decision of ouly one year 
earlier in Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), a case involving a challenge to patronage dismissals 
by the Sheriff's Office in Cook County, Illinois. A Republican sheriff was replaced by Richard 
Elrod, a Democrat. Upon assuming his new position, Mr. Elrod followed the accepted practice of 
requiring all non-civil-service employees who were not members of his party to either affiliate with 
that political party, gain the support of the party, or be dismissed from their jobs, to be replaced by 
party members. A number of employees who either had lost or were in danger of losing their jobs 
filed a lawsuit claiming a violation of their first amendment rights to freedom of belief and associa­
tion. 
The Supreme Court agreed with their claim. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion identified the 
patronage practices as forcing employees to switch their political allegiances under threat of losing 
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collective bargaining· activities as for political activities, because 
"[c]ollective bargaining in the public sector is 'political.' " 171 
In Justice Powell's view, all compelled financing of union activities 
seriously infringed the free speech and association rights of dissenting 
teachers; therefore strict scrutiny of the government purpose was neces­
sary. Under that scrutiny, the government's case was devoid of the nec­
essary justification. Two state purposes had been asserted: first, that 
exclusive union representation was necessary to prevent the confusion 
and conflict that would flow from authorizing more than one union to 
represent members of a single group of employees and negotiate with 
their employer on their behalf; and second, related to the first, that under 
an exclusive representation system it was necessary to prevent "free rid­
ers" from benefitting from union representation.l72 
Justice Powell remained unconvinced by these explanations and 
concluded that the government had failed to meet its burden of proof. 
The restrictive effects of the arrangement-preventing minority employ­
ees from being represented by their own union and from negotiating di­
rectly with their employer-had not been proven necessary to promote 
important government interests.173 Similarly, on the record before the 
Court, he found the government had not demonstrated that the payment 
of fees by dissenting employees was needed to serve the interest of labor 
peace and to avoid the free rider effect.174 
their jobs. Such coerced association and belief implicated the teachings of Barnette and, therefore, 
violated the first amendment. Moreover, the first amendment did not permit requiring political 
allegiance as a condition ofpublic employment unless the government could show it was utilizing the 
least restrictive means to achieve a vital end. /d. at 363. That standard was not satisfied by the 
government except as to those employees who held policy-making positions. /d. at 372-73. Interest­
ingly, Justice Powell relied on Elrod in his opinion in Abood but had dissented in Elrod. His Elrod 
dissent had questioned whether any first amendment right was implicated by the patronage system 
challenged in that case. /d. at 380. In addition, to the extent that first amendment rights were 
infringed, Justice Powell viewed the infringement as minor and outweighed by the benefits of the 
system. /d. at 382. 
Four years after its decision in Elrod, the Court in Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980), consid­
ered an additional challenge to patronage dismissals. This time the Court made clear that the dis­
charged employees need not show that they had "been eoerced into changing, either actually or 
ostensibly, their political allegiance." /d. at 517. Because Elrod had been decided on the ground 
that party affiliation was an unconstitutional condition, all the employees needed to demonstrate was 
that their discharge had resnlted from their failure to be affiliated with the appropriate political 
party. Once such a showing was made, it was up to the government employer to "demonstrate that 
party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for the effective performance of the public office in­
volved." /d. at 518. 
171. 431 U.S. at 257. 
172. /d. at 260. 
173. /d. at 262. 
174. /d. at 262-63. In addition to the inadequacy of the government's justification for the intru­
sion on first amendment interests, Justice Powell objected to the procedural burdens imposed on a 
nonunion employee who disagreed with some union uses of fee money. Such employees were re­
quired to announce their opposition to certain union activities on ideological grounds. In addition, 
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Although the majority and Justice Powell differed in their reason­
ing, both opinions embodied a common assumption in that they relied on 
the aptness of the analogy between the compelled fmancial support in 
Abood and the compelled affirmation in Barnette. It was assumed that 
because there was a free speech right to contribute, there correlatively 
had to be a right not to contribute. Although this causal assumption was 
made, neither opinion explored whether a parallel really existed between 
nonunion teachers forced to pay union dues and Jehovah's Witnesses 
forced to salute the flag. 
Analyzing this proposition requires returning to the Barnette deci­
sion and to the dual values protected by preventing governmental imposi­
tion of ideas: the long-term benefits society receives from innovative 
thinkers in its midst, and the individual's right to be one's own person. 
In exploring the impact on these objectives of requiring payment of union 
dues by nonmembers, separate attention should be given to the two as­
pects of the problem viewed as constitutionally distinct by the Abood ma­
jority opinion: first, forced support for collective bargaining activities; 
and second, payment for union political activities. An initial question is 
the impact that the agency-shop arrangement has on personal autonomy. 
The agency shop interferes with individual freedom to choose the 
kind of person one wishes to be to the extent that the individual objects 
to being forced to become a union supporter or a person represented by a 
union. If the individual's true self is antiunion-based on a belief in 
speaking for oneself and not as part of a group or through a representa­
tive--that self is compromised by the agency-shop arrangement. The ef­
fect is at least as intrusive as the state motto embossed on their license 
plate was for the Jehovah's Witnesses in Wooley. In fact, to the extent 
that the protection extended to individuals also includes a right to con­
trol how they will appear to the world, the impact of the agency shop is 
even more destructive of individual rights: there is a greater likelihood 
that every worker in an agency shop will be considered a union supporter 
than that someone will be viewed as a believer in a state motto because it 
appears on their license plate. 
This same individual resentment at forced association will be exper­
ienced by an employee whether the compelled act is contributing to 
the employees were then put to the task of instituting a proceeding to establish what percentage of 
the union's budget had been allocated to non-collective-bargaining activities that were offensive to 
the political views of the employee. Only after such a proceeding would these employees be entitled 
to a rebate of the share of their dues that had been expended for such purposes. In Justice Powell's 
view, this procedure reversed the first amendment norm by shifting the burden of proof from the 
government to dissenting employees. Id. at 254-55. The majority viewed the adequacy of the rebate 
procedure as not ripe for decision. See supra note 166. 
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union collective bargaining activities or financing union-supported polit­
ical causes. If the union endorses Candidate X or lobbies for the passage 
of Bill Y, dissenting employees will feel that their ability to control both 
who they are and the image they present to the world has been compro­
mised by forced contributions to union support of these causes. Interest­
ingly, there seems to be no difference in the degree of offensiveness to the 
individual between being compelled to support union political and 
nonpolitical activities. How offended an employee will be may reflect 
how opposed the individual employee is to the union itself rather than to 
any particular cause it supports; some may more deeply resent the use of 
service fees for union labor representational activities, while others may 
be more annoyed at supporting some union-approved political causes, 
and still others may resent them both equally. 
Thus, if one takes the view that Barnette recognizes the integrity of 
individual identity as a facet of first amendment protection, the service 
fee requirement in all of its aspects raises a valid claim of first amend­
ment interference. It may be, as the Abood majority argued, that the 
government has a sufficiently compelling justification for forced funding 
of collective bargaining activities, 175 but that it cannot justify required 
funding of political and ideological causes. Both situations, however, 
give rise to the same claim of infringement of a protected interest. 176 
Analyzing the infringement of the individual's willingness to be as­
sociated with dissident ideas-the societal concern at the heart of Justice 
Jackson's Barnette opinion-is somewhat more complex. From the per­
spective of this instrumental value, the situation of the nonunion em­
ployee in Abood is very unlike that of the Jehovah's Witnesses in Barnette 
or Wooley. Under the agency-shop arrangement, the nonunion employee 
is not forced to take a pledge of allegiance to union ideals or to belong to 
the union in any technical sense.177 The dissident employee is not even 
forced to advertise the union's message and never wears the "union la­
bel." The employee's forced association is less personal and direct-it 
consists of paying a fee to the union knowing that the union will use the 
money to support its activities. Although that may make an individual 
react with resentment, the compelled association is no more active than 
175. 431 U.S. at 222. 
176. A similar conclusion has been expressed elsewhere in more extreme terms: "Can there be 
any doubt that the state's requirement that dissenting public employees contribute monies to an 
organization engaged in objectionable political or ideological activities violates the First Amend­
ment, even if the compelled contribution is limited to the organization's collective bargaining ex­
penses?" Pulliam, Legal Aspects of Exclusive Representation: Ruminations on the Private-Public 
Sector Analogy, 5 J. LAB. RES. 351, 367 (1984). 
177. See supra note 151. 
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that.I78 
Despite this obvious difference in the degree of the activities com­
pelled in Abood and Barnette, the critical question is whether a nonunion 
employee will be less willing or likely to assert antiunion positions after 
being compelled to pay union dues and to accept represention by the 
union in collective bargaining.I79 Because an agency shop forces the 
nonunion employee into dependency on the union, this forced association 
may well reduce the employee's zest for antiunion activities. Coopta­
tion I so is possible, if not probable, in this setting. Because the union­
and no other organization or individual, including the employee-repre­
sents the workers, an employee must work with the union to have per­
sonal views taken into account. This circumstance tips the scales in favor 
of becoming one of them instead of remaining a dissident. 
Thus, even though the level of the compulsion is not as active as in 
Barnette or Wooley, the same threat exists for the diversity of ideas in the 
marketplace, or more particularly the workplace. From this analysis, it 
appears that Justice Powell's concurring opinion in Abood is correct in 
178. This view of the extent of the forced association in Abood is consistent with the view ex­
pressed in Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 858 (1961): 
What seems to me obvious is the large difference in degree between, on the one hand, being 
compelled to raise one's hand and recite a belief as one's own, and, on the other, being 
compelled to contribute dues to a bar association fund which is to be used in part to pro­
mote the expression of views in the name of the organization (not in the name of the dues 
payor), which views when adopted may tum out to be contrary to the views of the dues 
payor. I think this is a situation where the difference in degree is so great as to amount to a 
difference in substance. 
/d. at 858. For a further discussion of the Lathrop case, see supra text accompanying notes 154-58. 
179. Under many public-sector labor relations laws, the union's involvement with the nonunion 
employee extends beyond the payment of an agency fee and the representation of those employees as 
their exclusive bargaining agent. Thus, the union may play a role in the resolution of any employee/ 
employer grievance. That role may vary from the union having exclusive control of access to the 
grievance mechanism, see, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 423.211 (West 1978) (making desig­
nated representative of public employee unit its exclusive representative), construed in Mellon v. 
Board ofEduc., 22 Mich. App. 218, 177 N.W.2d 187 (1970), to the union grievance procedure being 
optional. Under some statutes, if the nonunion employee opts to complain to the employer without 
resorting to the union grievance procedure, the union representative has the right to be present at 
any conference between the employee and employer and no settlement of the dispute may violate the 
terms of the collective bargaining agreement. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 1606(b) (Smith-Hurd 
1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 150E, § 5 (West 1976). See generally Finkin, The Limits of 
Majority Rule in Collective Bargaining, 64 MINN. L. REV. 183 (1980) (discussing the limits that 
should be imposed on collective bargaining agreements in both the public and private sectors); Note, 
Public Sector Grievance Procedures, Due Process, and the Duty ofFair Representation, 89 HARV. L. 
REV. 752 (1976) (considering whether right of public employees may be determined through infor­
mal contract procedures consistently with the fourteenth amendment's due process clause). 
180. Cooptation is defined as "the process of absorbing new elements into the leadership or 
policy-determining structure of an organization as a means of averting threats to its stability or 
existenee." P. SELZNICK, TVA AND THE GRASS ROOTS-A STUDY IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF FORMAL 
ORGANIZATION 13 (1949) (emphasis omitted). 
The process of cooptation has been well described in the social science literature. See, e.g., J.S. 
COLEMAN, CoMMUNITY CONFLICT 17 (1957); W. GAMSON, POWER AND DISCONTENT 135-39 
(1968); C.W. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE 348-49 (1956); P. SELZNICK, supra, at 13-16. 
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arguing that the Court's casual treatment of the constitutionality of the 
public sector agency-shop arrangement is unjustified in light of first 
amendment principles. lsi 
Ironically, it appears that the constitutional problem taken most se­
riously by the majority in Abood-union use of service fee money to sup­
port political causes opposed by some nonunion employees-actually 
poses a lesser threat to the instrumental values underlying the first 
amendment preserved in Barnette. Assuming that some of the service fee 
money is used to suppport candidates and causes opposed by dissident 
employees, what effect will that fact have on those employees? Will they 
be less likely to speak out on those issues? Will the union's assertion of 
one view make them less likely to speak out in favor of an opposing view? 
This seems unlikely. The union's political involvement is not a surrogate 
for involvement on the part of individual employees because employees 
have not given their proxy to the union, authorizing it to participate in 
the political process in their stead. The union may be their exclusive 
representative at the collective bargaining table, but not in the voting 
booth. 182 The employee loses no freedom to work for candidates or 
causes. 183 In fact, it is just as likely that the employee will become more 
politically involved. Union support of one view may be the catalyst that 
turns an employee's passive belief in an opposing view into an active in­
volvement. Upgraded political involvement may grow out of annoyance 
that dues are being used by the union to further causes or candidates the 
employee opposes. Thus, the danger posed by union expenditures for 
political activities does not seem nearly as serious as the fear of forced 
conformity expressed in Barnette. Although the use of compulsory dues 
for political purposes may intrude on the right of selfhood, it does not 
inevitably infringe on individual willingness to contribute to the market­
place of ideas. 
181. See supra note 167 and text accompanying notes 167-74. 
182. The union may not even be able to influence "willing" union members to endorse the 
union's political positions. For example, 45% of union households voted for Ronald Reagan in the 
1984 presidential election despite union support for Walter Mondale. Raskin, Labor's Grand Illu­
sion, N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1985, § 6 (Magazine), at 52. 
183. The participation of public employees in political activities is curtailed by statutory limita­
tions. For a description of these limitations at both the state and federal level, see Developments in 
the Law-Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1611, 1651-60 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Public 
Employment]. The constitutionality of such legislation has been upheld by the Supreme Court. See, 
e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 606-18 (1973) (upholding Oklahoma statute restricting 
the partisan political activities of classified state employees); United States Civil Serv. Comm'n v. 
National Ass'n. of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 557-81 (1973) (upholding§ 9(a) of the Hatch Act, 
5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2) (1982), which prohibits federal employees from playing an active role in polit­
ical campaigns, running for local office, and engaging in other significant partisan political 
activities). 
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VI. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins 
The doctrine first announced in the '1940s through Barnette had lan­
guished during the fifties and sixties and finally picked up steam in the 
1970s with Wooley and Abood. In both cases the Barnette principle had 
been successfully invoked and expanded to cover situations involving 
something less than a compelled affrrmation of a government-dictated 
belief. Finally, in 1980 with the Supreme Court's decision in Prune Yard 
Shopping Center v. Robins,184 the Court identified a terminus for the Bar­
nette doctrine. Confronted with a claim of forced participation in the 
dissemination of an idea, the Court distinguished the situation from that 
of earlier cases. 
In Prune Yard a group of high school students had solicited signa­
tures for a petition declaring opposition to a United Nations resolution 
against Zionism. In order to obtain signatures, they had set up a table at 
the privately owned Prune Yard Shopping Center in Campbell, Califor­
nia. After being asked to leave the shopping center by a security guard, 
they flied suit in the California Superior Court alleging they had a right 
of access to the shopping center.185 On appeal, the California Supreme 
Court agreed with the students and ruled that such a right existed under 
the California Constitution's protection for speech and petitioning.186 
After this decision, the shopping center and its owner appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court arguing that California's interpretation of 
its state constitution violated their rights under the fourteenth amend­
ment.187 The first amendment argument made by appellants was that "a 
private property owner has a First Amendment right not to be forced by 
184. 447 u.s. 74 (1980). 
185. The California Superior Court of Santa Clara County ruled that the high school students 
had no right of access to the shopping center under either the state or federal constitution. That 
decision was affirmed by the California Court of Appeal. Id. at 77-78. 
186. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910, 592 P.2d 341, 347, 153 Cal. 
Rptr. 854, 860 (1979). Article I,§ 2 of the California Constitution read: "Every person may freely 
speak, write, and publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this 
right. A law may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press." Section 3 of art. I stated that 
"people have the right to ... petition government for redress of grievances ...." The California 
Supreme Court noted that these provisions gave greater protection to free speech than did the first 
amendment of the United States Constitution and held that the students' activities were thus pro­
tected. Pruneyard, 23 Cal. 3d at 908, 910, 592 P.2d at 346, 347, 153 Cal. Rptr. at 859, 860 (quoting 
Wilson v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 652, 658, 532 P.2d 116, 120, 119 Cal. Rptr. 468, 472 (1975)). 
187. Their first two constitutional claims-that the state had "taken" their property without just 
compensation and, that they had been deprived of property without due process of law-were re­
jected by the Supreme Court. The Court rejected the "taking" claim on the ground that there was 
no showing that the commercial value or usefulness of the property had been unreasonably impaired 
by granting appellees access rights. 447 U.S. at 83. The fourteenth amendment due process argu­
ment failed because the state's action was justified by its desire to promote freedom of expression. 
Id. at 85. 
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the State to use his property as a forum for the speech of others."188 
Appellants relied on Wooley and Barnette for authority to support this 
claim, but Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court distinguished both 
cases. 
Wooley was found inapplicable for three reasons. First, a distinction 
existed because the message in Wooley had been dictated by the govern­
ment itself.189 In contrast, the government was not disseminating any 
particular message in the shopping center but was granting members of 
the public an access right so that they could display whatever messages 
they chose. Furthermore, in Wooley the law forbade the Maynards to 
cover up the state's motto, but the center's owner could "disavow any 
connection with the message by simply posting signs."19° Finally, unlike 
the Maynards' automobile, the shopping center was a business establish­
ment generally open to members of the public. It was therefore unlikely 
that the message disseminated by the students on shopping center prop­
erty would be taken to represent the views of the center as opposed to the 
students. 191 
Barnette posed no greater difficulties. The government was not ask­
ing the center to communicate their agreement with a government-spon­
sored idea. 192 The center's owner was not asked to adopt any position, 
only to provide a fornm for the expression of the ideas of others, and was 
entitled to identify those ideas as ones he disagreed with.I93 
188. Id. at 85. 
189. Id. at 87. 
190. Id. In reality, the shopping center could not "cover up" the message of the high school 
students, although it could announce that the center did not share the views being expressed, thereby 
disavowing any association between the center and the message. Justice Rehnquist had dissented in 
Wooley and argued that the Maynards had not been placed "in the position of either apparently or 
actually 'asserting as true' the message." Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 721 (1977) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). The shopping center owner's position was closely analogous, making Justice Rehn­
quist's position in the two cases consistent. The self-help remedy Justice Rehnquist suggested for the 
Maynards-a disclaiming bumper sticker, see supra note 135-thus was promoted from a dissenting 
view in Wooley to part of the majority opinion in PruneYard; see also infra note 193 (discussing right 
to disavow in other cases). 
191. 447 U.S. at 87. 
192. Id. at 88. 
193. The Supreme Court also distinguished Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 
241 (1974), in which the Court struck down Florida's right-of-reply statute. See supra note 117. 
The Court pointed to the fact that the decision in Tornillo rested on the impermissibility of telling a 
newspaper what to print and the fact that the statute might deter the publication of critical com­
ments about candidates for public office. PruneYard, 447 U.S. at 88. 
The Court's attempts to distinguish Tornillo from PruneYard ignored some interesting similari­
ties between the cases. In both, the compelled message was not sponsored by the government but 
came from a member of the public, albeit in Tornillo a candidate for public office. Also, in both 
cases there was a right to disavow. In Tornillo, the newspaper's labeling an article as a candidate's 
reply to critical comments previously printed by the paper would serve as a disavowal of the views 
expressed in the article. Finally, in both cases there was little possibility that the message would be 
assumed to reflect the views of the provider of the forum. In the newspaper's case, this would be 
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Two separate concurring opinions in PruneYard commented further 
on the free speech issue in the case. Justices White and Powell agreed 
that there was no merit to the claim of interference with freedom of ex­
pression by the shopping center owner. Both also agreed, however, that 
the first amendment claim would not be so easily disposed of were other 
circumstances presented to the Court.l94 
Justice Powell elaborated on the circumstances in which a more suc­
cessful free speech claim might be raised. Three factors, none present in 
PruneYard, would be important: first, the likelihood that customers 
would suppose the views expressed in appellees' petitions reflected the 
opinions of the property owner; second, an objection to the specific ideas 
being asserted; and third, the possibility that the views communicated 
will be so objectionable that a property owner would feel compelled to 
respond even in the absence of any confusion as to source. 
Justice Powell saw Wooley as applicable to all property owners and 
as permitting "a person [to refuse] to allow use of his property as a mar­
ketplace for the ideas of others."195 This principle applied equally 
whether the state mandated a message of its own or whether it created 
access for third parties. In either situation, the property owner was faced 
with an untenable choice: either permit the speech and allow it to be 
interpreted as the property owner's own message, or be forced to disavow 
it, thereby giving up the right to remain silent. 196 The ideas expressed 
could be so objectionable to the property owner that, even in the absence 
of confusion as to source, a response would be dictated by the conscience 
of the owner. The state, by creating the right of access, would in effect 
even less likely because the reply would be labeled so as to disassociate the paper from the views 
being expressed. These factors were considered in Prune Yard (and in the Wooley dissent, see supra 
notes 135, 190), but played no role in the Court's invalidation of a "compulsion" statute in Tornillo. 
One is left with the impression that compulsion against the press may more easily violate first 
amendment rights than compulsion directed against a nonmedia speaker. This view, is of course, 
inconsistent with the Court's oft-expressed viewpoint that the press has no special status under the 
first amendment. E.g., First Nat'! Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798-802 (1978) (Burger, C.J., 
concurring); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 704-05 (1972). Not all of the Justices, however, 
accept this position. See, e.g., Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 571-72 (1978) (Stewart, J., 
joined by Marshall, J., dissenting) ("[O]ur Constitution does not explicitly protect the practice of 
medicine or the business of banking from all abridgement by government. It does explicitly protect 
the freedom of the press."); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 725 (1972) (Stewart, J., joined by 
Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) ("The Court's crabbed view of the First Amendment reflects 
a disturbing insensitivity to the critical role ofan independent press in our society."). Justice Stevens 
dissented separately in Zurcher, 436 U.S. at 577, as did Justice Douglas in a companion case to 
Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 71 1 (dissenting in United States v. Caldwell). 
194. 447 U.S. at 96 (White, J., concurring); id. at 97-101 (Powell, J., concurring). 
195. Id. at 97. Justice Powell also read Abood to support constitutional protection against being 
compelled to lend support to an objectionable idea. Because the students had not argued that Abood 
supported their claim, id. at 98 n.2, Justice Powell only briefly discussed the case. 
196. Id. at 99. 
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compel the owner to speak out in opposition to the views being expressed 
on the property. 
The PruneYard majority, in contrast to Justice Powell, found the 
situation easily distinguishable from both Wooley and Barnette. Justice 
Rehnquist's opinion for the majority took the view that the identity of 
the promulgator of the sentiment being expressed is key. 197 Justice Pow­
ell disagreed with that approach 198 and treated as the crux of the matter 
the level of the coerced individual's antipathy to the message. If the core 
value protected by the Barnette doctrine is the nonconforming individ­
ual's right to be free from government efforts to stamp out the urge to be 
different, then Justice Rehnquist is clearly correct. It is only when the 
message being fostered comes with a government seal of approval that an 
individual's own views are at risk. If the government simply requires 
access, instead of one insistent message, the result is a cacophony of ideas 
unlikely to affect a property owner's independence of thought. The 
source of the coerced message is not critical only if the central value is 
vindication of personality. In that case, the property owner's reaction to 
being forced to provide a forum would be more important than the iden­
tity of the speaker given access to that fornm. Under this approach, the 
individual's resentment at forced association with a detested cause wonld 
be enough to raise a claim of constitutional right. Thus, the opinions of 
Justices Rehnquist and Powell represent significantly different points of 
view about the interests deserving of constitutional protection through 
the free speech guarantee. Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion is con­
cerned with individuality only as an instrument of democratic self-gov­
ernment, but Justice Powell's opinion focuses on individuality for the 
sake of the individual. 
Another factor stressed by the majority opinion and criticized by 
Justice Powell is the opportunity to disavow, 199 a method the majority 
advanced for reducing the level of forced association. Although the 
property owner must allow the speech to take place on the owner's prop­
erty, at least the owner can disassociate himself from any disagreeable 
ideas expressed so as to avoid appearing to support them. This means 
property owners can set the record straight and not appear to others 
what they are not; they can protect their own persona as they appear to 
the world. Although the majority viewed this possibility as an advan­
197. Id. at 87. 
198. Id. at 98 ("But even when no particular message is mandated by the State, First Amend­
ment interests are affected by state action that forces a property owner to admit third-party 
speakers."). 
199. See supra notes 135, 190, 193. 
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tage, Justice Powell saw it as a burden because disavowal forces individu­
als to make a public statement when they would rather be silent. 
On closer examination, it appears that the opportunity to disavow is 
nothing more than a make-weight in this discussion. Unless the individ­
ual's ideas are themselves illegal so that their utterance can be punished, 
or unless they have been required to swear allegiance to a particular idea 
(as in the oath situation) so that disavowal amounts to perjury, there is 
always an opportunity to disavow. As Justice Rehnquist had urged in 
Wooley, a bumper sticker placed alongside the license plate would have 
been an effective method of disavowal.200 Even in Barnette, a public 
statement of opposition to the pledge might have been made (and was) by 
the Jehovah's Witnesses, but that would have been beside the point. Jus­
tice Jackson's fear was not that compelled affirmers lacked an opportu­
nity to disavow, but that they would cease to feel like speaking out 
against the state-mandated message. Their objection to the government's 
idea would be swept away in the tide of compelled conformity. 
Although the opportunity to disavow may be irrelevant from the 
perspective of the instrumental values behind Barnette, it has slightly 
more relevance in the area of protection of personality. From that per­
spective, if there is a chance to assert a differing view, at least individuals 
have the chance to correct the record. They need not leave people with 
the impression that they are something or someone that they are not. 
This ability to set the record straight, however, is not without its costs, as 
Justice Powell correctly pointed out. Utilizing this corrective measure 
requires taking a public position, which in itself may violate notions of 
privacy that individuals hold dear. Although the opportunity to disavow 
may make the case marginally less offensive from the viewpoint of the 
protection of individual personality, the associated costs suggest that this 
factor should be given little constitutional significance. 
The last factor stressed by the Prune Yard Court's majority opinion 
is that the views expressed on shopping center property are not likely to 
be assumed to be those of the owner. There is a clear relationship be­
tween this factor and the opportunity to disavow because both concern 
public perception of an individual and not the subjective impact on that 
individual. Even if the public does not associate the ideas expressed with 
the owner's personal viewpoint, the individual will still feel forced to pro­
vide a showcase for disagreeable views. The forced association exists in 
the property owner's mind even if it does not exist in the perceptions of 
the public. 
200. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 722 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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This factor, however, is not without significance. If the nature of 
the compulsion creates no impression that the individual is expressing a 
viewpoint, then it is unlikely that the individual's freedom of mind has 
been affected in any way that threatens the democratic process. Addi­
tionally, from the point of view of protection of individual personality, if 
the public is not likely to view an individual as having made any state­
ment of personal philosophy, the individual will not have been put in the 
position of giving a false impression to others. Moreover, the individual 
will not have to choose between that impression and speaking out when 
silence would be preferred. 
In light of these comparisons, the conclusion seems inescapable that 
PruneYard was rightly decided. Because the message is not the govern­
ment's and, equally important, because the forum is created for a variety 
of messages, rather than a single message repeated over and over again, 
no likelihood exists of casting a pall on the unorthodox ideas of the prop­
erty owner. Thus, the value of central concern in Barnette is not 
threatened. The comparison to Wooley with its concern for individuality, 
however, could lead to a different result. In Prune Yard, the record was 
barren as to whether the property owner disagreed with the substance of 
the petition,201 and the possibility of the public's connecting the owner 
with the petition was remote; therefore, in Prune Yard, neither the prop­
erty owner's identity nor the ability to project that identity was 
compromised. 
A different conclusion might be appropriate, however, if an owner, 
like the Jehovah's Witnesses in Wooley, objected to a forced association 
with ideas the property owner opposed. In such a case, the Wooley pre­
cedent would be much more compelling. Although the views conveyed 
by the unwanted message are not likely to be imputed to the owner, this 
same factor was also present in Wooley. Whether a particular message 
infringes on the property owner's first amendment rights may tum on 
whether a subjective or an objective test is employed. If owners feel of­
fended by forced association with an idea and feel it presents them to the 
world in a false light this would-under a subjective test-be enough to 
give rise to a constitutional objection. An objective test, however, de­
mands that reasonable people would assume the owner's own views were 
being expressed. 2o2 
201. 447 U.S. 74, 101 (1980) (Powell, J. concurring). 
202. An analogous problem exists in the symbolic speech area. The question is whether the 
symbolic communication needs to be understood by its intended audience or whether it is enough if 
the communicators believe they are engaged in an expressive activity even if their act is unlikely to 
be understood by others. The answer given by the courts under the symbolic speech doctrine is that 
an objective standard governs. The conduct can qualify as protected expression only if the symbolic 
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Concern for the protection of personality involves more than a fear 
that the government is standing in the way of an individual's ability to 
appear to the world in a desired way. In protecting this interest, it may 
be equally important that individuals subjectively feel that they are able 
to present themselves to others as they wish, even if no real danger of a 
false impression exists. On the other hand, protecting an individual's un­
realistic reaction (because no one would in fact confuse that person with 
the message expressed by others) may push the first amendment beyond 
any logical stopping place. 
The PruneYard situation clearly involves more complex overtones 
than the Court was prepared to deal with on the basis of the facts 
presented. Although Barnette itself is not truly implicated in such a situ­
ation, Wooley and Abood provide closer analogies. Identifying the limits 
of first amendment protection when freedom of personality is the value 
being protected is obviously problematic. 
VII. The 1983 Supreme Court Term 
A series of cases that raised claims of protection from compelled 
expression and association marked the 1983 Supreme Court Term.203 
communication is likely to be understood by its audience. Clark v. Community for Creative Non­
Violence, 468 U.S. 288,294 (1984); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,410-11 (1974) (per curiam). 
For a variety of reasons, an objective standard, focusing on understandability, may be justified when 
attempting to define the limits of protected symbolic expression. See Note, Symbolic Conduct, 68 
CoLUM. L. REV. 1091, 1113-16 (1968) (arguing that an objective standard assures substantial pro­
tection for symbolic conduct and is consistent with the purposes of the first amendment). A similar 
approach may be inappropriate, however, in compelled-expression cases because the focus is on 
impermissible impact on a particular individual, and not on communication to an audience. 
203. In the period between Prune Yard, decided in 1980, and the 1983 Term, the Court decided 
only one case containing extensive references to Barnette. See Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 
(1982). In Pico, a number of students had filed suit claiming the school board violated their first 
amendment rights by removing a number of books from school libraries because of their objectiona­
ble content. The district court granted summary judgment before trial in favor of the school board. 
Pico v. Board of Educ., 474 F. Supp 387 (E.D.N.Y. 1979). The judgment was reversed on appeal 
and the case was remanded to the district court for trial. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to 
consider whether any first amendment limitations restrain the discretion of a school board in decid­
ing to remove books from school libraries and whether, in the circumstances of the case before it, 
these constitutional limits had been exceeded. 457 U.S. at 863. 
By a five-to-four vote, the Court decided in favor of the students and remanded the case for 
trial. Actually, the Court was even more closely divided than its voting pattern indicates. Although 
voting \\ith the majority, Justice White refused to reach the constitutional issue of "the extent to 
which the First Amendment limits the discretion of the school board to remove books from the 
school library." Id. at 883. Instead, he read the record as raising a factual dispute between the 
parties as to the reasons for the removal of the books and found it unnecessary to reach the difficult 
constitutional question until that dispute had been resolved at trial. 
Seven members of the Court filed separate opinions, with four justices citing to Barnette at least 
once. In his plurality opinion, Justice Brennan relied on Barnette to condemn the notion of an 
"officially prescribed orthodoxy." Id. at 871. Thus, for Justice Brennan, if the removal decisions had 
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Although Barnette was cited only twice (in two dissenting opinions204) 
and never discussed at length, the extension ofBarnette that occurred in 
Abood returned to center stage in three major opinions. The trilogy of 
cases included Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship 
Clerks,205 Roberts v. United States Jaycees,206 and Minnesota State Board 
for Community Colleges v. Knight.207 Of these, Knight raised the most 
difficult problem in light of the Barnette precedent and provoked the 
most extensive opinions by members of the Court. All three decisions, 
however, must be examined to identify the Court's current view of this 
doctrinal area. 
Least surprising was the Court's eight-to-one decision in Ellis. The 
case raised several issues that the Court had specifically left unresolved in 
Abood. The challengers in Ellis were nonunion clerical employees of 
Western Airlines. When their complaint was filed, the exclusive bargain­
ing representative for the Western Airlines clerical employees was the 
Brotherhood of Railway, Airline and Steamship Clerks (BRAC). In ac­
cordance with provisions of the Railway Labor Act permitting the 
agency shop, 208 nonunion airline employees, although not compelled to 
join the union, were required to pay an agency fee that equalled the 
amount paid in the form of union dues by union members. The nonun­
ion employees did not challenge the agency-shop arrangement itself,209 
but did object to certain union expenditures and to the rebate procedure 
that refunded their shares of money spent on union ideological 
activities.210 
The employees specifically objected to the expenditure of funds for 
six types of union activities: the national convention held by the union 
been based on a disagreement with the "anti-American" ideas in the books, the decisions would be 
constitutionally improper. 
Justice Brennan's reliance on Barnette as precedent for this proposition seems iii-conceived. 
Whatever ambiguities may remain as to the meaning of Justice Jackson's opinion in that case, it is 
clear that Justice Jackson did not intend to deprive the government of all mechanisms for spreading 
favored ideas. Instead, his opinion condemns one means to this end, compelled agreement with 
government-prescribed ideas. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 642. No such compulsion is present in the con­
text of the public schoo11ibrary. See Harpaz, A Paradigm ofFirst Amendment Dilemmas: Resolving 
Public School Library Disputes, 4 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 1, 34 (1981). 
204. See Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271, 297 (1984) 
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 310 n.14 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
205. 466 u.s. 435 (1984). 
206. 468 u.s. 609 (1984). 
207. 465 u.s. 271 (1984). 
208. 45 u.s.c. § 152 (1982). 
209. Such a challenge was foreclosed by the Supreme Court's opinions in Railway Employes' 
Dept. v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956) and Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977). 
Hanson is discussed supra notes 150-53 and accompanying text. Abood and later cases posing first 
amendment challenges to collective bargaining arrangements are the subject of supra Part V. 
210. See supra note 174 (discussing rebate system as a remedial measure). 
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every four years; litigation not involving the union as a bargaining unit; 
the union's monthly magazine; social activities; the union's death benefits 
program; and the union's organizing efforts.211 The Court's task was to 
decide which of these activities could be funded with agency fees paid by 
nonunion employees. The need to engage in such precise line-drawing 
had been identified in Abood but that task had been reserved for some 
other time.212 With Ellis, that time had finally arrived.213 
Because three items on the list of challenged expenditures were stat­
utorily impermissible,214 or moot,215 the Court decided the constitutional 
question raised only on the remaining three, authorized expenditures. 
The Court reiterated and strengthened the holding of Abood-the 
agency-shop arrangement was a justifiable interference with the first 
amendment right to refuse to associate.2 16 
The precise first amendment issue was whether money spent on the 
union's convention, union social activities, and the nonpolitical articles 
printed in the union's monthly magazine involved "additional interfer­
ence with the First Amendment interests of objecting employees, and, if 
so, whether they are nonetheless adequately supported by a governmen­
tal interest."217 The Court decided that the social activities were objec­
tionable only because they were union activities, and for no other 
reason.218 Therefore, because spending on these activities did not add to 
211. 466 U.S. at 440. 
212. Abood, 431 U.S. at 236. 
213. Part of the controversy was resolved without reaching the first amendment issue. The 
Court initially asked whether each use made of monies paid by nonunion employees was authorized 
under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1982). In International Ass'n of Machinists v. 
Street, 367 U.S. 740, 750 (1961), the Court had managed, through the process of statutory construc­
tion, to avoid the resolution of a similar first amendment challenge to the Railway Labor Act. See 
supra note 154. On the statutory construction issue, the Court distinguished between authorized and 
unauthorized expenditures; union expenses were justified if "the challenged expenditures are neces­
sarily or reasonably incurred for the purpose of performing the duties of an exclusive representative 
of the employees in dealing with the employer on labor-management issues." Ellis, 466 U.S. at 448. 
214. Two categories of expenditures were found to be beyond the Act: (1) organizing activities 
through which the union attempted to recruit new members; and (2) the expenses of litigation not 
arising out of the collective bargaining activities of the union. 466 U.S. at 451-53. This restrictive 
view of the categories of union expenditures that can be imposed on dissenting employees because of 
the free-rider rationale has already been criticized. See Public Employment, supra note 183, at 1733. 
215. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 454. After the filing of the lawsuit, the defendant union had been decerti­
fied as the bargaining representative for the Western Airlines' employees. Thus, the claim for in­
junctive relief against union expenditures had become moot. What remained was the claim for a 
refund of money improperly expended by the union and interest on that money. Id. at 442. The 
Court decided that because the money paid into the death benefits system entitled the objecting 
employees to benefits under the program, equitable considerations did not require a rebate of this 
money. Id. at 454-55. 
216. See supra notes 143-59 and accompanying text. 
217. 466 U.S. at 456. 
218. ld. 
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the interference with first amendment rights imposed by the agency-shop 
arrangement itself, there could be no constitutional objection. 
The challenge to spending on the convention and the union publica­
tion, however, raised somewhat more serious issues. Both activities in­
volved communication of ideas: the convention established union policy 
and identified collective bargaining goals, and the monthly magazine was 
the union's method "of communicating information concerning collec­
tive bargaining, contract administration, and employees' rights to em­
ployees represented by BRAC."219 Despite their communicative 
function, however, these activities were viewed as imposing little addi­
tional burden on the rights of nonunion employees. In addition, both 
activities were justified by the same concerns that supported the agency 
shop itself. 220 After concluding that all three expenditures were constitu­
tionally permissible uses of the money contributed by nonunion employ­
ees, the Court ended its discussion by asserting that, as a policy matter, 
the union needed to have "flexibility in its use of compelled funds."221 
219. Id. at 450 (quoting from Ellis v. Brotherhood ofRy., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 685 F.2d 1065, 
1074 (9th Cir. 1982)). In challenging that portion of dues spent on the publication of a monthly 
magazine, no issue was raised regarding the "political" articles contained in the magazine. Under 
the then existing rebate program, objecting employees received a rebate for expenses resulting from 
publication of the political content of the magazine. This procedure required the calculation of the 
number of lines in the magazine "devoted to political issues as a proportion of the total number of 
lines." Id. One issue in Ellis was the costs of producing the part of the magazine that informed 
union members about the union's collective bargaining activities. Id. at 450-51. 
220. Id. at 455. 
221. Id. at 456. A second aspect of the Court's opinion concerned the constitutionality of the 
union's use of a rebate procedure to return to nonunion employees their share of service fees allo­
cated to non-collective-bargaining activities. The Court acknowledged that prior cases had sug­
gested a rebate scheme would be adequate. Id. at 443 (discussing Abood v. Detroit Bd. ofEduc., 431 
U.S. 209, 238 (1977); Brotherhood ofRy., Airline & S.S. Clerks v. Allen, 373 U.S. 113, 122 (1963); 
International Ass'n of Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740, 775 (1960)). The Court, however, held 
that the rebate approach did not keep the union within the statutory guidelines. The union proce­
dure required each employee initially to pay the entire service fee. At a later time, dissenting em­
ployees received a refund. The Court viewed this temporary interest-free borrowing of a portion of 
the service fee money as impermissible. 466 U.S. at 444. The Court suggested two possible alterna­
tives: "advance reduction of dues and/or interest-bearing escrow accounts." Id. Thus, if the non­
union employees were required to pay the entire fee, they were entitled to receive interest on the 
money rebated to them. 
Two years after its decision in Ellis, the Supreme Court again ruled on the procedural issues 
surrounding the return of service fee money to dissenting employees. In Chieago Teachers Union v. 
Hudson, 106 S. Ct. 1066 (1986), the Supreme Court identified three critical requirements for a con­
stitutionally adequate system for protecting the interests ofnonunion public employees. First, reiter­
ating its concern in Ellis, the Court required the union to adopt a plan that would avoid even 
temporary improper funding of ideological activities. Id. at 1075. The union was required to hold 
the amount of the fees reasonably in dispute in an interest bearing escrow account. Id. at 1078. 
Second, the Court required that "potential objectors be given sufficient information to gauge the 
propriety of the union's fee." Id. at 1076. Finally, the Court imposed a new requirement that the 
union make available a procedure to nonunion employees for raising their objections that would 
provide "a reasonably prompt decision by an impartial decisionmaker." Id. Applying these three 
criteria, the Court found the union procedure in Hudson to be constitutionally deficient because it 
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The Court's decision in Ellis broke no new ground.222 It attempted 
to draw a line accurately reflecting the distinction created in Abood be­
tween collective bargaining and political activities, and it did so even to 
the absurdity of forcing the union to calculate the number of lines de­
voted to political causes in the union magazine and to compute the rebate 
due nonunion employees for those lines. 223 
It is difficult to imagine how such a system really protects any sig­
nificant first amendment concerns of the nonunion employees. The mag­
azine is mailed to nonunion employees, but, because they are not forced 
to read it,224 they can avoid being influenced by its views. Unlike the 
visible license plate or recited pledge, the political message in the union's 
magazine may never even be seen-much less "worn"-by the dissident 
individuals. Should they leaf through the magazine, the employee would 
see, in addition to articles about political issues, "articles about negotia­
tions, contract demands, strikes, unemployment and health benefits, pro­
posed or recently enacted legislation, general news, products the union is 
boycotting, and recreational and social activities."225 Nonunion employ­
ees are just as, if not more, likely to be upset by news about negotiations 
and contract demands as by any political article. The former informa­
tion, unlike the latter, is likely to impact on the terms and conditions of 
their employment and, in addition, involves subjects about which they 
are powerless to do anything short of resigning their jobs. Those union­
negotiated job conditions will affect them on a day-to-day basis; by com­
parison, union views on legislation and political causes are likely to pro­
duce no more than a momentary annoyance, are unlikely to be assumed 
did not "provide an adequate explanation for the advance reduction of dues," and because the proce­
dure lacked objectivity in that it was completely under the control of the union. Id. at 1077. 
222. The Court's analysis in Ellis provoked only one partial dissent. Although Justice Powell 
agreed with most of Justice White's opinion for the Court, he disagreed with the Court's treatment 
of expenses associated with the union's convention. Applying the same test adopted by the majority 
in assessing the range of union activities permitted under the Railway Labor Act, Justice Powell 
found that the union had failed to show that all aspects of the convention were related to the union's 
collective bargaining duties. Ellis, 466 U.S. at 459-60. Although it was a forum for establishing 
union policy on collective bargaining, it also was used to promote the union's political goals. Politi­
cians appeared prominently on the list of convention speakers and no claim was made that their 
presence was related to the union's collective bargaining role. Even if all convention activities were 
within the statutory authorization, Justice Powell argued, convention politicking raised first amend­
ment problems. After Abood it was clear that dissenting employees could not be forced to contribute 
to political causes with which they disagreed. Thus, even if permitted by statute, such a use of 
nonunion employees' fees violated the first amendment. Id. at 461. 
223. See supra note 219. 
224. When they receive the union magazine in the privacy of their home, such employees are not 
in the position of a captive audience because recipients of unwanted mail can avoid its objectionable 
content. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) ("The cus­
tomer of Consolidated Edison may escape exposure to objectionable material simply by transferring 
the bill insert from envelope to wastebasket."). 
225. 466 U.S. at 450. 
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to be the views of the employee, and can be disavowed or combatted by 
contributions to or work for groups that take opposing positions. It is 
hard to see how the expenditure of a few pennies of an employee's money 
amounts to any greater annoyance than the imposition on the property 
owner accepted in Prune Yard. In that case, even though the shopping 
center was opened up to proponents of alien causes, the Court was able 
to view the imposition on the individual owner as not amounting to an 
invasion of first amendment rights. 
Coming after Prune Yard, Ellis makes even more obvious the distor­
tion offirst amendment interests that took place in Abood. Although the 
line drawn in Abood quantitatively reduced forced monetary contribu­
tions required of nonunion employees, it did so in a way that created no 
qualitative protection for the first amendment rights of nonunion em­
ployees working in an agency shop. 
The problem of compelled association, which the Court in Abood 
understood to be inextricably connected to the kind of compelled expres­
sion outlawed in Barnette, arose a second time during the 1983 Supreme 
Court Term in a vastly different context. In Roberts v. United States 
Jaycees,226 the Jaycees argued that application of the Minnesota Human 
Rights Act,227 outlawing discrimination in places of public accommoda­
tion on the basis of sex, to their organization's male-only membership 
standards violated the Jaycees' right to freedom of association under the 
first amendment. The Eighth Circuit had agreed with their claim, find­
ing that because "the advocacy of political and public causes, selected by 
the membership, is a not insubstantial part of what it does," the Jaycees' 
right to choose its members was protected by the freedom of associa­
tion.228 The Supreme Court reversed in a unanimous decision with seven 
members of the Court participating. 229 
The basic thrust ofJustice Brennan's opinion for the Court was that 
Minnesota's antidiscrimination law was not designed to suppress expres­
sion, that it promoted a compelling governmental purpose, and that it 
did so through the use of the least restrictive alternative. Justice Brennan _ 
noted that the Constitution protected the "freedom not to associate,"230 
but he was not convinced that the Jaycees had demonstrated any signifi­
226. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). The name "Jaycees" is derived from the organization's formal name. 
the Junior Chamber of Commerce. 
227. MINN. STAT. § 363.01-.14 (1984 & Supp. 1985). 
228. United States Jaycees v. McClure, 709 F.2d 1560, 1570 (8th Cir. 1983), rev'd sub nom. 
Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
229. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun did not participate in the consideration of the 
case. 
230. 468 U.S. at 623 (citing Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 234-35 (1977)). 
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cant infringement on that freedom.231 Their case was supported only by 
unproven assumptions about the impact of being required to admit wo­
men to membership. The Court held that even if there was such an in­
fringement, the government had sufficiently justified its action.232 
Only Justice O'Connor wrote separately in Roberts. While agreeing 
with the result reached, she expressed profound disagreement with the 
analysis employed by the majority opinion for two reasons: in one re­
spect, the opinion underprotected groups that engaged in expressive ac­
tivities receiving the full protection of the first amendment; and in 
another respect, it overprotected associations of persons who banded to­
gether for commercial purposes. 2 33 
The first type of association, one "predominantly engaged in pro­
231. Justice Brennan recognized two distinct categories of freedom ofassociation. Id. at 617-18. 
One category protects intimate relationships as an element of personal-liberty. See, e.g., Zablocki v. 
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-86 (1978) (describing the right to marry as a fundamental right of pri­
vacy protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment); Moore v. City of E. Cleve­
land, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (extending protection of due process clause beyond nuclear family); Karst, 
The Freedom ofIntimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980) (defining "freedom of intimate asso­
cation," and discussing the values at stake and the constitutional doctrines that nurture freedom of 
intimate association). The other involves the right to associate in order to engage in expressive 
activities. See, e.g., Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (ordi­
nance limiting amount of contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures 
violates first amendment rights of association and speech); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) 
(litigation activities of NAACP are protected forms of expression and association). The Jaycees 
argued that both types of associational interests had been infringed. Justice Brennan dismissed the 
Jaycees claim to interference with a personal relationship on the ground that the Jaycees were a large 
and unselective organization. 468 U.S. at 620-21. Their claim to an invasion of the right to associate 
for the purpose of speaking was meritorious, however, because the Jaycees take public positions on 
political issues and engage in lobbying and fundraising. Id. at 623, 626-27. The evidence in the 
record convinced Justice Brennan that the invasion involved would be only incidental. Id. at 628. 
232. Id. at 628-29. The compelling interest promoted by Minnesota was "[a]ssuring women 
equal access" to the "various commercial programs and benefits offered to members" of the Jaycees. 
Id. at 626. This conclusion is consistent with Supreme Court assertions that a governmental purpose 
of eliminating discrimination satisfies the compelling interest component of strict scrutiny review. 
E.g., Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S. 728, 744-48 (1984); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 
574, 604 (1983). Because the Jaycees' discriminatory membership policies produced harms that 
were unrelated to the organization's exercise of the right to communicate its ideas, the state was free 
to eradicate these harms by means that were narrowly tailored to achieve such ends. 468 U.S. at 
628-29. This balancing analysis departs from the absolutist position that compelled expression is per 
se inappropriate to achieve a legitimate or even compelling government end. It is far from clear, 
however, that this absolutist view represents even Justice Jackson's approach in Barnette, see supra 
note 28, let alone the view of the Court in more recent cases. For example, in Abood, the Court 
concluded that the compelling government interest in promoting labor peace and avoiding free riders 
justified the agency-shop arrangement and the requirement that nonunion employees finance the 
union's collective bargaining activities undertaken on their behalf. 431 U.S. at 220-23. 
Justice Brennan also rejected a claim by the Jaycees that the Minnesota law was unconstitution­
ally vague and overbroad. The statute had been construed by the Minnesota Supreme Court to 
apply to the membership policies of organizations that were "public" when viewed from the perspec­
tive of their "size, selectivity, commercial nature, and use of public facilities," 468 U.S. at 629, and 
not to apply to private organizations. In Justice Brennan's view, this limiting construction had 
eliminated any problems of vagueness and overbreadth. Id. at 630-31. 
233. Id. at 632 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
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tected expression,"234 was, under Justice Brennan's analysis, given the 
burden of "making a 'substantial' showing that the admission of unwel­
come members 'will change the message communicated by the group's 
speech.' "235 Justice O'Connor believed that such a burden imposed an 
unreasonable and unrealistic limit on the ability of an association en­
gaged in first amendment speech to select its membership. It was unclear 
just how such a burden would be met and why it was imposed in the fust 
place. 
Even more fundamentally, Justice O'Connor disapproved of the ma­
jority's failure to distinguish between expressive associations and com­
mercial associations. In Justice O'Connor's view, expressive associations 
were entitled to the full complement of fust amendment protections for 
all their activities,236 but commercial associations could claim only mini­
mal constitutional protections and could be subject to rational state regu­
lations.237 Distinguishing between the two types of associations required 
focusing on an organization's purposes and the purposes of its member­
ship in joining the group. 
Recognizing that this classification would not always be easy to 
make, Justice O'Connor nevertheless believed that such a dividing line 
was constitutionally mandated. 238 Some clear examples from past cases 
were available as starting points. On the one hand, a large commercial 
law fum is an association for commercial purposes; partnership decisions 
are therefore subject to rational state regulation to assure nondiscrimina­
tory practices.239 On the other hand, an association engaged in lawyer­
ing activities in order to further social goals is an expressive 
association;240 any regulation of its membership, solicitation, recruit­
ment, or other association practices should be subject to strict judicial 
review. "Protection of the association's right to define its membership 
derives from the recognition that the formation of an expressive associa­
tion is the creation of a voice, and the selection of members is the defini­
tion of that voice."24I 
234. Id. at 635. 
235. Id. at 632 (quoting Justice Brennan's opinion for the Court, id. at 627, 628). 
236. Id. at 633. 
237. Id. at 634. 
238. Id. at 636-37. 
239. Hishon v. King & Spaulding, 467 U.S. 69 (1984) (holding that allegation by former associ­
ate that law firm's decision not to invite her to become a partner was a product of sex-based discrimi­
nation stated a claim under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1982)). 
240. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415,429-30 (1963) (holding that NAACP efforts to end racial 
discrimination by instituting civil rights litigation are protected by the first amendment and cannot 
be regulated by the state in a way that discourages such activities in the absence of a substantial state 
interest). 
241. 468 U.S. at 633. 
881 
Texas Law Review Vol. 64:817, 1986 
Justice O'Connor found additional support for her view in the 
Court's treatment of labor unions. AB she interpreted past cases, if the 
regulation of unions in their role as protector of the business needs of 
employees was challenged, the state could justify its regulation by show­
ing ouly that it bore a rational relationship to a legitimate end. 242 Such 
was the case in Abood, when the Court ruled that nonunion employees 
could be compelled to support the union's collective bargaining activities. 
Conversely, when the union promoted ideological goals, individuals 
could not be compelled to participate in such activities if they objected to 
the ends being promoted. 243 
Justice O'Connor argued that the activities of the Jaycees should be 
examined to determine whether it was a commercial or expressive associ­
ation. To be an expressive association, it was not enough that an organi­
zation engaged in some expressive activities. -Instead, sueh activities had 
to represent the predominant character of the organization. This distinc­
tion was critical in the case of the Jaycees. The organization did support 
certain political causes, 244 but this did not represent the primary focus of 
the organization. Instead, the group mainly devoted itself to training 
members in the skills of solicitation and management in order to enhance 
business expertise.245 Toward this end, much time and attention was de­
voted to encouraging members to sell memberships in the Jaycees. Jus­
tice O'Connor viewed this agenda as directed at commercial activities, 
justifying Minnesota's imposition of rational regulations on the opera­
tions of the Jaycees.246 
In Roberts, the Jaycees raised claims of unconstitutional compulsion 
under both the expressive and associational strands of the compulsion 
doctrine. Arguing that the state forced the admission of persons to mem­
bership against the organization's will was the reverse of the objection 
raised by nonunion employees under an agency-shop contract. The em­
ployees in that setting were being forced to belong to an organization 
against their will; in Roberts, the constitutional objection was that an 
association should have the right to select its own members to make cer­
tain they will support and work toward the organization's goals. With­
out membership control, the organization might be forced to accept 
members who would impede the association's efforts, either by unwilling­
242. Id. at 637. 
243. Id. at 638. 
244. The opinion of the Court of Appeals recited a lengthy list of political issues on which the 
national Jaycees and their state and local affiliates had taken public positions. See McClure, 109 
F.2d at 1569-70. 
245. 468 U.S. at 639. 
246. Id. at 640. 
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ness to commit time and energies or by purposefully setting out to sub­
vert the organization.247 
The second claim raised by the Jaycees related to the impact of a 
state-mandated change in membership policy on the message communi­
cated by the organization. As a male-only association, the Jaycees pro­
ject an organizational image that will be altered by the forced admission 
ofwomen.248 The Jaycees argued that this projected image is the organi­
zational equivalent of a personality. Just as Barnette and Wooley protect 
an individual's chosen persona, in Roberts the argument was that Minne­
sota interfered with the personality the Jaycees wished to project to the 
public. In addition to an adverse effect on its chosen image, there was a 
further claim of a compelled message. Left on their own, the Jaycees 
would promote the interests of men in business and not concern them­
selves with issues of equal treatment for women in the business world. 
With a change in membership to include women as voting members, 
these new members may force the organization to alter its agenda and to 
espouse causes it would not have supported in its male-only days.249 
These multiple claims of first amendment infringement merit more 
thorough consideration than they received in the majority or concurring 
opinions in Roberts. Moreover, the interests at stake in Roberts shonld 
be compared with the Court's previous concerns in cases raising claims 
of protection from compelled association and expression. In Prune Yard, 
Justice Rehnquist identified three distinguishing characteristics that 
made the case less constitutionally troublesome: the message dissemi­
nated did not originate with the government, there was a chance to disa­
vow, and the views expressed would not be assumed to be those of the 
shopping center owner.250 Applying those criteria to the Roberts facts 
produces an interesting result. Although it was true in Prune Yard that 
the anti-United Nations Resolution message was not sponsored by the 
government, that is not the case in Roberts. As a result of compelling the 
Jaycees to admit women, the government was making it likely that the 
247. But see id. at 627 ("The Act requires no change in the Jaycees' creed of promoting the 
interests ofyoung meu, and it imposes no restrictious on the organization's ability to exclude individ­
uals with ideologies or philosophies different from those of its existing members."). 
248. But see id. at 627. ("[A]ny claim that admission of women as full voting members will 
impair a symbolic message conveyed by the very fact that women are not permitted to vote is attenu­
ated at best."). 
249. 	 As the lower court noted: 
If the statute is upheld, the basic purpose of the Jaycees will change. It will become an 
association for the advancement of young people. Young men will no longer be its only 
beneficiaries. It is natural to expect that an association containing both men and women 
will not be so single-minded about advancing men's interests as an association of men only. 
McClure, 709 F.2d at 1571. 
250. Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980), discussed supra Part VI. 
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organization would promote economic justice for both men and women, 
a viewpoint different from the previous position taken by the Jaycees.251 
Although this transformation was not explicitly dictated by the govern­
ment-ordered membership policy, it is a highly probable outcome of the 
government action. The government has altered the organization's struc­
ture in such a way as to make highly likely a change in the organization's 
message, one consistent with Minnesota's public policy as reflected in its 
Human Rights Act.2s2 
The second PruneYard factor is the opportunity to disavow. In 
Roberts, to the extent that the Jaycees organization was transformed 
from male-only membership to a mixed-gender organization and now 
supports the advancement of both males and females in business, there is 
no opportunity to disavow these new views. Because the views are an 
inevitable result of its new membership, the organization cannot disasso­
ciate itself from the interests of some of its members. 
The third factor is the probability that the pro-equality viewpoint of 
its women members will be imputed to the organization. As full voting 
members of the Jaycees, women will influence the organization's policies 
and public positions, and they will be assumed to speak for the 
organization. 
Although none of the three critical factors were satisfied in 
Prune Yard, the opposite is true in Roberts. In light of this, Justice Bren­
nan's brief treatment of the Jaycees' first amendment argument seems 
251. The Jaycees philosophy is summarized by the Creed adopted by the organization as part of 
its bylaws: 
We believe 
That faith in God gives meaning and purpose to human life; 
That the brotherhood of man transcends the sovereignty of nations; 
That economic justice can best be won by free men through free enterprise; 
That government should be of laws rather than of men; 
That earth's great treasure lies in human personality; 
And that service to humanity is the best work of life. 
Article 2, By-Laws of the United States Jaycees, reprinted in McClure, 109 F.2d at 1562 (emphasis 
added). 
The possibility that a compelled change in the membership policy of the Jaycees will produce a 
change in the organization's philosophy as reflected in its Creed is suggested in the opinion of the 
Court of Appeals: 
But some change in the Jaycees' philosophieal cast can reasonably be expected. It is not 
hard to imagine, for example, that ifwomen become full-fledged members in any substan­
tial numbers, it will not be long before efforts are made to change the Jaycees Creed. 
Young women may take a dim view of affirming the ''brotherhood of man," or declaring 
how "free men" can best win economic justice. Such phrases are not trivial. The use of 
language betrays an attitude of mind, even ifunconsciously, and that attitude is part of the 
belief and expression that the First Amendment protects. 
Id. at 1571. 
252. "An organization of young people, as opposed to young men, may be more 'felicitous,' 
more socially desirable, in the view of the State Legislature, or in the view of the judges of this Court, 
but it will be substantially different from the Jaycees as it now exists." McClure, 109 F.2d at 1571. 
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inappropriate. Even when a significant first amendment claim exists, the 
government may be able to justify the invasion of first amendment inter­
ests;253 however the case should not have been decided without a serious 
treatment of the Jaycees' first amendment argument.254 
The third case during the 1983 Term involving compelled associa­
tion and expression was Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges 
v. Knight.255 Of the three 1983 cases, it is by far the most difficult to 
evaluate. In Knight, the Court considered a constitutional challenge to 
an aspect of the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations Act 
(PELRA).256 Under the Act, public employees had the right to select an 
exclusive bargaining representative to "meet and negotiate" with their 
government employer over the "terms and conditions of employ­
ment."257 In addition, professional employees were given the right to 
"meet and confer" with their employer on "employment related-ques­
tions not subject to mandatory bargaining."258 The professional employ­
ees were required to choose a representative for these "meet and confer" 
sessions. If an exclusive bargaining agent had been chosen, that agent 
253. See supra note 232. 
254. A claim quite similar to the somewhat novel first amendment argument raised unsuccess­
fully by the Jaycees in Roberts has been raised in at least one other recent lawsuit. In Gay Rights 
Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., No. 5863-80 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1983), rev'd, 496 A.2d 567,568 (D.C. 
Ct. App. 1985), vacated, 496 A.2d 587 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985) (original appellate decision vacated and 
rehearing ordered after filing of supplemental briefs), two student organizations promoting the cause 
of "gay pride" sued Georgetown University for its refusal to grant official recognition to the organi­
zations, claiming the university's actious violated the Human Rights Act of the District of Colum­
bia, D.C. CODE .ANN. § 1-2501 to 2557 (1981), by discriminating on the basis of sexual preference. 
The University contended that being forced to recognize the student groups would violate the Uni­
versity's right to freedom of religion-the University is affiliated with the Catholic Church and the 
Church's position is that a homosexual lifestyle is morally objectionable. 
Although Georgetown University did not make a first amendment freedom of expression argu­
ment, this claim was raised on their behalf by an amicus brief. Brief of Arthur B. Spitzer, Amicus 
Curiae, Gay Rights Coalition v. Georgetown Univ., 496 A.2d 587 (D.C. Ct. App. 1985) [hereinafter 
cited as Georgetown Amicus Brief]. Requiring the University to grant recognition to the two gay 
rights groups, thereby subsidizing their activities, would be to compel the university to support the 
groups despite the University's disapproval of their activities and purposes. /d. at 28-36. Spitzer 
argned such compelled support violates the principles announced in Barnette, Wooley, and Abood, 
and viewed Prune Yard and Roberts as distinguishable. He distinguished Prune Yard on the ground 
that the University in fact permitted the plaintiff groups to use its facilities, and that nothing the 
Court said in Prune Yard required more than access to facilities. Because the plaintiff groups sought 
subsidization and endorsement, the case went beyond PruneYard. /d. at 34 n.28. Roberts was distin­
guished because, unlike the showing made by the Jaycees, "Georgetown has established clearly in 
the record the manner in which subsidizing the plaintiffs' activities would infringe its ability to 
communicate its message, rather than the plaintiffs' contrary message, to the university community 
and to the broader community." /d. at 35. 
255. 465 u.s. 271 (1984). 
256. MINN. STAT. § 179A.01-.25 (1984). 
257. 465 U.S. at 274; see MINN. STAT. §§ 179.65, 179.66 (1982) (current versions at 
§§ 179A.06(5), 179A.07(2) (1984)). 
258. 465 U.S. at 274; see MINN. STAT. §§ 179.63, 179.65, 197.73 (1982) (current versions at 
§§ 179A.03(19), 179A.06(4), 179A.08 (1984)). 
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also served as the "meet and confer" representative, and the public em­
ployer was not free to "meet and confer" with any other members of the 
bargaining unit, even to discuss policy matters not subject to mandatory 
bargaining.zs9 
Under PELRA, the faculty at twenty community colleges in the 
Minnesota community college system formed a single bargaining unit 
and selected the Minnesota Community College Faculty Association 
(MCCFA) as their exclusive bargaining agent. To carry out their charge 
to meet and confer with the state board operating the community college 
system (the Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges), MCCFA 
organized meet-and-confer committees on individual campuses. The rep­
resentatives on these committees were all faculty members who belonged 
to MCCFA. Nonmembers were able to communicate their views 
through nnoffi.cial channels, but could not participate in the meet-and­
confer sessions.260 The subjects before these committees included "the 
selection and evaluation of administrators, academic accreditation, stu­
dent affairs, curriculum and fiscal planning."26I 
In 1974, a group of community college faculty members who did not 
belong to MCCFA filed suit challenging the constitutionality ofPELRA 
in so far as it permitted MCCFA to (1) be the exclusive representative for 
mandatory bargaining and (2) control the selection of meet-and-confer 
representatives. Although the challenge to the exclusive representative 
system for mandatory-bargaining subjects failed on the authority of 
Abood,262 the three-judge district court found the method of choosing 
meet-and-confer committee members violated the rights of freedom of 
speech and association of the non-MCCFA faculty. The Association and 
the State Board for Community Colleges appealed to the Supreme Court, 
which reversed the district court's finding that appellees' first amend­
ment rights were violated by PELRA. 
Justice O'Connor, writing for the Court, reasoned that the meet­
259. 465 U.S. at 274-75; see MINN. STAT. § 179.66(7) (1982) (current version at § 179A.07(4) 
(1984)). 
260. 465 U.S. at 275. Despite the Act's formal prohibition against "meet and confer" sessions 
with other members of the bargaining unit, the employer may meet informally with other public 
employees to hear their views. This practice is permitted so long as these meetings do not interfere 
with the rights of the exclusive representative. See MINN. STAT. §§ 179.65 (1), 179.66 (7) (1982) 
(current version at§ 179A.07(4) (1984)). 
261. 465 U.S. at 276. 
262. Knight v. Minnesota Community College Faculty Ass'n, 571 F. Supp. I, 5 (D. Minn. 1982). 
On appeal, this aspect of the three-judge district court's decision was summarily affirmed by the 
Supreme Court, 460 U.S. 1048 (1983), although the Court later reversed the district court's holding 
that the "meet and confer" provisions of PELRA deprived nonmembers of their constitutional 
rights. See Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. at 279. 
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and-confer sessions were not a public forum263 and that appellees-either 
as members of the public or as public employees-had no constitution­
ally protected right to be heard by a state policy-making body.264 Fur­
thermore, non-MCCFA members were free to express their views on the 
subject of educational policy and were free to associate with whomever 
they chose because membership in MCCFA was not required by 
PELRA.265 Finally, appellees' equal protection claim was rejected on 
the ground that the state's decision to give MCCFA a unique role in the 
meet-and-confer process was rational. 266 
Justice O'Connor saw Knight as a right-of-access case without a 
constitutional basis and in no way involving compelled behavior. 
Although faculty members might feel some pressure to join MCCFA in 
order to participate in meet-and-confer sessions, this pressure was not 
considered adequate to give rise to a claim of compelled association. 267 
The situation in Knight was viewed differently by the dissenting Jus­
tices. Justice Brennan's brief separate dissent portrayed PELRA as pos­
ing a Hobson's choice for non-MCCF A faculty members because it 
compelled them to abandon one of two rights protected by the first 
amendment: 
On the one hand, those faculty members who are barred from par­
ticipation in "meet and confer" sessions by virtue of their refusal to 
join MCCFA have a First Amendment right to express their views 
on important matters of academic governance to college adminis­
trators. At the same time, they enjoy a First Amendment right to 
be free from compelled associations with positions or views that 
they do not espouse. In my view, the real vice of the Minnesota 
Public Employment Labor Relations Act (PELRA) is that it im­
permissibly forces nonunion faculty members to choose between 
these two rights.268 
In Justice Brennan's opinion, the choice presented was constitutionally 
unacceptable. 
Justice Brennan's evaluation of the case was influenced by his con­
263. See Knight, 465 U.S. at 280 ("A 'meet and confer' session is obviously not a public fo­
rum."); see also Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46-47 (1983) (inter­
school mail system was not a public forum because it has not traditionally been available to members 
of the public for speech nor had the government designated it as a public forum). But see City of 
Madison Joint School Dist. No.8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 174­
75 (1976) (school board meetings are a public forum). 
264. 465 U.S. at 283. 
265. /d. at 289-90 n.ll. The PELRA system is the equivalent of an agency shop. Public em­
ployees do not need to join MCCFA. They are, however, required to pay a fair-share fee to defray 
the costs of the negotiations conducted by the exclusive representative on their behalf. See MINN. 
STAT. § 179.65(2) (1982) (current version at§ 179A.06(3) (1984)). 
266. 465 U.S. at 291-92. 
267. /d. at 289-90. 
268. /d. at 295-96 (footnote omitted). 
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elusion that the meet-and-confer process played a crucial role in the for­
mation of academic policy for the community colleges. That conclusion 
was reinforced by his belief that "many non-union faculty members view 
participation in the meet and confer process as 'essential to their role on 
the faculty.' " 269 Because the only way to participate in the meet-and­
confer process was by joining MCCFA, significant pressure existed for 
faculty members to "abandon their personal or ideological objections to 
associating with MCCFA."270 Placing faculty members in such an un­
tenable position unnecessarily infringed on their first amendment rights, 
Justice Brennan argued, and the government could not justify the exclu­
sivity of the meet-and-confer sessions on the same grounds that sup­
ported exclusivity in the collective bargaining context. 271 
Justice Stevens, in a lengthier dissent joined by Justices Brennan and 
Powell, approached PELRA from a different but related perspective. He 
saw the exclusivity principle in the meet-and-confer context as effectuat­
ing a forbidden form of viewpoint discrimination. 272 Only association 
members had a meaningful chance to communicate their views to college 
administrators on academic policy matters, and those with opposing, 
views were consequently screened out by the statute. In Justice Stevens' 
view, the statute was "invalid because the First Amendment does not 
permit any state legislature to grant a single favored speaker an effective 
monopoly on the opportunity to petition the government."273 
For the issues raised in this Article, the significant aspect ofKnight 
is the disagreement between Justices O'Connor and Brennan over 
whether the Minnesota statutory scheme was a form of unconstitutional 
compelled association because it pressured faculty members to join 
MCCFA. In Justice O'Connor's view, pressure did not equal compul­
sion; in Justice Brennan's opinion, pressure in the form of deprivation of 
significant rights amounted to hnpermissible compulsion. Returning 
once again to a values discussion and to the three PruneYard factors 
helps in deciding which is the better view. 
Ever since Barnette, the key value has been protection against forced 
269. Id. at 298 (quoting from Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement of Appellant at A-51). 
270. Id. at 299. 
271. Id. at 299-300. 
272. Justice Stevens has stressed in several other recent cases his concern with viewpoint dis­
crimination as a chief vice forbidden by the first amendment. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, 
468 U.S. 364,413-15 (1984) (Stevens, J., dissenting); City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 
789, 803-04 (1984); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods., 463 U.S. 60, 84 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring); 
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 553 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The 
essential concern embodied in the First Amendment is that government not impose its viewpoint on 
the public or select the topics on which public debate is permissible."). 
273. 465 U.S. at 301. 
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conformity to government-supported ideas. To the extent that a govern­
ment employee feels pressured to join the organization that serves as the 
exclusive bargaining representative for that employee, it is unlikely the 
government is attempting to indoctrinate the employee to accept certain 
ideas. In Knight the faculty association was elected by faculty vote and 
the government employer could not have easily anticipated either the 
particular entity that would be elected or what the association's views 
would be on particular collective bargaining issues or on issues of aca­
demic policy. The government's purpose was to negotiate with a single 
employee representative, thereby reducing confusion and easing the task 
of agreeing on collective bargaining terms. 274 Even if the nonunion pub­
lic employee were to succumb to pressure and join the union, the govern­
ment would have no guarantee that any subsequent change in the 
attitudes and outlook of that employee would favor government-spon­
sored ideas. Thus, unlike the state purpose asserted in Barnette and 
Wooley, the government motive for imposing pressure to conform was 
not to spread a particular idea or squelch any disfavored belief. In this 
sense, the Knight case is more like Prune Yard than Barnette. 
In its potential impact on personality, however, the situation in 
Knight is more troublesome. To the extent a faculty member was moti­
vated to join MCCFA by the desire to play a significant role in the for­
mation of academic policy, there is a possibility that such a decision 
would affect the personality of that individual. Whether the impact 
would be directly upon the individual or only perceived by the world is 
hard to know. Under PELRA, active participation in the meet-and-con­
fer process would be possible only if one was selected as a meet-and­
confer representative. Thus, it is probable that nominal MCCFA mem­
bership would not bring about this result, and because active association 
membership would maximize the chance of gaining a place on a meet­
and-confer committee, some identifiable change in the individual could 
well occur. To be selected, some degree of conformity to association 
views might be necessary. 
PruneYard-in addition to involving no government-sponsored 
message-focused on two additional factors: the opportunity to disavow 
the alien message and the likelihood an individual would be assumed to 
share the ideas of the group with which he or she is forced to associate. 
In the Knight situation no real disavowal of association views would be 
possible. Such disavowal would probably eliminate any benefit to the 
individual from joining MCCFA; on a campus where a majority of the 
274. For a more extensive discussion of the rationales underlying exclusive bargaining represen­
tation, see supra note 159 . 
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faculty belonged to MCCFA, disavowal would doom a faculty member's 
chances of gaining a place in the meet-and-confer process. In contrast, 
nonunion employees in Abood were easily able to disavow any political 
positions taken by the union that served as their collective bargaining 
representative.275 
The final PruneYard factor was the likelihood that an individual 
would be associated with the group's views. Although this could occur 
for association views on widely publicized collective bargaining issues, 
such a result would be less probable on issues of academic policy for 
which a party line might not even exist. In fact, what the appellees in 
Knight pressed for was a role in the process whereby academic policy 
positions were formed. Individuals successful in gaining such a role 
could influence faculty views on matters discussed at the meet-and-con­
fer sessions, a result at least as probable as that they would be associated 
with preestablished MCCFA views. Thus, on balance, the danger that 
an individual would be associated with the views of the collective bar­
gaining representative is no more likely in Knight than it would be in 
Abood or in any other agency-shop situation. This factor therefore is not 
of special significance in the Knight setting. 
From the twin perspectives of first amendment values and the 
PruneYard factors, the vices of the meet-and-confer provisions in 
PELRA added some further first amendment burdens to those already 
imposed by the decision to select an exclusive bargaining agent. As the 
earlier analysis of Abood shows, a major interference with first amend­
ment freedoms occurs under any agency-shop arrangement that gives a 
union power over all workers, even nonunion employees.276 A careful 
look at the Knight facts, however, demonstrates that additional problems 
are created by compelling actual association membership as a condition 
for involvement in the meet-and-confer process. Those burdens pose a 
threat to the integrity of individual personality, a threat exacerbated by 
the fact that a faculty member forced to join the association is unable to 
disavow its views without sacrificing any real chance of involvement in 
the meet-and-confer process. Any defense of the Court's decision to up­
hold the requirement of association membership in Knight, especially 
when contrasted with the Court's willingness to strike down the use of 
compelled fee money for political purposes in Abood, must be based on 
differences in the level of government justification required to permit im­
positions on first amendment interests, and not on the conclusion that 
first amendment values are less at risk in Knight. 
275. See supra text accompanying notes 182-83. 
276. See supra text accompanying notes 179-81. 
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VIII. Pacific Gas & Electric 
Since the trilogy of compelled expression cases decided during the 
1983 Supreme Court Term, the Court has decided one potentially signifi­
cant case involving a compelled expression claim. In Pacific Gas & Elec­
tric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,277 the Court reviewed the 
constitutionality of a California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) or­
der directing the Pacific Gas and Electric Company (PG&E) to insert 
periodically certain materials in its billing envelopes. In contrast to its 
offhanded rejection of the compelled expression and association claims in 
Roberts and Knight, in Pacific Gas & Electric the Court once again up­
held such a claim as a serious intrusion on first amendment rights. 
The ruling challenged in Pacific Gas & Electric was prompted by 
PG&E's practice of distributing a company newsletter along with its 
monthly bills.278 In 1980, a group objecting to utility rates asked the 
CPUC to forbid the utility's inclusion of political editorials in its billing 
envelopes. The group, Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN), ar­
gued that ratepayers should not have to finance political speech engaged 
in by the utility. In ruling on TURN's request, the CPUC found that the 
surplus space279 in the billing envelopes was the property of the utility's 
customers. The Commission decided to apportion this space between the 
ratepayers and the utility. Finding that TURN "represented the inter­
ests of 'a siguificant group' of appellant's residential customers,"280 the 
CPUC permitted TURN to use extra billing envelope space four times a 
year over a two-year period to communicate its views to ratepayers.281 
The Commission stated that ratepayers would receive more of a benefit if 
their envelope space was used to disseminate a variety of views and not 
just the views of the utility.282 
277. 106 s. Ct. 903 (1986). 
278. The newsletter contained editorials, public interest features, and information on energy con­
servation and payment plans offered by the utility. /d. at 905. 
279. Surplus space was defined by the CPUC as "the space remaining in the billing envelope, 
after inclusion of the monthly bill and any required legal notices, for inclusion of other materials up 
to such total envelope weight as would not result in any additional postage cost." /d. at 906 (quoting 
Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at A-2 to A-3). 
280. /d. at 906 (quoting Appendix to Jurisdictional Statement at A-15). TURN's appropriate­
ness as a representative of the residential customers was based on TURN's participation as an inter­
venor in ratemaking proceedings. 
281. The Commission authorized TURN to use the space for fundraising and to communicate 
its views to the customers. No limit was placed on the content of TURN's speech in the mailings, 
except that it was "required to state that its messages [were] not those of [the CPUC]." /d. at 906­
07. TURN was entitled to use more than surplus space so long as it paid the extra mailing costs. /d. 
at 906. 
282. /d. Two qualifications accompanied the ruling. TURN was required to identify its materi­
als as expressing its views and not the views of the utility, and the Commission held open the possi­
bility that it would allow other groups access to the billing envelopes in future rulings. /d. at 907. 
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After the California Supreme Court refused to review the Commis­
sion's order, PG&E appealed the CPUC decision to the Supreme Court 
claiming the order required it to distribute, in violation of the first 
amendment, a message with which it disagreed. In a five-to-three deci­
sion,283 the Court reversed the Commission's order. 
Justice Powell, in a plurality opinion,284 viewed appellant's newslet­
ter as the first amendment equivalent of a newspaper.285 His opinion 
invalidated compelled access to the billing envelope on the same grounds 
that the Court had used previously in Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo 286 to strike down a state law granting a right of reply to unfavor­
able editorial commentary in the pages of a newspaper.287 In drawing 
this analogy, the opinion emphasized that the right not to speak served 
the same societal purposes as the right to speak2SS_both assure that pub­
lic debate on public issues is vigorous. Compelling access as a penalty for 
expressing certain viewpoints tends to discourage the expression of those 
viewpoints because the potential speaker often chooses silence to avoid 
the penalty.2s9 
283. Justice Blackmun took no part in the consideration of the case. 
284. Justice Powell's opinion was joined by Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Brennan and 
O'Connor. Justice Marshall wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment. Justice Rehn­
quist dissented, joined in part by Justices White and Stevens, and Justice Stevens wrote an additional 
dissent. 
285. Justice Powell was of the view that the newsletter's content was close enough to that of a 
traditional newspaper to merit the full protection of the first amendment and not the lesser level of 
protection afforded commercial speech, even though its author was a corporation. Id. at 907-08. 
286. 418 u.s. 241 (1974). 
287. See supra note 117. 
288. 106 S. Ct. at 909, 912. 
289. Id. at 908. This deterrent effect is somewhat different than that of the typical compelled 
expression case in which the compelled expression is less easily avoided. In Barnette, the only avail­
able avoidance technique was to attend private school; in Wooley, the Maynards would have to 
refrain from driving an automobile; in Abood, the nonunion employees would have to seek other 
employment; and in PruneYard, the center owner would have to sell his shopping center. In all 
these cases, because the plaintiff's speech did not trigger the obligation to accommodate the un­
wanted speech, changing the content of one's speech could not avoid the obligation. The compelled 
access provision in Pacific Gas & Electric, like the Florida right-of-reply law in Miami Herald Pub­
lishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), was viewed, therefore, as a more subtle device; a subcat­
egory of compelled expression that is objectionable on somewhat different grounds. 
The analogy between Pacific Gas & Electric and Tornillo was viewed as compelling despite 
recognized differences between the two cases. In Tornillo, by avoiding an editorial position critical 
of the qualifications of a candidate for political office, the newspaper could avoid any right-of-reply 
obligation because access was triggered only by the paper's expression of particular views. In Pacific 
Gas & Electric, access rights did not turn on the utility's engaging in the expression of any specific 
views. 106 S. Ct. at 910. The access decision was based on the Commission's view that the ratepay­
ers owned the extra envelope space and that their interest would be better served by periodically 
receiving information from TURN. It seems unlikely, given the Commission's property right basis 
for its rule, that even the total abandonment of the utility's monthly newsletter would eliminate the 
rights granted to TURN. I d. at 919 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In addition, access was not granted 
to the pages of the utility's own newsletter as it was to the pages of the Miami Herald. Id. at 909 n.7. 
Despite these differences, the cases were viewed as having one important deterrent effect in common. 
Although refraining from expressing political views could not completely avoid access by TURN, 
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In reaching the conclusion that the CPUC order was unconstitu­
tional, Justice Powell distinguished PruneYard 290 on three grounds. 
First, the shopping center owner in Prune Yard had not alleged that his 
own speech would be altered by the presence of students protesting 
United Nations action; therefore, his right to speak was not burdened. In 
contrast, PG&E's right to speak was burdened in several ways: it might 
decide to alter the content of its speech to discourage debate on its views 
by TURN291 or feel compelled to respond to opinions expressed by 
TURN with which it strongly differed.292 The second distinction was 
that the center property was open to the public in a way that the utility's 
billing envelopes were not. 293 
The third distinction was that the shopping center, open to all 
speakers regardless of the content of their speech, was a content-neutral 
public forum. In Pacific Gas & Electric, access decisions by the Commis­
sion discriminated among those seeking access based on the viewpoint 
they wished to express.294 The Commission's goals in ordering access 
were to intrude into the marketplace of ideas and to artificially magnify 
the views of the utility's opponents by giving those views greater visibil­
ity.295 Justice Powell reasoned that opponents of the utility were the ben-
Justice Powell speculated that the utility's realization "that whenever it speaks out on a given issue, 
it may be forced-at TURN's discretion-to help disseminate hostile views" might discourage it 
from expressing such views. Id. at 910. 
290. Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), discussed supra Part VI. 
291. 106 S. Ct. at 910. 
292. /d. at 911. The view that a compelled response is objectionable under the first amendment 
is consistent with Justice Powell's opinion in PruneYard. Concurring in the outcome of that case, 
Justice Powell distinguished cases in which the owner of the property opposed the views being ex­
pressed on his property and might, therefore, feel compelled to respond to those views. For a discus­
sion ofJustice Powell's concurring opinion in PruneYard, see supra text accompanying notes 194-96. 
In Pacific Gas & Electric, Justice Powell found the forced-response aspect of the Commission 
order no less objectionable, even though the compelled speaker was a corporation. Id. at 912. In 
addition to finding the appellant's corporate character not significant, Justice Powell saw no special 
importance in the fact that the compelled speaker was a regulated utility. Id. at 912 n.l4. 
One further manner in which the access order affected PG&E's free speech rights was suggested 
in Justice Marshall's concurring opinion. By virtue of the order, PG&E was deprived offour oppor­
tunities to use the surplus envelope space to distribute a monthly newsletter. Id. at 916 (Marshall, J., 
concurring). This displacement effect may well have been the CPUC order's most serious intrusion 
on the utility's rights. 
293. Id. at 910 n.8. 
294. /d. at 910-11. The Commission, intent on creating a forum for opinions adverse to those of 
the utility and for information deemed beneficial to consumers, had selected TURN to present these 
views. The record in Pacific Gas & Electric indicated that at least one application for use of the extra 
space had been rejected by the Commission on the ground that the group seeking to use the space 
"neither wished to participate in Commission proceedings nor alleged that its use of the billing 
envelope space would improve consumer participation in those proceedings." Id. at 907 n.5. 
295. The Court generally has struck down government attempts to "restrict the speech of some 
elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others." Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 
1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) (invalidating $1,000 ceiling on independent expenditures for political 
candidates); accord First Nat'! Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-92 (1978) (striking down law 
forbidding expenditures by banks and business corporations to influence referendum voting). The 
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eficiaries of government favoritism assisting those speakers in spreading 
their message and at the same time burdening the utility in expressing its 
views.296 Such viewpoint discrimination has long been viewed as offen­
sive to the first amendment's equality principle and as justifiable only 
when supported by a compelling interest. 297 
Having determined that the Commission's order burdened protected 
expression, Justice Powell nevertheless would have upheld the order if 
the state was furthering a compelling interest and had chosen means 
which were narrowly tailored to further its end.298 The state asserted 
two interests: assuring an effective ratemaking process299 and "promot­
ing speech by making a variety of views available to appellant's custom­
ers."300 Although Justice Powell was willing to agree that these interests 
were compelling, the state failed to satisfy the means component of the 
standard of review, because compelling access to the billing envelope for 
TURN's fundraising effort was not sufficiently related to the state's in­
terest in assuring an effective ratemaking procedure. 301 Moreover, the 
state was not free to advance TURN's speech at the expense of the util­
ity's own speech rights as a means of promoting public awareness and 
debate.302 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall stressed two distinctions 
between Pacific Gas & Electric and Prune Yard: "the degree of intrusive­
ness of the permitted access"303 and the fact that "the State has chosen to 
give TURN a right to speak at the expense of appellant's ability to use 
the property in question as a forum for the exercise of its own First 
Court responds more positively only when the government subsidizes some speech without any in­
tent to supress the speech ofothers. See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 
548-50 (1983) (upholding tax deductions for contributions to veterans' organizations); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. at 97-105 (upholding general election campaign financing for major parties). 
296. 106 S. Ct. at 911. In criticizing the viewpoint-discriminatory aspect of the Commission's 
action, Justice Powell found that it exacerbated the chilling effect of the access order. See supra note 
289. 
297. See supra note 132. 
298. 106 S. Ct. at 913. One other argument justifying the CPUC order was also rejected by 
Justice Powell. His opinion dealt with the Commission's conclusion that the utility's customers 
owned the surplus space in the billing envelopes and that, therefore, the utility could not complain 
about the fact that access rights to that space were awarded to groups that represented those custom­
ers. Justice Powell found the fact of customer ownership of the surplus space to be irrelevant be­
cause, under the Commission's order, the utility was required to distribute TURN's literature in its 
billing envelope. The envelope itself was not viewed by the Commission as the property of the 
customers. Justice Powell viewed this circumstance as equivalent to the Maynards being forced to 
lend their automobile to display the state's message printed on their license plate. /d. at 912. 
299. /d. at 913. 
300. /d. at 914. 
301. /d. at 913. 
302. /d. at 914. Because the order did not satisfY the requirement of content neutrality, the 
opinion also rejected CPUC's argument that its order was a reasonable time, place, and manner 
regulation. /d. 
303. /d. at 915. 
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Amendment rights."304 Justice Marshall viewed the intrusiveness in 
Prune Yard as minor because the center was open to the public in ways 
that were similar to traditional public forums and because the state 
courts had not allowed activity on the property that was any more intru­
sive than the activity the owner himself encouraged. By contrast, the 
billing envelope had not been made available to the public to serve "as a 
sort of community billboard."3os 
Additionally, the facts in Prune Yard did not suggest that the prop­
erty owner was prevented from engaging in protected expression of his 
own as a result of the access granted to others. In Pacific Gas & Electric, 
however, the forum was limited to the monthly billing envelope. Four of 
the twelve opportunities each year for communication with utility cus­
tomers were given over to TURN, ousting the utility from occasions on 
which it would have used the surplus envelope space for its own 
speech.306 This intrusion, given the character of the state's justification, 
was viewed as impermissible by Justice Marshall. Because the state was 
interested in promoting speakers with particular viewpoints, it would 
have been free to utilize its own resources to further the interests of 
TURN, but it could not use means that interfered with the first amend­
ment rights of the utility.J07 
Three justices dissented in Pacific Gas & Electric.30S Justice Rehn­
quist's dissent disagreed with the majority in several fundamental re­
spects. First, he did not believe that the access order would 
demonstrably affect the utility in the exercise of its first amendment 
rights, and he found the case indistinguishable from Prune Yard in this 
aspect.309 Second, he was of the view that corporations do not have the 
304. ld. at 916. 
305. ld. at 915. 
306. Id. at 916. 
307. Id. at 916-17. In addition to Justice Powell's plurality opinion and Justice Marshall's con­
currence, there was one other concurring opinion. Although joining Justice Powell's opinion, Chief 
Justice Burger also wrote a brief separate opinion stressing his view that the case could be decided on 
the authority of Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. 
Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). As in those two cases, the utility was ordered to employ its property 
to disseminate views that it found objectionable. 106 S. Ct. at 914. 
308. Justice Rehnquist's dissent was joined in part by Justices White and Stevens; Justice Stevens 
also wrote separate 1 y. 
309. Justice Rehnquist's dissent reaffirmed much of the reasoning relied on in his majority opin­
ion in PruneYard, in which three factors were seen as distinguishing that case from Wooley v. May­
nard. First, the disseminated message did not originate with the government; second, there was an 
opportunity to disavow in PruneYard, unlike the situation in Wooley where the license plate message 
could not be covered up, see supra note 190; finally, the third PruneYard factor was the possibility 
that views expressed would be assumed to be those of the shopping center owner. Under the circum­
stances of PruneYard, Justice Rehnquist's opinion found no such possibility existed. For a discus­
sion of Justice Rehnquist's opinion in PruneYard, see supra text accompanying notes 189-93. 
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same free speech rights as individuals and newspapers.310 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion took a narrow view of the scope of the 
first amendment right not to speak. He would protect that right only 
when "the effect of the action approximates that of direct content-based 
suppression of speech."311 If the government action granting access 
"only indirectly and remotely affects a speaker's contribution to the over­
all mix of information available to society,"312 it would be upheld if it 
could be justified by a rational basis. 
On the facts of the case before him, Justice Rehnquist found the 
"potential deterrent effect" to be "remote and speculative" and not "suf­
ficiently immediate and direct to warrant strict scrutiny."313 Relying on 
the fact that no particular action by the utility triggered TURN's right of 
access, Justice Rehnquist found no logical or evidentiary support for the 
view that the utility would refrain from speaking out about certain sub­
jects to attempt to discourage TURN from speaking on those subjects.3 14 
He also disagreed with the plurality's conclusion that the utility would 
feel compelled to respond to views expressed by TURN. As he had in his 
opinion inPruneYard,315 he viewed the required disclaimer of any associ­
ation between the utility and the views expressed by TURN, as removing 
any likeliliood of impermissibly compelling PG&E to respond to the 
opinions expressed by TURN.316 Moreover, because TURN could ex­
press its views in other places ifdenied access to the billing envelopes, the 
utility might decide to respond to TURN's opinions even in the absence 
of CPUC's order. Finally, the utility retained complete control over the 
content of its monthly magazine. Given these facts, Justice Rehnquist 
saw no way in which PG&E's behavior had been affected by the Com­
mission's order that rose to the level of a significant direct effect on its 
first amendment rights. 
Justice Rehnquist's opinion also offered a more sweeping alternative 
analysis. He viewed the individual's right to refrain from expression as 
"a component of the broader constitutional interest of natural persons in 
freedom of conscience."317 This interest explained the Court's opinions 
in Barnette, Wooley, and Abood., Justice Rehnquist viewed the interest in 
310. Justices White and Stevens did not join this part of the opinion. 
311. 106 S. Ct. at 918. 
312. Id. at 917 (emphasis in original). 
313. Id. at 919. 
314. Id. at 920. 
315. PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980). 
316. 106 S. Ct. at 920; see also supra note 190 and text accompanying notes 199-201 (discussing 
Justice Rehnquist's disavowal analysis in PruneYard and the reasons that caused Justice Powell to 
dissent in that case). 
317. 106 S. Ct. at 920. 
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protecting individual "freedom of mind"318 as inappropriately applied to 
nonmedia corporations: "Extension of the individual freedom of con­
science decisions to business corporations strains the rationale of those 
cases beyond the breaking point. To ascribe to such artificial entities an 
'intellect' or 'mind' for freedom of conscience purposes is to confuse met­
aphor with reality."319 Recognizing that corporations have been granted 
free speech rights, Justice Rehnquist nevertheless viewed such rights as 
arising out of a desire to promote the exchange of information and opin­
ions, and not out of a view that corporations have any independent inter­
est in self-expression. Because freedom of conscience promotes values­
such as privacy-separate and distinct from the promotion of a vigorous 
marketplace of ideas, that freedom ought not to apply to corporations. 320 
The various opinions in Pacific Gas & Electric raise a complicated 
series of analytic possibilities. On an obvious level, Pacific Gas & Electric 
presented another opportunity to explore the situation first encountered 
in PruneYard. In his Prune Yard opinion, Justice Powell limited the deci­
sion to the facts of the case and held open the possibility of a different 
result if the property owner opposed the message distributed through the 
use of his property. For Justice Powell, Pacific Gas & Electric was just 
such a case. The antipathy between the utility and TURN's message was 
obvious because TURN was granted access rights only because its views 
were opposed to those of the utility. His Pacific Gas & Electric opinion 
also reiterated his Prune Yard view that neither the opportunity to disa­
vow321 nor the nongovernment source of the message322 are of first 
318. /d. (quoting Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977)). 
319. /d. at 921. 
320. /d. at 921-22. Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion took a much narrower view of the issues 
in the case. His view of the CPUC's order was that TURN was granted access for the purpose of 
fundraising efforts and that the Commission did not authorize TURN to use the surplus space to 
engage in general advocacy of political viewpoints. /d. at 923. Moreover, because TURN was the 
only ratepayer organization that had applied for access, he declined to find that the Commission had 
engaged in viewpoint discrimination. /d. at 922-23. Justice Stevens, given the limited purpose for 
which TURN was granted access, saw no difficulty in upholding a CPUC order requiring "the 
utility to act as the conduit for a public interest group's message that bears a close relationship to the 
purpose of the billing envelope." /d. at 924. Justice Stevens found the access requirement to be 
similar to a variety of rules, not thought to raise any first amendment concerns, applied to commer­
cial communications by the Securities and Exchange Commission. /d. His rejection of the plural­
ity's viewpoint-discrimination approach comes as something of a surprise given his general 
receptivity to such claims. See supra note 272. 
321. See PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 99 (1980). Justice Powell views 
the opportunity to disavow as part of the burden impermissibly imposed on the speaker in violation 
of the first amendment. The utility may be forced to take advantage of that opportunity in order to 
disassociate itself from the views of its opponents. In Pacific Gas & Electric, the Commission's order 
specifically required that TURN attach a disclaimer to its message stating that the views expressed 
were not those of the utility. 106 S. Ct. at 907. This disclaimer did not impress Justice Powell as 
lessening the unconstitutional impact of the Commission order, even though PG&E was not pres­
sured to speak in order to clarify any ambiguity as to the source of the communication. Justice 
Powell worried that, despite TURN's required disclaimer, the utility would feel pressured to respond 
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amendment significance because they do not lighten the first amendment 
burdens created by the order. Also important to the outcome in 
Prune Yard was the fact that the state had chosen a content-neutral 
method of promoting its ends.323 In Pacific Gas & Electric, the state 
chose a less favored content-based method of achieving its objectives. As 
a result, its effort was much more easily struck down. 
Despite the differences between Pacific Gas & Electric and 
Prune Yard, it cannot go unnoticed that Pacific Gas & Electric follows 
two Supreme Court opinions, Roberts 324 and Knight,325 in which claims 
of compelled expression and association received swift rejection. One 
wonders what factors present in Pacific Gas & Electric made it so easily 
distinguishable from those earlier decisions. 
One factor relevant to this result is that, despite citations to Barnette 
and Wooley, it is clear that Pacific Gas & Electric is viewed by the plural­
ity as a special subcategory of compelled expression cases in which the 
obligation of compelled access to private property is triggered by state­
ments the property owner makes. In such cases, the owner may be able 
to avoid the access obligation by altering the behavior that gave rise to 
that obligation. 326 This subtle "content-based penalty"327 is in many 
ways more invidious than a specific compelled governmental message be­
cause of its immediate hnpact on the expression of the person or entity 
confronted by the penalty. 
Another hnportant qualification is that Pacific Gas & Electric is a 
to TURN's speech out of a fear that it otherwise would be presumed to agree with these views. 
Thus, Justice Powell saw a distinction between the ratepayers' believing the utility was the speaker, 
and their believing the utility agreed with the speaker because the speech was enclosed in the utility's 
billing envelope. 
322. 447 U.S. at 98 (1974) (Powell, J., concurring) ("But even when no particular message is 
mandated by the State, First Amendment interests are affected by state action that forces a property 
owner to admit third-party speakers."). Even if Justice Powell had found some relevance in the 
source of the communicated views, he could have found the nongovernment source requirement 
satisfied in Pacific Gas & Electric. Although the government was not the author of the message as it 
had been in Barnette and Wooley, the government had chosen to favor antiutility views in order to 
expose ratepayers to a greater diversity of views and sought to aid speakers with messages that 
furthered the Commission's purpose of spotlighting the essentially antiutility viewpoint. Therefore, 
the government was not as disassociated from the content of the speech as it had been in Prune Yard. 
323. /d. (Powell, J., concurring) ("[N]o particular message [was] mandated by the State ...."). 
324. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), discussed supra text accompanying 
notes 226-54. 
325. Minnesota State Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984). For further 
discussion, see supra text accompanying notes 255-76. 
326. See supra note 289. Ironically, the only other recent compelled expression case in which an 
analogous circumstance exists is Knight. In that case, the faculty members could avoid the obliga­
tion to join MCCFA if they were willing to give up their right to participate in the meet-and-confer 
process. 465 U.S. at 298-99 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
327. 106 S. Ct. at 910 (quoting Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 256 
(1974)). 
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compelled-access case, like PruneYard and Wooley insofar as private 
property owners are obligated to provide a forum for the speech of 
others328-private parties or the government-and not to say something 
they do not wish to say. Unlike PruneYard, however, the access is not 
granted on a content-neutral basis. Here, the Commission selects some 
speakers for access based on the content of their speech. This viewpont 
discrimination is a special concern under the first amendment and very 
similar to the government's dictating a particular message of its own 
choosing and coercing private parties to participate in the dissemination 
process, the situation in Wooley. 329 The use of such objectionable means 
was a critical factor in the analysis of the Pacific Gas & Electric plurality 
and concurring opinions. 
A third factor that cannot be ignored in evaluating Pacific Gas & 
Electric is the extent to which the case involves traditional free speech 
concerns. In Justice Marshall's analysis of the facts, the utility is pre­
vented from using the envelope space four months out of the year. Thus, 
not only have access rights been granted, but they have been granted at 
the sacrifice of the utility's ability to speak. This partial silencing of a 
speaker and depriving the speaker of a chosen method of communication 
turns Pacific Gas & Electric into a censorship case, not requiring any 
compelled expression analysis. Even Justice Powell's plurality opinion, 
although it does not emphasize this same adverse impact, nevertheless 
describes direct invasions of free speech rights when he worries that 
PG&E will feel pressured to refrain from speaking as a result of its com­
pelled distribution of TURN's views. 
Because the case contains so many of the worst features of prior fact 
patterns-ousting speakers from space otherwise available for their own 
speech; imposing access obligations on speakers because they have exer­
cised free speech rights; imposing obligations to spread a message with 
which the speakers disagree; and acting in a viewpoint-discriminatory 
manner-it comes as no surprise that the Commission order was 
invalidated. 
Despite the unsurprising nature of the outcome in Pacific Gas & 
Electric, there is one very striking difference between the decision and its 
doctrinal predecessors. In Pacific Gas & Electric, the nature of the de­
328. Examples of Supreme Court approval of government authorized access to private property 
as a forum for expression are rare. In addition to Prune Yard, one well-known example is found in 
Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), which upheld FCC rules requiring free 
reply time on radio to respond to personal attacks and political editorials. Justice Powell's plurality 
opinion in Pacific Gas & Electric distinguishes Red Lion as justified by the public ownership of the 
airwaves and the scarcity of broadcast frequencies. By contrast, communication by mail is freely 
available to all. 106 S. Ct. at 908 n.6. 
329. See supra text accompauying notes 130-34. 
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bate among the ·various Justices shifted. For the first time, the debate 
focused on more than factual similarities with and differences from prior 
cases; the debate also considered the first amendment values at stake. 
For the majority, first amendment values associated with freedom of ex­
pression are threatened, such as the likelihood that the utility will change 
its speech as a result of the order and the fact that the utility is deprived 
of the opportunity to speak four months out of the year. By comparison, 
for Justice Rehnquist there is no empirical data to support this adverse 
impact ·on the marketplace of ideas, and, to the extent Barnette and 
Wooley draw their doctrinal origins from the intrinsic values of intellec­
tual individualism, such rights do not apply to the nonmedia corpora­
tion. Pacific Gas & Electric attempts to confront the values underlying 
the decision to protect the right not to be compelled to speak; this effort 
is both commendable and novel in the Court's compelled expression 
jurisprudence. 
·The debate over values and the plurality's hostile attitude toward 
the Commission order raise the question of whether that hostility is justi­
fied based on the concerns that prompted the Barnette opinion. One of 
Justice Jackson's first concerns was the prospect that compelled speakers 
would alter their own beliefs under the influence of government compul­
sion and that society would be deprived of their differing views. No 
member of the Court suggests that such a danger exists in Pacific Gas & 
Electric. There is little danger that the utility, unlike the Jehovah's Wit­
nesses in Barnette, will change its point of view as a result of the forced 
association with TURN's opinions. The nature of the utility's business 
enterprise dictates many of the views that it holds and makes any change 
highly improbable. 33o 
A second concern of Justice Jackson was that compelled speakers, 
even if not changing their beliefs, would be less likely to express their 
true views as a result of compelled association with government-spon­
sored ideas. Justices Powell and Rehnquist disagree about this possibility 
in their opinions in Pacific Gas & Electric. Although it is hard to know 
whether such a result will occur, this seems unlikely on many of the is­
sues of interest to both Pacific and TURN because these issues are con­
tested in mandatory appearances before state and federal regulatory 
agencies, and the views of the utility are already a matter of public rec­
ord. As to other issues, such as proposed legislation, even when there are 
330. In the same way that commercial speech "may be more durable" and less vulnerable to a 
chilling effect than political speech, Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer 
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976), it can be argued that the utility is more likely to adhere 
to its origiual views than an individual. 
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issues on which the utility chooses not to air its views before its custom­
ers, it seems doubtful that the prospect of a response by TURN will oper­
ate as a significant deterrent factor. As Justice Rehnquist points out, 
TURN is free to express its views in other forums, as it has in the past, 
which is just as likely to prompt a response by the utility. Unlike cases in 
which the proximity of opposing views makes a response more compel­
ling, proximity seems unlikely to play a role in the utility's 
decisionmaking. 
The only other forced expression concern raised in Pacific Gas & 
Electric is found in Justice Powell's belief that the utility will feel com­
pelled to respond to TURN when it would prefer to remain silent. In 
previous cases, such an effect was seen as threatening the individual's 
right to develop one's own personality, even if it was a silent one, free of 
outside interference. What is doubtful in Pacific Gas & Electric is that 
the utility would realistically prefer silence. As a regulated utility, many 
of whose policies are established or approved by government bodies, 
PG&E has little incentive to remain silent when its interests are at stake. 
In this respect, to the extent that there is a publicly held corporate per­
sonality, it is not a personality that is as individualized as its human 
counterparts. Whatever motivates private individuals to prefer silence­
shyness, inarticulateness, preferring to be private persons, uncertainty 
about their views-seems unlikely to influence the behavior of a large, 
publicly held, and highly regulated corporate entity. Without taking Jus­
tice Rehnquist's extreme view that corporations are not protected from 
being forced to speak, in the circumstances of this case there is little real­
istic likelihood of such an impact on PG&E's first amendment right to 
remain silent. 
When examined closely, the Pacific Gas & Electric fact pattern 
raises few of the concerns that were implicated in Barnette, or even in 
Wooley. The most serious first amendment consequence, depriving 
PG&E of the use of the surplus space for four months out of the year, 
directly involves the utility's right to speak and not its right to refrain 
from speech or association.331 
Despite the Court's efforts to treat Pacific Gas & Electric as a proto­
typical compelled expression case, in truth the circnmstances of the case 
331. Any possibility of a forced association claim seems eliminated by the disclaimer contained 
on TURN's communications and the fact that TURN is not granted space in PG&E's own newslet­
ter. The only association between the utility and TURN is the fact that TURN's newsletter shares 
physical space with communications from the utility contained in the envelope enclosing the utility 
bill. This physical proximity bears no relationship to the forced association of the nonunion em­
ployee forced to pay union dues or the male members of the Jaycees forced to admit women to 
membership in their organization. 
901 
Texas Law Review Vol. 64:817, 1986 
share few of the philosophical underpinnings of past compulsion cases. 
Although the Court's focus on values is to be applauded, it has failed to 
appreciate the important distinctions between Barnette with its concern 
for intellectual individualism, and the plight of a utility forced to share 
its billing envelope with its opposition. 
IX. A Suggested Two-Tiered Analysis 
It is clear that the Supreme Court's approach to the first amend­
ment problem of compelled expression and association is neither consis­
tent nor adequate. The varying first amendment interests at stake in the 
different factual situations encountered within this general problem area 
are not appropriately considered. 
A. The Analytic Framework 
This Article suggests a possible analytic technique· for deciding such 
cases that would avoid at least some of the pitfalls that the Court has 
encountered. As its first principle, this technique requires considering 
the nature and extent of the first amendment infringement that has oc­
curred as a factor in the resolution of the case. All invasions of the right 
, to be free from government-compelled expression and association are not 
equally serious under this approach: an effort is made to separate those 
cases in which the level of compulsion is sufficiently serious to involve 
the first amendment interest in intellectual individualism that concerned 
Justice Jackson in his Barnette opinion. The cases falling into this first 
category are those in which government compulsion creates a serious risk 
of forced conformity to government-favored ideas. 
A second group of cases, although rising to the level of a first 
amendment invasion, involve a less worrisome form of invasion. Here, 
the individual is not alleging that the degree of government intrusion 
chills the enthusiasm for expressing contrary ideas or seriously com­
promises individual identity. Instead, the individual typically complains 
of interference with the freedom to be one's own person unfettered by 
government constraint. In such cases, the government should be permit­
ted to support its action with a lesser level of justification. 
Dividing compelled expression and association cases into two tracks 
seems justified in light of this Article's detailed evaluation, based on cases 
the Supreme Court has decided, of how seriously first amendment values 
are affected. The cases demonstrate a range of different impacts, not all 
serious to the same degree. The kind of division suggested, moreover, is 
hardly unusual in first amendment analysis-the Court already distin­
guishes between categories of speech, protecting some more than others 
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based on the unique characteristics of different varieties of speech.332 
And, when confronted with a claim of government prohibition of speech, 
the Court customarily distinguishes between direct government censor­
ship of speech that suppresses an idea (content-based cases) and govern­
ment restraint that is incidental to some purpose other than the desire to 
suppress an idea (content-neutral cases).333 In content-neutral restraint 
cases, the Court requires a lesser level of governmental justification based 
on its view that such restraints present fewer threats to basic first amend­
ment values.334 Although a parallel two-tiered analysis for compulsion 
cases is not surprising, the Court has failed to distinguish between these 
two types of cases in its earlier encounters with compelled expression. 
1. First-Tier Cases.-If the government directly requires individu­
als to engage in speech against their will or requires that individuals be­
come more than nominal members of an organization, the case would be 
viewed as the most serious interference with fust amendment values. In 
such cases, having identified the government's action as a direct compul­
sion, the inquiry would shift to the government's asserted justification 
and choice of means. That justification should then be subjected to strict 
scrutiny. If the government's purpose is to encourage a particular idea or 
further a particular cause or association, that goal would be inadequate 
332. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 743 n.18 (1978) (Stevens, J., concurring) 
("A requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its primary effect on the form, rather 
than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if any, thoughts that cannot be ex­
pressed by the use of less offensive language."); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens 
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976) ("[G]reater objectivity and hardiness of 
commercial speech ... may make it less necessary to tolerate inaccurate statements ...."); Chaplin­
sky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (stating that there are certain narrowly limited 
classes of speech that may be constitutionally subject to punishment); see also Schauer, Categories 
and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 V AND. L. REv. 265 (1981) (discussing categori­
zation in free speech analysis). 
333. Compare Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (striking down a state university ban on 
the use of school facilities for religious meetings because the content-based exclusion was not justi­
fied by a sufficiently compelling government interest as required by strict scrntiny review) with Hef­
fron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (upholding a 
content-neutral rule restricting distribution of literature at a state fair to a rented booth as justified 
by the state's siguificant interest in crowd control). For a thorough exploration of the Supreme 
Court's use of the content-based/content-neutral distinction, see Stone, Content Regulation and the 
First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 189 (1983). 
334. The Court's standard of review in content-neutral cases has been described as "an essen­
tially open-ended form of balancing." Stone, supra note 333, at 190. In one major category of 
content-neutral regulation-restrictions classified as time, place, and manner restraints-the test 
employed by the Supreme Court asks whether the regulations "are content-neutral, are narrowly 
tailored to serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication." Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). The 
Court's characterization of content-neutral time, place, and manner restraints as presenting a lesser 
threat to first amendment values and its use of a lower-level of scrutiny for regulations of this type 
has been viewed with approval. See Farber & Nowak, 17ze Misleading Nature of Public Forum 
Analysis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REv. 1219, 1237 (1984). 
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to justify direct interference. If the government's purpose is unrelated to 
a desire to further speech, then the question becomes whether the pur­
pose is a compelling one and whether the choice of means is necessary to 
accomplish that compelling end. Such strict scrutiny is merited because 
of the seriousness of the invaded interest in terms of the impact on values 
protected by the first amendment. 
2. Second-Tier Cases.-lf compelled behavior is exacted by the 
government, but the nature of the compelled behavior is-instead of 
speech or membership--some lesser association with an idea or an organ­
ization, a lower level of scrutiny should be applied in order to judge con­
stitutionality. These indirect or incidental associations with ideas are 
forms of compelled behavior; they involve, however, a lesser impact on 
individual conscience and are less likely to discourage the individual 
from expressing contrary ideas. Because such incidental coercive meas­
ures involve a less serious challenge to first amendment values, the lower­
level of scrutiny is justified. Just as in fust-tier cases, despite the lower­
level standard of review, a court should be hostile to government efforts 
to justify the use of compulsion as a means of spreading a particular 
government-sponsored message or coercing adherence to a government­
favored idea.335 As long as the government action is not motivated by 
such a suspect purpose, the court should uphold a law if it found that: 
(1) the government's purpose was both nonsuspect and substantial; (2) 
the law directly advanced the asserted government purpose; and (3) the 
law was no more extensive than necessary to serve that purpose. 
B. Applying the Two-Tier Approach 
1. Barnette Revisited.-Under this two-tiered analysis, Barnette is 
clearly a first-tier case. The governmental interference is direct: school­
children were required to recite the words of the pledge and salute the 
flag. Because the invasion of first amendment interests is direct, compel­
ling speech itself, strict scrutiny review is mandated. The next inquiry 
focuses on the government's purpose for requiring the flag salute. In 
Barnette, the government's purpose was its desire to encourage patriot­
ism.336 Because this purpose is simply an attempt to spread a govern­
ment-favored idea, such a justification is not adequate to excuse a direct 
compulsion of speech. Although the government's motive may be per­
335. See supra notes 130-34 and accompanying text. 
336. West Va. State Bd. ofEduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 626 n.2 (1943) (noting that the West 
Virginia Board of Education resolution adopting the mandatory flag salute described the American 
flag as the symbol of national unity and the purpose of the mandatory flag salute as promoting 
national unity). 
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missible, the means used are not acceptable. Alternative means exist to 
achieve such an end that do not interfere to the same extent with first 
amendment interests. 
Applied in a case like Barnette, this analysis parallels cases of con­
tent-based censorship, in which the government desires to suppress a dis­
favored idea and does so by directly forbidding its utterance. Such a 
motive is at odds with basic first amendment values. Therefore, such an 
impermissible motivation will lead to the virtually automatic invalidity of 
the law,337 unless the speech involved is entirely unprotected by the first 
amendment or receives only some lower level of protection.338 By com­
parison, when the government attempts to spread an idea instead of sup­
pressing one, no clear rule of invalidity currently exists. 339 Instead, 
limitations on government-fostered speech have focused on the narrower 
question of the appropriateness of the means employed, and the Court 
has held impermissible only those means that compel allegiance to an 
idea and deprive an individual of the ability to refuse to cooperate with 
the government's efforts. 340 To permit such government action wonld 
337. See, e.g., Board ofEduc. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 870-72 (1982) (plurality opinion) (remand­
ing district court summary judgment that held the removal of anti-American books from a school 
library did not violate first amendment); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 
530, 536 (1980) (striking down order of public utility commission prohibiting utility bill inserts that 
discussed controversial issues of public policy). 
338. Content-based regulations are viewed with less hostility when the speech singled out is not 
entitled to the full protection of the first amendment. For speech deserving no protection, the gov­
ernment's justification for content-based censorship usually is directed at the same harmful qualities 
attributed to the speech that led the Court to consider the speech outside of the protection of the first 
amendment. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982) (concluding that "a con­
tent-based classification of speech has been accepted because ... the evil [of child pornography] so 
overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests"). When the government is regulating a category 
of speech receiving reduced first amendment protection, the Court has been less hostile to content­
based regulations that are reasonable in light of the special nature of the speech subject to the regula­
tion. See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978) (commercial speech); Young v. 
American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (sexually explicit speech). 
339. Government efforts to disseminate an idea are described generally under the heading of 
government speech. See supra note 134. Although commentators have argued that first amendment 
limits on government participation as a speaker in the marketplace of ideas are appropriate, e.g., 
YuooF, supra note 134, at 260-61; Kamenshine, supra note 134, at 1105-06, courts have followed 
their lead only when the government is engaging in partisan political activities, and then only by 
relying on nonconstitutional grounds for decision. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Boston, 376 Mass. 
178, 198, 380 N.E.2d 628, 641 (municipality lacks authority to spend funds to influence referendum 
results), appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 1060 (1979); Stern v. Kramarsky, 84 Misc. 2d 447, 453, 375 
N.Y.S.2d 235, 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.) (state agency lacks authority to campaign for passage ofproposed 
amendment to state constitution); see also Ziegler, Government Speech and the Constitution: The 
Limits of Official Partisanship, 21 B.C.L. REv. 578 (1980) (analyzing the statutory and constitu­
tional restraints on governmental partisanship); Note, The Constitutionality ofMunicipal Advocacy 
in Statewide Referendum Campaigns, 93 HARV. L. REV. 535 (1980) (critiquing the current mode of 
analysis used to adjudicate municipal referendum advocacy). 
340. This hostility to compelled expression motivated by the government's desire to spread an 
idea is obvious in the Court's decision in Barnette, 319 U.S. at 641. A similar hostility appeared in 
Wooley when the Court summarily rejected a state justification that was not considered to be view­
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work a two-fold distortion of the marketplace of ideas: one distortion 
occurs because the government-compelled idea is artificially elevated in 
prominence above others by gaining the advantage of citizen advocates 
who are compelled to express the idea; the second distortion occurs be­
cause some individuals who might otherwise express a differing view­
point may be discouraged from doing so as a result of the government 
compulsion. 
2. The Loyalty Oath Cases.-A second example of direct interfer­
ence with the freedom from compelled expression and association is 
found in the loyalty oath cases. 341 Individuals are compelled to speak 
against their will by reciting a loyalty oath or affixing their signatures to 
a form; the government's asserted purpose is assuring that persons it em­
ploys and entrusts with carrying out policies are loyal to their govern­
ment employer and will endeavor to execute their duties by lawful 
means.342 
Unlike Barnette, in the loyalty oath cases the government's domi­
nant purpose is not a desire to encourage a government-favored idea­
acting within the law-but instead to test an individual's preexisting be­
lief in such an idea, an admittedly subtle distinction. Because the govern­
ment's purpose is not the suspect one of spreading a government­
approved idea, the compelled speech should not be immediately con­
demned as inappropriate in terms of first amendment values. There is 
nothing impermissible about the government's desire to assure belief in 
the law on the part of its employees. Moreover, far from being impermis­
sible, such a goal satisfies the compelling government purpose require­
ment of strict scrutiny review.343 The outcome of the case therefore 
turns on the fit between means and ends. The question to be asked is 
whether use of a compelled loyalty oath is necessary to assure that gov­
ernment employees respect the law and are loyal to their employer. 
One way of resolving this question is to focus on the existence of 
available alternative methods for assuring the loyalty of employees with­
out so directly intruding on interests protected by the first amendment. 
It may well be that by concentrating on job qualifications, by interview­
ing prospective applicants to discern attitudes, and by checking refer-
point neutral. Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 716 (1977); see infra text accompanying notes 345­
47. 
341. For a discussion of the loyalty oath cases, see supra Part III. 
342. Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 682 (1972). 
343. See, e.g., Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-51 (1983) (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 
371, 373 (1882) (noting the government's legitimate purpose in "promot[ing] efficiency and integrity 
in the discharge of official duties, and [in] maintain[ing] proper discipline in the public service")). 
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ences of potential employees, the government will be better able to assure 
loyalty among its employees than by the use of a loyalty oath. The dan­
ger of using a loyalty oath for this purpose is that the least law-abiding 
employees are more likely to be willing to recite the oath and risk perjur­
ing themselves in order to infiltrate government. Thus, the technique 
may be ineffective for avoiding the danger of disloyal employees and yet 
appear sufficiently intrusive to persons who would make excellent em­
ployees to discourage them from working for the government. 
3. Second-Tier Cases: Wooley, Abood, PruneYard, and Pacific 
Gas & Electric.-Many of the subsequent coercion cases fall into the 
second tier and merit a lower level of judicial scrutiny. For example, in 
Wooley v. Maynard,344 the behavior coerced-displaying the state motto 
on the Maynards' license plate-was an incidental restraint on freedom 
from coerced expression. Because the Maynards' involvement with the 
state motto was something less than coerced speaking of the motto, and 
because the association between the Maynards and the motto was not 
one that would make the world believe the Maynards were advocates of 
the state's "Live Free or Die" message, lower-level scrutiny is justified. 
A court's focus for similar fact situations should begin with the govern­
ment's purpose behind requiring citizens to bear the state message. 
In Wooley, the Court identified two government purposes. 345 One 
was the state's desire to spread the state's motto and communicate "an 
official view as to proper appreciation of history, state pride, and individ­
ualism";346 the second was the need for easy identification of properly 
licensed vehicles. The first purpose, because it involved the desire to 
spread a particular viewpoint, was not sufficient to justify the compelled 
behavior, just as such a purpose was not sufficient to justify the use of 
compulsion in Barnette. The second purpose, even if assumed to be sub­
stantial, as required by lower-level review, would require a focus on the 
fit between means and ends. The suggestion of the Court's opinion in 
Wooley was that the means were more extensive than necessary because a 
state's license plates can be made easily identifiable without the presence 
of a motto. 347 
A similar analysis would also apply to facts like those presented in 
Abood v. Detroit Board ofEducation.348 In that case, indirect coercion 
existed in the form of forced payment of union dues. That degree of 
344. 430 U.S. 705 (1977), discussed supra Part IV. 
345. 430 U.S. at 716. 
346. /d. 
347. /d. at 716-17. 
348. 431 U.S. 209 (1977), discussed supra Part V. 
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compelled participation is clearly less than speech itself or compelled ac­
tive participation in an organization. In addition, the government's pur­
pose was to promote labor peace and to avoid the free-rider effect, and 
not any desire to promote a particular union message. 349 These articu­
lated purposes were easily viewed as important to the system of labor 
relations. Just as in New Hampshire's effort to justify the state motto 
with the need for vehicle identification, the critical question for Abood 
becomes the fit between means and ends. 350 
A third case falling within the second tier is PruneYard Shopping 
Center v. Robins,351 in which the forced association was indirect. The 
center's owner was not forced to engage in speech but had to make the 
shopping center property available as a forum for the expression of the 
ideas of others. The government's purpose for compelling access to the 
shopping center property was the state's desire to promote the market­
place of ideas, a value protected by the California Constitution's free 
speech provision. 352 Government efforts to provide access to a forum for 
expression are generally viewed as involving a substantial government 
purpose, although there are significant limits on the means that can be 
used to achieve this end. 353 
Assuming the propriety of compelled access, the question becomes 
the traditional one of whether there was a direct fit between means and 
349. 431 U.S. at 220-23. 
350. Because the analysis of whether such a fit is direct and the requirement no more extensive 
than necessary involves difficult questions of labor policy and union management, that analysis will 
not be attempted here. It was the Supreme Court's view in Abood that adequate justification existed 
for imposing the costs of union collective bargaining activities on nonunion employees, id. at 222, 
but that there was no similar reason to make nonunion members pay for the union's political activi­
ties. Id. at 235. 
351. 447 U.S. 74 (1980), discussed supra Part VI. 
352. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 908-11, 592 P.2d 341, 346-48, 153 
Cal. Rptr. 854, 859-60 (1979) (interpreting CAL. CoNST., art. I, § 2). 
353. Prior to its decision in Pacific Gas & Electric, the Court had already recognized significant 
limits on access grants. For example, the government cannot usually open up a forum for expres­
sion and exclude speech that advocates a particular point of view. E.g., Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 
U.S. 853, 871 (1982) (Brennan, J.) (plurality opinion). Even subject-matter restraints are stricdy 
scrutinized. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276 (1981) ("requir[ing] the most exacting 
scrutiny in cases in which a State undertakes to regulate speech on the basis of its context" and 
applying that scrutiny to a state university regulation that prohibited the use of school grounds for 
religious worship or teaching); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 544 
(1980) (inclusion by public utility of controversial, political statements in monthly billing envelopes 
is neither "a permissible subject-matter regulation[] nor a narrowly drawn prohibition justified by a 
compelling state interest"); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98-99 (1972) (explaining that "justi­
fications for selective exclusions from a public forum must be carefully scrutinized" and, because 
"picketing plainly involves expressive conduct within the protection of the First Amendment, ... 
discrimination among pickets must be tailored to serve a substantial governmental interest."). Addi­
tionally, government efforts to equalize access to a forum by potential speakers with disproportion­
ate assets have been viewed as violative of basic first amendment principles. E.g., First Nat'! Bank v. 
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam). 
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ends. Provision of access to the shopping center property clearly satis­
fied that test. Because large numbers of persons can be easily and 
cheaply encountered for first amendment purposes, such as distributing 
leaflets and collecting signatures for petitions in a shopping center, mak­
ing this forum available significantly contributed to the purpose of open­
ing up a forum for expression. 354 In addition, because property owners 
were permitted to create reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions 
on access to their property,355 the access requirement was no more exten­
sive than was necessary to further the government's substantial interest. 
The most recent compelled expression case, Pacific Gas & Elec­
tric,356 also is classified as an indirect compulsion case. Like the other 
second-tier cases, the behavior compelled is less than the direct expres­
sion of an idea by the utility. Just as in Prune Yard, the utility was forced 
to lend its property for the expression of the ideas of others. The connec­
tion between the utility and the ideas expressed by TURN was an indi­
rect one especially in light of the disclaimer contained in TURN's 
communication.357 The state's purposes for compelling access to the bill­
ing envelopes were twofold: fair utility regulation and, as in Prune Yard, 
promoting the marketplace of ideas.358 While these purposes are easily 
viewed as substantial, the CPUC order fails to satisfy the means compo­
nent of second-tier scrutiny. As Justice Powell's opinion recognizes, ef­
fective utility ratemaking can be promoted more directly by a variety of 
other means that avoid the intrusion on Pacific's first amendment rights 
resulting from the access order. The second purpose provides even less 
justification for the choice of means. The state has chosen to advance a 
favored viewpoint by giving that viewpoint access to private property in a 
way that imposes a burden on the expression of the property owner. 
Such means are an impermissible method of promoting the state's inter­
est in encouraging the exchange of views about utility regulation. 359 
354. The modern-day importance of shopping center property as a forum for expression was 
recognized by the Supreme Court in Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan 
Valley Plaza, Inc. 391 U.S. 308, 324-25 (1968). Although the Court subsequently overruled Logan 
Valley, it did so on the ground that state action conld not be found under the public function theory 
by analogizing between the central business district of a city and a shopping center, not because 
shopping centers were viewed as insignificant forums for expression. Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 
507, 518, 520-21 (1976). 
355. Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899, 910-ll, 592 P.2d 341, 347-48, 153 
Cal. Rptr. 854, 860-61 (1979), aff'd sub nom. Prune Yard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 
(1980). 
356. 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986). For a discussion of the Pacific Gas & Electric case, see supra Part 
VIII. 
357. 106 S. Ct. at 907. 
358. /d. at 913-14. 
359. See, e.g., First Nat'! Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-92 & n.31 (1978) ("Government is 
forbidden to assume the task of ultimate judgment, lest the people lose their ability to govern them­
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Thus, the commission's order is unconsitutional under the second tier 
analysis. 
4. The Difficult Cases: Roberts and Knight.-Although the ma­
jority of the compelled expression cases fall relatively easily into either 
tier one or two for purposes of analysis, two of the three cases decided 
during the 1983 Tenn depart from this pattern of easy characterization. 
The lone exception is Ellis v. Brotherhood ofRailway, Airline & Steam­
ship Clerks,360 which follows closely in the footsteps ofAbood. The chal­
lenge to union use of the agency fee in that case can easily be seen as a 
government action having only an incidental effect on speech. As in 
Abood, the outcome turns on the fit between the means (using fee money 
for certain purposes) and the end (eliminating free riders and achieving 
labor peace). 
In contrast, Roberts v. United States Jaycees 361 can be placed in 
either tier depending on one's perspective. Being compelled to admit wo­
men to membership is something less than speech itself; moreover, no 
one was forced to join the Jaycees against their will. This formal analysis 
could lead one to conclude that the compelled act amounted to an indi­
rect compulsion and no more. 
Moving beyond form and focusing on substance, however, yields a 
different result. Although the compelled behavior was not speech as 
such, it could be viewed as symbolic expression.362 Requiring the 
Jaycees to communicate their approval of becoming a mixed-gender or­
ganization could easily be viewed as a direct compulsion, linking the or­
ganization with a new message, one not chosen voluntarily. In addition, 
being compelled to accept new members might be, from the organiza­
tion's point of view, an interference with associational freedom as severe 
as forcing an individual to join an organization. 
If the effects were classified as direct compulsion, strict scrutiny re­
view would be applied, but such scrutiny is not inevitably "fatal in 
selves."); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48-49 (1976) (per curiam) ("[T]he concept that government 
may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in order to enhance the relative voice of 
others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment ...."). 
360. 466 U.S. 435 (1984), discussed supra text accompanying notes 208-25. 
361. 468 U.S. 609 (1984), discussed supra text accompanying notes 226-54. 
362. The possibility of classifYing compelled behavior as symbolic expression was first suggested 
by Justice Jackson in Barnette when describing the mandatory flag salute. See supra text accompa­
nying note 22. Although the compelled act of admitting women to membership in the Jaycees is not 
a universal symbol on the order of the flag salute, the act of admitting women might "be understood 
by the viewer to be communicative" of approval of women members joining the organization. Clark 
v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 294 (1984) (prohibiting camping in Wash­
ington D.C. parks does not violate the first amendment even though the symbolic expression of 
camping is designed to highlight the problem of the homeless). 
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fact."363 The government purpose was not spreading the idea of equal 
treatment for women, but, instead, eliminating discrimination against 
women by places ofpublic accommodation as a social policy objective. 364 
The government's target was discriminatory behavior itself and not the 
communication of the idea of equal treatment as a social good. Of 
course, it should be noted that spreading this idea was an incidental bene­
fit consistent with the government's primary purpose in altering the 
membership policies of the Jaycees. Under strict scrutiny review, the 
government's purpose of eliminating gender discrimination was a com­
pelling one. 365 Thus, the only question that remained concerned the ne­
cessity of the chosen means. In similar situations, the Court has shown 
deference to legislative judgments about the necessity of means adopted 
to eradicate discrimination. 366 Given a similar deference, the application 
of the state's human rights law to the membership policies of the Jaycees 
could survive strict scrutiny review. 
Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight 367 also re­
quires some effort to categorize accurately. In Knight, faculty members 
at the Minnesota community colleges were forced to join an organization 
that functioned as their exclusive bargaining agent if they wished to serve 
on the meet-and-confer committees that served as the formal mechanism 
for discussions of academic policy on nonbargaining subjects with the 
administration of the community colleges. Organization membership 
was unnecessary if faculty members were willing to sacrifice the opportu­
nity to participate in the meet-and-confer process. 
Although faculty members were not compelled to join the organiza­
tion under a direct state order, this does not relegate the Knight facts to 
the second tier. The fact that the government used the device of a condi­
tion, instead of a direct mandate, does not change the character of the act 
that the government strongly encouraged. By imposing this requirement, 
the government compelled actual and active membership in an organiza­
tion as a precondition to participation in the formal process for discuss­
363. Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search ofEvolving Doctrine on a 
Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REv. I, 8 (1972). 
364. See supra note 232. 
365. /d. 
366. Cf. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591-92, 595-96 (1983) (upholding IRS 
ruling that private schools with racially discriminatory admissions policies are not entitled to tax­
exempt status as a means of discouraging racial discrimination); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313, 
318-20 (1977) (per curiam) (upholding congressional effort in § 215 of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 415 (1970 and Supp. V), to redress past economic discrimination against women); Heart of 
Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 259-61 (1964) (upholding public accommoda­
tions provisions of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241, 243-46 (codified at 
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-6 (1964)), and, by implication, similar state statutes). 
367. 465 U.S. 271 (1984), discussed supra text accompanying notes 255-76. 
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ing academic policy. Because faculty members could choose whether to 
belong to the association, the critical question in Knight was whether any 
kind of compulsion existed. 368 The troubling issue in the case was not 
whether the compelled association was direct or indirect. If one dis­
counts the mitigating effects of imposing a condition rather than an or­
der, and views the choice given faculty members as only theoretical, then 
the "compelled" act directly interfered with the freedom from compelled 
expression and association. 
Under this approach, Knight would be classified as a direct compul­
sion case; therefore, the government's burden to justify this compulsion 
as a legitimate extension of the exclusive representation system of labor 
relations would be heavier than was the case in Abood and Ellis. That 
heavier burden would require some more exact showing of the need for 
organization membership as a requirement for meet-and-confer commit­
tee participation. Nothing in the Knight record satisfies this required 
evidentiary showing. The justification for the Minnesota requirement 
was described in terms of guaranteeing that the government employer 
hears only one version of the views of its employees so that reaching an 
agreement on academic policy matters would be facilitated.369 Under 
strict scrutiny review, a more specific showing of the necessity for this 
requirement would be required for it to survive a constitutional chal­
lenge. Such a showing could probably not be satisfied, and the law 
should consequently be declared to be unconstitutional. 370 
The suggested two-track standard of review does not make resolu­
tion of the compelled expression and association cases easy. Neverthe­
less, the suggested test at the least begins to focus attention on the fact 
that all cases in which the government is guilty of compulsion do not 
involve the same degree of threat to first amendment interests. More­
over, unlike the Supreme Court's current approach, the proposal ad­
vanced brings this area of first amendment doctrine into the mainstream 
of contemporary first amendment analysis. 
X. Conclusion 
Written in the midst of a turbulent period for first amendment juris­
prudence, Justice Jackson's pronouncements in Barnette appealed to 
368. This question produced a serious disagreement between Justices O'Connor and Brennan in 
Knight. Compare 465 U.S. at 271 (O'Connor, J.) ("[T]hey are not required to become members of 
MCCFA.'') with id. at 298-99 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Minnesota has put direct pressure on non­
union faculty members to join MCCFA."). 
369. Id. at 291-92. 
370. A similar skepticism about the validity of the state's interest in imposing the membership 
requirement is expressed in Farber & Nowak, supra note 334, at 1259. 
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high-sounding principles, but actually reflected an effort to walk a nar­
row decisional path avoiding the freedom of religion pitfalls that had 
previously divided the Court. 
In the period after Barnette, the decision was relied upon often, but 
no further attempts were made to refine or comprehend the values that 
were at the heart of the opinion. Justice Jackson had stressed two ideals: 
first, freedom from government-compelled ideas as a necessary precondi­
tion for avoiding forced conformity and the costs it would impose on 
society, and second, protection of the individual right to be one's own 
person, a freedom essential to the ideal of tolerance in a democratic na­
tion. Later decisions did not consciously root themselves in these values. 
Instead, Barnette was applied through a process of factual analogy with­
out any attempt to understand what was really at stake. 
Perhaps unintentionally, the Barnette doctrine was extended some­
what beyond its original concerns in Wooley. In that case, an unconsid­
ered and unenunciated extension of Barnette took place, and personality 
rather than political conformity became the preeminent concern. Subse­
quent cases reflect an effort to draw a line somewhere, but, again, this 
effort was effectuated more by seeing factual differences than by making 
principled distinctions. In Abood, the line was drawn between permissi­
ble compelled financing of collective bargaining activities and impermis­
sible forced funding of union political activities. In PruneYard, the 
Court looked to the source of the compelled message, the opportunity to 
disavow, and whether the message would be assumed to reflect the views 
of the provider of the forum. Although these distinctions could explain 
the results of the particular cases, they have little relevance to the first 
amendment values central to the Barnette decision. 
Ironically, the two situations that involved problems closely similar 
to those that Justice Jackson addressed in Barnette were disposed of by 
the Court with perfunctory attention to potential first amendment diffi­
culties. In Abood, the constitutionality of the agency shop and the use of 
the agency fee for collective bargaining purposes was easily justified as 
applied to public employees; in Knight, restricting participation in the 
meet-and-confer sessions to association members was upheld with little 
concern for the rights of faculty members who did not wish to join the 
association. 
For the first time since Barnette, the Court seriously considered the 
values underlying the compelled-expression doctrine in Pacific Gas & 
Electric. It is too early to tell whether subsequent cases will continue to 
address these basic questions, or whether the Court will revert to its 
practice of looking more at facts than exploring values. As a cautionary 
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note, the Court's willingness to look askance at the Commission's order 
in Pacific Gas & Electric, but to find no first amendment fault in Roberts 
and Knight raises additional questions about the level of doctrinal consis­
tency the Court will achieve in future cases. 
The area of compelled expression and association is ripe for rethink­
ing. One alternative to the current haphazard analysis employed by the 
Supreme Court is the use of the two-tiered method of analysis suggested 
above. Whether this or some other solution to the problem is chosen, it 
is clear that rational evolution of the doctrine is possible only if an at­
tempt is made to understand the cases in terms of specific values being 
protected. Clear boundaries for the scope of the values being protected 
can be presented, and articulated choices must be made. Otherwise, the 
Supreme Court and the lower courts as well may continue to drift from 
case to case without any clear touchstones to provide a foundation for 
analytic development. 
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